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Euroflections is an academic report on the European elections 2019. With 
Euroflections we want to provide the public with interesting reflections on 
the election campaigns and their main actors, namely the voters, the parties 
and the media. In total, more than 70 experts in political science and political 
communication representing almost every EU country offer insightful analyses 
of campaign developments and electoral outcomes. Some contributions are 
one-country studies, while others are written from comparative or thematic 
perspectives.
Euroflections is intended to fill a gap in European elections reporting and 
research. The report is not as fast as news media analyses and social media 
comments published immediately when the electoral outcome is known. On 
the other hand, these texts are produced much faster than standard academic 
works. The basic idea of Euroflections is thus to combine the best of speed and 
smartness. Whether we achieve this difficult goal or not is finally up to our 
readers to find out.
Euroflections is based on a concept we first developed during the Swedish 
National Elections 2018. We were also deeply inspired by previous productions 
from UK scholars from Bournemouth University who have produced similar 
reports on UK and US elections. We would like to thank them and all other col-
leagues who made this fascinating project possible by delivering their brilliant 
thoughts on European Elections 2019 just in time. We also like to express our 
gratitude to Mid Sweden University for funding this project. 
Finally, we are still a bit concerned about using the word Euroflections as 
we are non-native English speakers and did not find the term in any available 
dictionaries. However, we have started to get used to it, and in fact it sounds 
‘better’ for every time we use it.
Sundsvall, Sweden in June 2019
The Editors
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More like 28 national elections  
than one European election
Niklas Bolin




Migration, Brexit and Trump. There is no doubt that recent 
years have been extremely turbulent and challenging for the 
European Union. Consequently, the European election cam-
paign context in 2019 was very different from the previous 
one five years ago.
In the fall of 2015 the huge migration flows from the Midd-
le East and Africa to Europe took many EU leaders by great 
surprise, and showed that hitherto commonly agreed princip-
les to handle such situation were not possible to implement. 
Member states were deeply split on effective immigration po-
licies, and the polarized positions on this issue have remained 
as an important political controversy within the union. 
Then followed Brexit. What few in Europe believed could 
happen actually happened. After the UK referendum in June 
2016, Britain decided to leave the European Union. As one of 
the most important member states and net economic contri-
butors to the union, Britain’s decision will have a huge impact 
on EU affairs in the forthcoming years. It is also important to 
note that the Brexit process and the chaos that followed this 
decision appears to have silenced EU skeptical parties in other 
member states, at least when it comes to the debate about 
remaining in the union or not.
The third surprise was Donald Trump. His unexpected 
victory in the US presidential election in November 2016 
caused new tensions between EU and the US. The ‘America 
first’-vision of Trump resulted in foreign policy shifts and 
new international trade actions that are definitely not in the 
interests of the European Union.
However, it seems like these surprising and dramatic 
events have had limited influence on the political agenda 
when EU citizens were asked to name their priority political 
issues a few months before the European Elections 2019 (see 
Figure 1). In the very beginning of the campaign, the highest 
ranked issues among voters were economy and growth, and 
the fight against youth unemployment. Climate change was 
also ranked higher than in previous surveys, while immigra-
tion was ranked lower than before. EU as a political organi-
zation may be perceived as weaker and more divided than 
before, but EU citizens still believe the union is able to play 
an important role in improving economic conditions and 
handling urgent transnational issues.
The Eurobarometer in Spring 2019 also showed that 68 per 
cent of EU citizens believe that EU membership is good for 
member states, and 61 per cent say that membership is a good 
for their own country. This figure has not been as high since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist 
bloc in Eastern Europe in 1989.
A narrow majority of EU citizens also voted in the Euro-
pean elections 2019 (see Figure 2). Voter turnout increased 
in 20 of the 28 member states. The common wisdom that 
EU citizens think there is ‘less at stake’ in EP elections may 
be false. On the contrary, it is plausible to believe that more 
Introduction
Kajsa Falasca





Figure 1. Top Campaign Issues, 2018 and 2019 
(% of EU citizens giving priority to the issue)
The question asked was: ”Which of the following themes should be 
discussed as a matter of priority during the electoral campaign for the 
next European Parliament elections? Firstly? And then? (Max. 4 an-
swers). Source: Eurobarometer 90.1 (Sept-Oct 2018) and Eurobarometer 
91.1 (Feb-March 2019).
Protection of personal data
Security and defence policy
Protection of external borders
Consumer protection and food safety
The way the EU should be working in the future
Promoting human rights and democracy
Social protection of EU citizens
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voters than before – and particularly younger generations 
–  share the opinion that important political issues do not 
recognize national borders and need to be addressed on the 
international level. The significant average increase in voter 
turnout in EU28 was definitely a success, even if figures are 
still modest compared to most national elections on the Euro-
pean continent.
At the same time, the higher level of political participation 
and voter interest in EU issues probably need to be interpre-
ted cautiously. In fact, many European elections campaigns 
in 2019 were highly influenced by domestic political agendas 
and existing conflict dimensions on the national level. Mobili-
zation of voters for the European election was therefore often 
based on arguments not relevant for EU political affairs, and 
more associated with the national political agenda. Against 
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this background, votes in the European elections may be 
basically perceived as reflections of current national public 
opinion.
In terms of the party political landscape, much of the 
pre-election speculations dealt with assessments about how 
much ground Eurosceptic forces would gain at the expense 
of the old dominant pro-European party groups. Both of the 
biggest groups EPP and S&D were predicted to lose. Similar-
ly, many expected the election to be a continued surge of 
the Eurosceptic populists. The result, indeed, reasserted the 
prognosis (see Figure 3). However, while the general picture is 
in line with expectations, we do not need to dig deep before a 
slightly different picture emerges. A look beneath the aggre-
gated numbers reveal quite a number of exceptions from the 
overall trend.
While the EPP and S&D lost quite heavily, both groups 
include winners. Fidesz led by the controversial Hungarian 
Prime Minster Viktor Orban, and at the time of the election 
a suspended member of EPP, was one of only two parties (the 
other one was the Malta Labour Party) that managed to win 
more than a majority of its country’s votes. Despite turbu-
lence at the domestic arena the Austrian ÖVP also gained 
electoral support. A third example of a successful member of 
the EPP is the resurgence of the once dominant Greek New 
Democracy.
In Spain the socialist PSOE, reinforced by its recent domes-
tic electoral success, did exceptionally well. The Dutch coun-
terpart PvdA, one of often cited examples of the general social 
democratic decline in Europe, surprised many and became 
the country’s biggest party.
In total, Eurosceptic populists, made marked gains. In Italy, 
Lega became the biggest party. In France Le Pen’s National 
Rally managed to beat Macron’s Renaissance and in Britain 
the newly formed Brexit Party at the helm of Nigel Farage, 
won more than one in four votes, just to name a few examp-
les. However, at the same time, the left-wing radical parties of 
the GUE/NGL group are among the biggest losers. In the wake 
of the Eurozone crisis, parties like the Spanish Podemos, the 
German Die Linke and the Greek Syriza made an impact in 
the polls in 2014. After the 2019 election they find themselves 
being the smallest group. Also among the right-wing populists 
there are important instances going against the overall trend. 
Wilder’s Freedom party loss all their Dutch seats and the Da-
nish People’s Party lost three out of five votes becoming only 
the fourth biggest party in Denmark.
Next to the scattered group of Eurosceptic populist to the 
right, two other groups can be coined the winners of the 
election. Including the seats of the new Renaissance coalition 
led by French president Macron’s En Marche and the tempo-
rary (?) seats of the British Liberal Democrats, the ALDE&R 
group increase its seat share with more than 50 per cent. 
Also the The Green/EFA group made big gains. These groups 
Figure 3. Election result in EP Elections 2019
Note: The figure shows the provisional results at the party group level. 
Source: European Parliament, downloaded June 9, 2019.
Figure 2.  
Voter turnout by country in EP Elections 2014 and 2019
The figure shows voter turnout in every member state in the two latest 






























in the different nations. Voters around Europe were exposed 
to quite different campaigns dependent on were they live. 
Moreover, despite the ongoing evolution of the media, there 
still is no real influential single European media market. And 
while the elections indeed have winners and losers at the 
aggregate level, an in-depth analysis reveal that the picture 
is much more scattered. In most party groups, we find big 
winners and big losers.  If anything, the campaign and the 
results suggest that domestic issues, events and parties still 
are more important than what happens at the European level. 
While this might please some and disappoint others, the ove-
rall judgement is clear. We should not think of the recently 
completed election as one major European event as much as 
28 different national events merely collected by name under a 
pan-European umbrella.  
Figure 4. 
Party system fragmentation in EP elections 1979-2019
electoral progress arguably is an important counterweight 
against those who wish to coin the elections a victory of the 
Eurosceptics.
The overall picture that emerges is one of complexity. 
The big party groups are getting smaller. The small party 
groups are getting bigger. Never before have we faced such a 
fragmented European parliament (see Figure 4). Both of the 
big groups lost almost 20 per cent of their seats each, leaving 
their combined seat share short of a majority for the first 
time ever. This is of course a major incident. No longer can 
the two dominant driving forces of European integration, by 
themselves, make decisions without the consent of at least 
one other party group. While the European parliament surely 
is a bastion of negotiations and pragmatism, this situation is 
new and means we might enter a phase of adaptation before 
these party groups have settled with the new playing field.
At the same time the electoral success of the Eurosceptic 
right-wing populists will not automatically be translated into 
political incluence. While their overall strength has increased, 
parties to the right with critical stances towards the EU are 
divided among many different groups. We also know from 
the past that these parties have had problems of finding a way 
to cooperate both within and across party groups. It remains 
to be seen if they will be able to improve on their rather 
lackluster previous performance on this account. While 
parties such as Lega, the Brexit Party and Fidesz might have 
somewhat similar ideas about the shortcomings of the EU, 
they surely differ as much as they have in common on most 
other issues dealt with by the European parliament. With 
increased strength, the pro-European liberal and green groups 
are certainly also other forces who will do as much as possible 
to keep the Eurosceptics away from influence.
So what are the major take away points of the European 
elections 2019? Although Eurosceptical parties have won a 
greater share of seats than ever before, there are also positive 
signs from an EU perspective. Although the turnout is far 
below a decent level, the trend is upwards. The overall attitu-
des towards the EU seems to be on the rise. Brexit seems to 
have made both citizens and parties less prone to demand an 
exit from the union.
However, even though there are some positive signs for 
those who embrace the idea of a continued strong union, 
there are at the same time important indications that speak 
against the wishes of those that harbor ideas about more 
supranationalism. The campaigns were predominately na-
tional. Despite attempts to make it a real European election 
– think for instance about spitzenkandidaten, joint party 
group manifestos and suggestions about supra-national seats 
– few voters seem to regard the election as an European vote. 
Instead national factors such as different regulations and the 
persistence of various political cultures and traditions have 
a great influence on the forms and content of the campaign 
Note: The figure shows a) the effective number of parliamentary party 
groups (N) according to the formula, N=  , where pi is party group 
i:s seat share and b) the total seat share of the EPP and S&D groups 
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The dominant narrative coming into the European elections 
of 2019 was the rise of anti-EU sentiment across Europe. Me-
dia reports focused on the growing strength of EU-skeptic po-
pulist parties on the far-right, while academic analyses spoke 
of growing politicization and contestation of the EU. Coming 
on the back of Brexit, challenges to the EU’s authority by 
Hungary and Poland, and the election of a nationalist govern-
ment in traditionally EU positive Italy, surely these European 
elections epitomized a crisis of legitimacy for the Union?
Think again. Contrary to the conventional narrative, there 
is much to suggest that these European elections presented 
an indication of strength for the legitimacy of the EU. In 
this context, legitimacy refers to the extent to which people 
regard the authority of a political institution as appropriate, 
as indicated by their attitudes toward, engagement with, and 
acceptance of this institution. Importantly, it is not about 
what parties people vote for or whether they appreciate all 
policies coming out of the institution. It is about their faith in 
the political institution as such.
In this respect, three features of the European elections 
2019 indicate stronger rather than weaker legitimacy for the 
EU. 
First, these elections brought about a dramatic shift in 
voter turnout. While average EU voter turnout has been in 
steady decline since the first election to the European Parlia-
ment in 1979, reinforced by the accession of less voting-prone 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the 2000s, it now 
rose from 42.6 per cent in 2014 to 51.0 per cent. This is the 
highest turnout since the elections in 1994, and surpasses 
turnout in US congressional elections, but is still significantly 
lower than in most European national elections. Interestingly, 
the European elections this year registered record turnout 
in several countries whose governments have made a point 
of contesting core EU values and policies, notably, Hungary, 
Poland, and Romania.
Second, the elections signaled greater acceptance of the 
European Parliament as an institution, and of the EU as a 
political system, even among EU-skeptic parties. Whereas 
mainstream parties always have accepted this arena, 2019 was 
the year when EU-skeptic parties, too, moved in this direction. 
While campaigning on an agenda of national control and se-
eking a unified EU-critical front, these parties tend not to ad-
vocate leaving the Union (anymore). Consider Lega in Italy, PiS 
in Poland, National Rally in France, and AfD in Germany. In 
my own country, Sweden, the two parties previously opposed 
to EU membership – the Sweden Democrats on the far-right 
and the Left Party on the far-left – both shifted to a position 
of engagement prior to the elections. Rather than contesting 
the EU as a construction, EU-skeptic parties now compete for 
power in its parliament as a way of changing its policies in 
their preferred direction. While many of us might not like 
their message, the shift in approach of these parties signals a 
step toward greater acceptance of the EU as a political arena.
Third, these elections took place against a background of 
rising trust in the EU among its citizens. Trust or confidence is 
a common indicator when researchers measure the percei-
ved legitimacy of a political institution among people. The 
average level of trust in the EU has fluctuated somewhat over 
the past two decades, often tracking developments in public 
opinion toward domestic political institutions. While trust 
in the EU declined in the wake of the Euro-crisis, it has since 
regained ground. According to the latest Eurobarometer poll, 
42 per cent of citizens have trust in the EU. Interestingly, this 
is seven percentage points higher than citizens’ average trust 
in their national governments and parliaments – a pattern 
that has held steady throughout the 2000s. If there is a legiti-
macy crisis for political institutions, it is one that afflicts the 
national level to a greater extent than the European.
These good news for the legitimacy of the EU fit into a 
broader neglected pattern in world politics. At a time when 
political pundits focus narrowly on anti-globalist populism in 
the wake of momentous events such as Brexit and Trump, the 
full data suggest a different and more positive picture about 
international cooperation. The popular legitimacy of global 
governance appears stable, significantly more states join than 
leave international institutions, and liberal norms are surpri-
singly well respected world-wide. This does not mean that 
everything is hunky dory in international cooperation. Coo-
peration could have been more ambitious, less cumbersome, 
and better implemented. In addition, confidence in interna-
tional institutions remains higher among elites than citizens 
at large. But it does mean that the conventional narrative of a 
legitimacy crisis in Europe and global governance broadly is 
increasingly off target.
A sign of strength for EU legitimacy
Jonas Tallberg






It was a little noticed novelty in this year’s European election 
that for the first time we saw more or less authoritarian 
elections taking place under the European frame. By 2019, 
the leading credit rating agency of the world’s democracies 
reduced Hungary’s score to ‘partly free’, and Europe’s decision 
making bodies started the so-called ‘nuclear option’ of an 
Article 7 procedure, meant to deter member states from aban-
doning democracy, against two member states (Poland and 
Hungary), with the name of a third (Romania) occasionally 
mentioned as the next in line. It is time to consider the initial 
evidence on how political actors react to European elections 
taking place in contexts that many observers do not recognize 
as fully democratic.
The European Parliament will recognize without hesitation 
the mandates of all MEPs from all countries concerned. Even 
if the lengthy Article 7 procedures that are still in their early 
phases were already completed, there would not be obvious 
legal ground for acting otherwise, or commonly accepted 
political rationale for denying citizens representation in 
the EP on account of doubts about election integrity at the 
national level. Besides, elections in the kind of electoral au-
thoritarian states that are at this point conceivable in Europe 
do not produce compelling evidence of ballot stuffing, parties 
denied a place on the ballot, widespread voter intimidation, 
vote buying, or fraudulent voter registries. Whether that is 
a question of facts or of not looking hard enough could be 
clarified by election observation missions though. However, 
the member states seem hesitant to open this Pandora’s 
Box in each other’s backyards. Any embassy could register 
international observers for the EP election in Hungary (where 
citizen observers are disallowed), yet the number of observers 
from ‘partly free’ or ’not free’ states like Georgia, Mexico and 
Russia easily equaled or exceeded the number of observers (3) 
from the single EU member state (France) that bothered with 
registering an interest at all.
Nonetheless, informal sanctioning mechanisms may be 
emerging. In the heat of the campaign, Manfred Weber, the 
European People’s Party candidate for Commission President, 
felt compelled to state that he would not accept to win the 
office on account of votes from Fidesz (Hungary’s governing 
party, the EPP membership of which was suspended in March 
2019). After the election, it was swiftly clarified that Fidesz 
MEPs - the third largest national contingent in the current EPP 
- can run for any office in the EPP’s parliamentary group. Yet 
the latter deemed prudent not to risk defeat, and gave up on 
retaining the vice-presidency they customarily held. Should 
most MEPs hesitate to support bids by Fidesz, PiS or PSD (the 
Polish and Romanian main government party, respectively) 
to win committee chairs and deputy chairs in parliament, a 
de facto curtailing of the political influence of those with a 
‘representative of an authoritarian government’ stigma would 
emerge. But such sanctioning would not be rule- 
bound and hence systematic, and occur instead on the basis 
of ad hoc and possibly inappropriate considerations. In any 
case, such a sanction would at most put supposed authoritari-
ans at the same level with non-inscrit MEPs. We should thus 
expect a further development of relevant norms in the next 
European Parliament.
The parties in the member states with diminished demo-
cratic credentials will inevitably play a role in pushing for this 
clarification of formal and informal norms and possible sanc-
tions (or lack thereof). There is nothing inherently incompa-
tible between being an authoritarian back home and pushing 
for further integration in some or most policy domains in 
Europe. But all three above government parties campaigned 
(partly) with ’let’s defend national sovereignty from the in-
cursions of Brussels’ as they have a vested interest in avoiding 
European scrutiny into rule of law, allocation of EU funds, 
and whether elections provide for a level playing field in their 
respective countries. It is equally inevitable that pro-demo- 
cratic constituencies, when sensing an authoritarian threat 
from the government in the national arena, seek protection 
from it at the European level. 
No wonder that the biggest contingent of the Polish 
opposition chose to run as a ‘European Coalition’, and that 
Hungarian and Romanian opposition voters were dispropor-
tionately attracted, just on the occasion of this election, to the 
most emphatically pro-EU lists, especially those promising to 
take the domestic battle to the European stage. Ultimately, all 
MEPs from these countries may push, albeit with opposite go-
als, for a precise clarification in the next European Parliament 
of what it really means that EU member states are expected to 
be democratic by the treaties, and they will all protest linking 
this issue to the allocation of European funds. The bull in 
the China shop will not go hiding but demand everyone’s 
attention.
The bull in the china shop
Gabor Toka





Hong Kong has a special place in the economic relations 
between Europe and China as a gateway to the Chinese 
market and as an international financial centre. Its status as a 
Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China makes it a signi-
ficant case for the EU’s normative foreign policy in which the 
European Parliament plays an important role. How will the 
elections of a new parliament in May 2019 influence the EU’s 
stance towards Hong Kong?
Hong Kong’s relations to Europe go back to the time as a 
British Crown colony in the 19th and 20th centuries and the 
managed handover of the territory to China in 1997. Today, 
mid-way through the transition period, the return of Hong 
Kong is still governed by the principle ‘One Country, Two Sys-
tems’ and the terms enshrined in the Basic Law which grant 
a number of important freedoms to Hong Kong citizens and 
ensure an independent judiciary and the rule of law. However, 
recent developments have raised a number of concerns regar-
ding the influence of China on the conditions of Hong Kong’s 
integration with the mainland. 
The Basic Law accords the right to Hong Kong to shape 
its own laws regulating the conditions for economic activity, 
social issues and public affairs. It also gives the right to Hong 
Kong to maintain independent relations with countries and 
international organizations in the areas of economic policy, 
culture, tourism etc. To this effect and due to the importance 
of trade with Europe, Hong Kong and the EU have established 
an ongoing sectoral dialogue and the former has long-stan-
ding economic and trade offices in Brussels, London and 
Berlin. For the EU, the relationship with Hong Kong repre-
sents a delicate balance as it needs to respect the sovereignty 
of China over Hong Kong and the indivisibility of the Chinese 
territory as cornerstones of its strategic partnership with 
China while it supports the principle of ‘One Country, Two 
Systems’, the integrity of Hong Kong’s political and judicial 
authorities and fundamental freedoms as stipulated in the 
Basic Law. This is not a trifle dilemma for the EU as its ability 
to project soft power relies on defending international norms 
such as human rights and the rule of law.
So, given this ambition, has the EU any influence over the 
future development of Hong Kong and are there any examp-
les of the city emulating European solutions?
In order to paint a representative picture, it is important to 
point out that the EU as such is not well known to the people 
of Hong Kong. Its member states, especially Great Britain, are 
of course better known and so is the general notion of Europe 
as an attractive place for tourism and business. For Hong 
Kong’s political, business and academic elites, the EU con-
stitutes an important global economic player almost on par 
with the US when it comes to its ability to set international 
standards in various economic sectors. Here, the EU may exert 
influence in specific areas driven in part by Hong Kong’s need 
to attract international business and finance. Examples of 
the influence of EU regulatory regimes include Hong Kong’s 
tax system which was reformed after European pressure and 
parts of its new competition policy which was modelled on 
the EU.
In the midst of increasing tension between the US and Chi-
na, Hong Kong’s political elite has become more aware of the 
importance of the EU in global affairs as a third pole of power 
with the potential to act as a counterweight to the self-inte-
rests of the former two and as a player willing to stand up for 
multilateralism and a rule-based international system.
Besides its reputation as a global economic player, the EU 
has been consistent in its monitoring of the political develop-
ments in Hong Kong since 1997 alongside the US and the UK. 
Its annual report on the developments in Hong Kong, first 
published in 1997, is presented to the European Parliament. 
It has become a focal point for assessing the implementation 
of the Basic Law in particular in the area of political and civic 
freedoms, reform of the electoral system, the independence 
of the judiciary and the rule of law. In this vein, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament have raised con-
cerns over recent developments in Hong Kong which suggest 
that some democratic reforms enshrined in the Basic Law 
alongside existing freedoms may be in jeopardy.
The European Parliament has traditionally held a high 
profile in the promotion of democracy and human rights and 
systematically nudged the EU to take a firmer stance on these 
internationally. To this end the Parliament issued a resolution 
in December 2017 reiterating that the Basic Law and the ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’ constitute cornerstones of the EU’s 
policy towards Hong Kong as well as China.
Ahead of the European Parliament elections, many 
feared a tsunami of right-wing populism which would upset 
its long-standing progressive stance on human rights and 
democracy promotion. Signs in the form of repeated refusals 
of Hungary, Italy and Greece to support the EU taking a prin-
cipled stance on human rights abuse in the UNHRC heralded 
the possibility of a much weaker position of the incoming 
Parliament had the right-wing populist parties been able to 
form a blocking minority. However, the results of the election 
suggest that although the traditional coalition between the 
Socialist and the Christian Democrats has been broken, the 
potential coalition partners, the Greens and the Liberals, will 
support an ambitious stance on democracy and human rights, 
possibly even pushing the Parliament future along this line. 
Therefore, the prospect of the EU’s continued support for the 
model ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and Hong Kong’s ability to 
uphold civic and personal freedoms and the rule of law seems 
assured.
Hong Kong and the EU’s normative reach in Asia
Anna Michalski
Associate Professor in Political Science





Democracy requires alternatives. If voters are deprived of 
meaningful choice when casting their ballot, they have no gu-
arantee that any real change in policy will ensue, irrespective 
of how they vote. Moreover, in the absence of such meaning-
ful choice, there is an obvious risk that citizens will instead 
end up opposing the political system as such. This is why the 
influential political scientist Robert Dahl saw the existence of 
a political opposition – an opposition able to present viable 
alternative policies to those promoted by the office-holders  
– as democracy’s most salient characteristic. The question 
here is whether, in this year’s elections to the European Parli-
ament (EP), voters had access to sufficient policy alternatives.
The EP has long been dominated by a pro-European ‘grand 
coalition’ of mainstream centrist parties pushing for an ever 
closer Union. For forty years – ever since the first EP elections 
in 1979 – the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and 
the centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) have held a ma-
jority of seats. This longstanding hegemony on the part of the 
two biggest pro-European party groups has clearly worked as 
a breeding ground for Eurosceptic challenger parties opposed 
to the system.
This year’s elections to the EP were expected to change 
these conditions. Before the elections, Eurosceptic challenger 
parties in several countries abandoned their calls for referen-
da on their countries’ membership of the Union. In France, 
Germany, Italy, and Sweden, for example, nationalist and 
populist parties said they instead wanted to reform the Union 
– to change the course of European integration. Regardless of 
the intent behind this change of course, the new orientation 
would appear to have provided voters with a wider set of  
alternative policies to be promoted by the European Parlia-
ment.
The results of the elections clearly indicate an increased 
fragmentation of the European political landscape, and a 
palpable shift in the overall political balance. The dominant 
grand coalition has been broken, having lost its majority 
of seats. At the same time, the expected nationalist and 
populist surge did not fully materialize. Some countries did 
see substantial gains by far-right parties, among them Matteo 
Salvini’s League in Italy and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally 
in France; but in other countries the story was different. 
Nationalist parties now have a much larger share of seats, but 
they failed to achieve a breakthrough. Pro-European greens 
and liberals also gained ground, substantially countering the 
rise of the far right.
The prevailing narrative among pundits seems to be that 
democracy prevailed. The nationalist and populist wave was 
contained, and voter turnout rose for the first time in forty 
years. But the elections also revealed an emerging paradox, 
with consequences for the EP’s democratic legitimacy: while 
the elections resulted in greater fragmentation as well as 
a shift in the political balance, the choice faced by voters 
in many countries was in fact a simple one, with just two 
options: to make the Union stronger, or to bring the European 
project to a halt.
The debates held at the national level largely followed this 
fault line, as did the few debates held between the top can-
didates (Spitzenkandidaten). In Emmanuel Macron’s France, 
the contest was between the pro-European campaign of his 
Renaissance list and the nationalist agenda of the far right; in 
Italy, Matteo Salvini portrayed the election as a referendum 
between the Europe of elites and the Europe of peoples; in 
Poland, the ruling nationalist Law and Justice Party faced off 
against a pro-European coalition of parties calling themselves 
the European Coalition; and in Sweden, the prime minister 
dubbed the European election a referendum on right-wing 
extremism. Although framed to reflect domestic conditions, 
the question was largely the same across the Union: namely, 
what is the future of the EU to be?
This polarization may have increased voters’ willingness to 
go to the polls, but the traditional mainstream parties clearly 
failed to offer viable policy options on the issues that most 
concern voters: climate change, migration, terrorism, and the 
economy. Seen over a long period, the traditional mainstream 
parties are losing ground. There is an ongoing realignment of 
party systems in Europe, with new dividing lines challenging 
the traditional left-right divide. In this landscape new parties 
and movements are emerging, while old ones are weakening 
and, in some cases, almost disappearing. To preserve their re-
levance, parties must provide voters with policy options that 
address their main concerns. The legislative powers of the EP 
are in fact far-reaching, so it is a mistake to reduce elections 
to it to a simple choice between two options. Deprived of any 
meaningful choice in EU politics, citizens will continue to 
support parties that oppose the system itself. If EU democracy 
is to work, meaningful alternatives must be provided. Unless 
it offers voters a real choice, the Union will continue to suffer 
from democratic shortcomings.
How the elections to the European  
parliament fell short of providing alternatives
Thomas Persson






Across EU member states, political parties are struggling 
with political and media environments that constantly are 
changing, and with voters who are becoming increasingly 
volatile in their party preferences and vote choices. This is 
evident in national elections, and in many respects, it is even 
more evident in EP elections. The key reason is of course that 
EP-elections still constitute second-order national elections, 
and for that reason, many voters (a) feel less compelled to 
vote at all and (b) less restrained in their vote choices. The 
result is that horse race polls are less predictive and that poli-
tical parties are even more uncertain of the election outcome 
than in national elections.
Still, the strategic choices facing political parties are 
largely, even if not exactly, the same as in national elections. 
That holds true for their basic orientation as well as for their 
campaigning and strategic political communication.
In terms of basic orientation, one useful distinction can be 
drawn between product-oriented, sales-oriented and mar-
ket-oriented parties. In simplified terms, product-oriented 
parties are characterized by arguing for what it stands for and 
believes in, and most efforts are oriented towards the develop-
ment of the political product – the policies, the party image, 
and the candidates and leaders. In product-oriented parties, 
members and activists are crucial, and the political product 
is developed internally based on how members and activists 
interpret the party’s ideology and core values. Implicitly, a 
party that is product-oriented tends to assume that voters will 
realize that its ideas and policies are the best and therefore 
vote for it.
A sales-oriented party is similar in the sense that the politi-
cal product is largely developed internally and based on mem-
bers’ and activists’ interpretation of the party’s ideology and 
core values, but dissimilar in the sense that it realizes that the 
party and its product have to be “sold” and communicated 
effectively. Thus, sales-oriented parties try to make people 
want what the party offers through as effective use as possible 
of various marketing and campaign strategies, tactics, and 
techniques. Market intelligence, such as focus groups and 
opinion polls, are used to aid the party when deciding what 
target groups to focus on and when developing their strategic 
communication and marketing. 
A market-oriented party is fundamentally different from 
both product- and sales-oriented parties. Instead of developing 
the political product largely through internal processes 
where members and activists are key, market-oriented parties 
attempt to identify voters’ needs and demands, and then 
develop a political product that is design to meet these needs 
and demands and hence provide voter satisfaction. Or, put dif-
ferently, if other parties use market intelligence such as polls 
to help them in their strategic communication, market-orien-
ted parties use them to find out what kind of political product 
selected target groups are looking for. Thus, in contrast to 
sales-oriented parties that try to change what people want, 
market-oriented parties try to give voters what they want.
Of course, these party types are ideal types, and in reality, 
no party is fully product-, sales- or market-oriented. Rather, 
they tend towards either type of party. In addition, in most 
cases, it is more appropriate to describe parties as engaging 
in selective rather than full-scale market-orientation, in the 
sense that they are willing to change some policies on some 
issues in order to adapt to voters’ wants and needs, but not all 
policies on all issues. 
Nevertheless, my interpretation of the political develop-
ment since the last election to the European parliament is 
that political parties across EU member states have become 
increasingly market-oriented, if still selectively so. This is 
perhaps most evident with respect to immigration policies, 
where a number of political parties – stressed not least by the 
rise of anti-immigrant, right-wing populist parties and voter 
losses to such parties – have become much more restrictive in 
their policies. This also spills over on EU-policies, where even 
parties that used to be strongly in favor of free movement in 
the EU in the last election emphasized problems rather than 
opportunities associated with free movement. In Sweden, one 
example is the Moderate Party. However, adapting to voters’ 
needs and demands also led some parties to abandon or 
de-emphasize their former opposition to the EU. In Sweden, 
that holds true for both the Left Party and the Sweden Demo-
crats. Of course, the latter development is highly influenced 
by the Brexit-failure, but not in itself, but filtered by increa-
sing public support for the EU. 
Thus, the EU-relevant policy consequences of increasing 
market-orientation might vary, but what is missing is a prin-
cipled defense for the EU and the core principles underlying 
the EU, including the four freedoms. In less-established 
democracies such as Hungary, it also includes core democratic 
principles such as the rule of law. 
For the future of EU, this is arguably problematic. This 
holds particularly true as many voters are quite ill-informed 
about the EU and on most policy issues. One implication 
is that the voters’ “wants and needs” that market-oriented 
parties attempt to adapt to might be uninformed and not 
reflect their true “wants and needs”. Another implication is 
that parties, when attempting to adapt to voters’ “wants and 
needs”, in fact contribute to shaping them. The question then 
is, who is leading? 
Political market-orientation in EP elections
Jesper Strömbäck







As one of several attempts to alleviate the EU:s alleged demo-
cratic deficit, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a new procedure 
for selecting the President of the European Commission. The 
limited mechanisms of holding executive power into account 
has been highlighted as one element of European governance. 
Despite the strengthened role of the European Parliament (EP) 
over time, with increasing legislative power and more mecha-
nisms for controlling the Commission, there is no proper par-
liamentarism at the European level. The elections to the EP do 
not decide the political composition of the executive. The low 
levels of electoral turnout in European elections has partly 
been explained by the lack of an executive link in the system 
of representation. While voters do have a unique opportunity 
to vote at supranational parliamentary elections, it does not 
give opportunity to sanction or give mandates to a European 
level executive. Since the Lisbon Treaty a clearer link between 
the elections and the head of the Commission has been explo-
red. The key change is that the European Council should take 
“into account the elections to the European Parliament” when 
proposing a new President of the Commission.
In 2014, European level party groups launched their Spit-
zenkandidaten who would be their candidate for Commission 
president. The swift manoeuvring of the EP and the European 
level parties took many by surprise. The interpretation advan-
ced was that the candidate from the party-group winning the 
plurality of seats would almost automatically be the first one 
proposed by the European Council, where the heads of state 
of government meet.  EPP-candidate Jean-Claude Juncker was 
installed through this procedure. Already half-way through 
his tenure, Juncker declared that he would not stand a second 
term, thereby limiting the possibility for voters to sanction 
and vote retrospectively. 
In the run-up to the 2019 elections, EP adopted a slight-
ly different interpretation of the Spitzenkandidat-system. 
Instead of arguing that the biggest party-group candidate 
should be selected, a notion of ’tolerance’ was introduced. 
As the EPP has been the biggest party inside the EP for a 
long time, it would seem pointless – not least for the smaller 
groups – to launch a candidate. Some of the European parties 
had primaries to select their candidates. The struggle between 
Alaxander Stubb and Manfred Weber in the EPP did get some 
attention. Frans Timmermans of the PES did not face any 
competition. For the rest, candidate selection was largely 
unnoticed by the public. The liberals in ALDE did not select 
one single candidate, but a team of candidates. In contrast to 
2014, the conservative group ECR launched a candidate, while 
the more Eurosceptic groups EFDD and ENF did not have can-
didates, which meant that debates among the Lead candidates 
did not represent the whole political spectre.  
Like 2014 the campaign by the European level candidates 
did not get substantial attention in various national contexts. 
Proposals to add the Lead candidate’s name on the ballot of 
national parties did not fly. Several national parties are in 
fact deeply sceptical about the whole procedure of selecting 
Commission president in this way and wanted to avoid being 
too closely related to ’their’ candidates because of political 
differences 
While research demonstrated that voters who could 
recognise Lead candidates in 2014 showed a small increase 
in probability of turning out to vote, national parties showed 
little interest in advancing their candidates, making them 
known to the voters. In the aftermath of the 2019 election, 
the significant increase in electoral participation has already 
been used as an argument by the European level party groups, 
individual candidates and the EP to argue that one should not 
abandon the model and that one of the candidates should 
indeed become the next Commission president. However, it 
is hard to conclude that the Spitzenkandidat-system alone is 
behind the increased electoral mobilisation. 
So, what now? Considering the outcome of the elections, 
the EP is more fragmented than ever before. What does 
‘taking into account the elections’ mean in such circumstan-
ces? The two dominant parties, S&D and EPP have lost their 
majority and grand bargaining is therefore harder to foresee. 
The European Council, learning from its slow reaction in 
2014, swiftly gathered a special summit just two days after 
the elections. It did not render any clarity over names or 
process. In view of the fragmented political landscape, it 
seems more likely to search for a candidate somewhere in the 
centre which can indeed be ’tolerated’ by a majority of the 
house. Whether this candidate was part of the Spitzen-race 
or not remains to be seen. If the purpose of the new electoral 
link was to introduce an element of European-level political 
competition – notably between ‘left’ and ‘right’ – the political 
fragmentation of the EP (and the differences of political 
orientation among the Member-States) may result in a situa-
tion whereby only a centrist politician can be ‘tolerated’ by a 
majority, which would counter the logic of the new system.  
There is currently something of an institutional struggle 
between the Member-States in the European Council and the 
EP. The outcome of this process will determine whether the 
Spitzenkandidat-system is here to stay or if it will be remem-
bered only as a one-off experiment in 2014. Regardless of the 
outcome of this process, a genuine European-level contesta-
tion over executive office is not likely to emerge in the near 
future – not least because many national political parties are 
unwilling to make it happen. 
Spitzenkandidaten – make or break?
Göran von Sydow
Director The Swedish Institute  






European Parliament (EP) election campaigns often concen-
trate on the most important national issues in each member 
state, rather than topics that are actually within the com-
petence of the EP. But if we were to imagine the EU as one 
unified political space in which the EP functions as a national 
parliament, what would be the most polarising issues 
between the parties? In this brief analysis, I try to answer this 
exact question.
I use data from the cross-national voting advice application 
(VAA) euandi that was developed for the 2019 EP elections with 
the help of more than 100 scholars all over Europe. euandi 
gives a chance to conduct such a wide comparison, as it  
mapped the stances of the relevant parties from every EU 
member state on an identical set of political issues. Alto-
gether, over 270 parties from 28 member states were positio-
ned on 22 political statements with which the parties and the 
VAA users can either agree/disagree completely, tend to agree/
disagree or take a neutral stance. The statements cover a wide 
rande of policy areas, such as taxation, welfare state, Euro-
pean integration, environmental protection, law and order, 
immigration  and social values. 
Looking at the distribution of parties all across the Europe, 
the first notable observation is that polarisation is higher on 
the issues that pertain to immigration, social values/liberalisa-
tion and openness to further European integration. Regarding 
the classic socioeconomic issues like taxation and social 
benefits, however, parties are less dispersed and do not take 
strong positions.
The single most polarising issue-statement between the 
parties is ’Asylum-seekers should be distributed proportionally 
among EU Member States through a mandatory relocation 
system’. More than 60 per cent of the parties take a strong 
stance on this issue, approximately half of them being com-
pletely against and the other half in complete agreement with 
this proposal. High polarisation on this issue is not surprising, 
as it touches two very controversial topics: immigration/
refugees and transferring decision-making authority from 
the member states to the EU. Also, there is a strong regional 
aspect in this division, as 72 per cent of the parties in the Cen-
tral Eastern European (CEE) region are against this proposal, 
whereas in Southern Europe (SE) - the region most exposed 
to refugees - a clear majority of parties support such measure 
(81%). In Northwestern Europe (NWE), the bulk of parties (68%) 
are also in favour of mandatory refugee quotas, but polarisa-
tion is higher compared to SE, because the parties that are 
against such quotas are usually adamant in their opposition 
(‘completely against’). 
Polarisation on the asylum-seekers issue is the most vivid 
example of a more general trend: while most parties see Eu-
ropean integration as a good thing (66% agree with this state-
ment and 24% are against), regarding more specific proposals 
to further EU integration we see notable polarisation. The sta-
tement about strengthening EU defence policy reveals, again, 
some regional considerations behind party positions. Among 
the CEE countries that are more vulnerable to the Russian 
threat, almost 3/4 of the parties support stronger EU defence 
policy. Meanwhile, in NWE and SE, there is strong polarisa-
tion over whether the EU should be given more authority in 
this area. Defence policy is an issue where right-populists are 
holding the same position with far-left and even with some 
green parties, all of them being against further integration 
in this area. Polarisation is even higher regarding granting 
tax-raising powers to the EU. Here, the division is more ideo-
logical than geographical. In all regions, the socialists, greens 
and even many far-left parties support collecting taxes at the 
EU level, whereas right-wing parties are against it.
Another highly polarising bloc of issues in the pan-Euro-
pean political space relates to social values and liberalisation. 
As for the general dispersion of parties, the second most 
polarising statement is whether same-sex marriages should be 
allowed. Polarisation on that issue is, again, partly regional. 
As expected, post-communist countries are more skeptical 
towards legalising same-sex marriages and this is reflected 
in party positions, as only 30 per cent of CEE parties support 
such a proposal, while over 50 per cent are against it. In NWE, 
however, a consensus is forming over equal marriage rights 
and almost 80 per cent of the parties are in complete or par-
tial agreement with allowing same-sex marriage. Statements 
about legalising soft drugs and euthanasia are also high on 
the polarisation scale. Again, the post-communist parties are 
more conservative, whereas in the rest of Europe these issues 
divide parties almost evenly. However, compared to same-sex 
marriage and asylum-seekers, there are far fewer parties that 
exhibit strong agreement towards legalising soft drugs and 
euthanasia. 
Analysing the positions of EU parties on an identical set of 
issues confirms that the EU is far from being a unified politi-
cal space. Although ideological affiliations are not negligible 
in determining party stances, regional considerations domina-
te on many issues. Regarding further EU integration, parties 
tend to support it only in domains that are beneficial for their 
own country, while being skeptical about chipping in to help 
other regions. Also, there is a clear division between the more 
conservative post-communist Europe and the rest of the EU. 
Issues that relate to values, identities and national sovereign-
ty invoke strong emotions and are not easy to compromise 
on. Thus, from the perspective of the future of the EU, these 
insights regarding polarisation in the European party system 
do not instill much optimism.
The most polarising issues in the EU party system
Andres Reiljan






European party systems are changing. In almost every elec-
tion held in recent years around Europe, the story is the same. 
The once dominant party families, the Social Democrats to 
the left and the Christian Democrats and Conservatives to the 
right, are losing at the polls. The notable winners are primari-
ly the challengers from the radical right. But the surge of new 
contenders is not only confined to this widely discussed party 
family.
The dominance of the above-mentioned party families 
has not only been a national pattern. Quite the opposite. The 
Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats and Conserva-
tives have also dominated EU politics since the inception of 
the union. As government parties in most member countries, 
they have had a heavy presence in the European Council 
and the Council of the European Union. Similarly, they have 
dominated the European Parliament. In fact, since the first 
election of the EP in 1979, the EPP and S&D (or their predeces-
sors) have never gathered less than 50 per cent of the seats 
between themselves. However, as we discuss in the introducto-
ry chapter of Euroflections, this is no longer the case. When the 
votes were counted, these groups were more than 40 seats 
short of a majority. This is also mirrored in how the European 
Parliament is more fragmented than ever. The big groups are 
getting smaller. The small groups are getting bigger. 
This pattern is also evident when we look at the European 
election results at the national levels. The fragmentation is 
greater than ever before. The combination of more parti-
es, big parties on the decline and small parties on the rise 
that we witness can be captured by measuring the effective 
number of parliamentary parties (ENPP). In the early years of 
elections to the European Parliament the fragmentation was 
rather modest, as indicated by an average of less than four 
effective number of parties, meaning that it is similar to the 
complexity of a party system consisting of four equal sized 
parties. With the exception of a small downturn in 2004, 
there is a rather linear trend toward more fragmentation. 
Today, there is an average of more than five effective number 
of parties.
However, if these numbers are disaggregated, both levels 
and changes vary. On average, for example, the fragmentation 
is somewhat higher in the EU15 countries. While the trend 
towards fragmentation is present also in the newer member 
countries, the complexity is not at the same level as in the 
older ones. Also, within each category of member states we 
find striking variations. After the 2019 election, Belgium is the 
undisputed European champion of party system fragmenta-
tion. The country’s 21 seats are divided between no less than 
12 parties (10.3 ENPP). At the other end of the scale we find 
Malta (1.8 ENPP) and Hungary (2.3 ENPP). In terms of changes, 
it is interesting to note, for example in both Italy and Poland, 
a trend towards less fragmentation.
The rising levels of fragmentation come at the expense of 
the big parties. While there is no general definition of a big 
party it seems like a cut-off point at 30 per cent is reasonable. 
Again, going back to the first direct elections of the European 
Parliament, we can see that most countries had big parties. In 
1984, for example, only Belgium and Denmark lacked parties 
with support of over 30 per cent of the voters. The share of 
countries with big parties has steadily been on the decline 
since then. In the 2019 election, in only about a third of the 
member states (10 of 28), the voters cast 30 per cent of the 
votes on at least one party.
This development will not be without consequences. No 
longer can the two dominant party groups in the European 
Parliament make decisions without the consent of at least 
one other party group. Moreover, with more parties from 
each country it also seems likely that party group formation 
will be more complex. It is reasonable to believe that this 
will have repercussions on the cohesion of the party groups. 
Decision-making in the European Parliament will be more 
difficult. The question is how long it will take before the party 
groups settle with this new playing field.
Of course, it is difficult to say what happens in the future. 
Very little, however, indicates that the complexity of the Eu-
ropean party systems will decrease to a significant extent. The 
new fragmented party systems are here to stay; the historical 
era of high levels of party identification is over. Voters are less 
sentimental and more prone to go for new options. While 
individual parties still dominate in a few countries, much 
suggests that the era of big parties is coming to an end.
The end of the big-party era?
Niklas Bolin
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Figure 1. Party system fragmentation 1979-2019
The context
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Results of recent ellections to the European Parliament are 
sending good news from the largest international political 
assembly in the planet. We will again discuss the future of our 
continent, and not the end of the European Project.
There is more diversity in today’s Europe and the territory 
trully reveals, to paraphrase the Czech dissident writer Milan 
Kundera, the greatest variety within the smallest geographic 
space. Politically, there are many more alternative forces, such 
as greens, environmentalists and liberals that disentangle the 
previously dominant centre-right and centre-left holding in 
the European Parliament. Though the far right populists will 
also have more seats in the new Parliament, still the extreme 
shifts towards nostalgia infused nationalist radicalization did 
not happen, no matter what populists have struggled to pro-
mote and promise. The newly mobilized pro-European powers 
might indeed mark the beginning of something novel in the 
times of accelerated change and intensified uncertainty. 
Today’s Europe is as diverse and different as it never has 
been before. Hence, Europeans need to rediscover the logic 
and the reasons behind the EU’s integration process in the 
first place. People seem to be craving for fresh ideas. Yet 
people are also longing for stability and security, which often 
become exploited by populists. As we have seen with Brexit, 
disbeliefs and doubts about the uncertain future, the urge to 
seek comfort in false memories and nostalgia for the things 
that have been lost, might indeed turn into pathology infec-
ting individuals as well as entire societies. 
As accepted, European modernity and democratization is 
based on openness to critical ideas. In Europe there always 
has been a tradition of critical knowledge and activism to 
defend and safeguard the tradition of conversation. Culture 
and knowledge institutions have always been forefront insti-
tutions safeguarding ideals of inclussion and openness also 
on behalf of other social groups. Today, however, all of those 
institutions are restrained by neoliberalist dogmas drawing 
them away from their core missions of promotion of Europe-
an culture. The crisis of contemporary European democracy 
seems to be closely linked with the changed status of those 
centers of intellectualism and knowledge.
The grand metaphor of the European Project and Europe-
anness is indeed appealing. But it calls to be refreshed. One 
such prospect might be discovered by looking into peripheral 
and boundary regions, i.e. some indigeneous places of geo-
graphical Europe. And such exotic example might be a small 
Baltic country – Lithuania.
Lithuanians are indeed embrasing the future. Despite the 
troubling current times and ongoing post-communist trans-
formations, Lithuanians appear to be the biggest optimists 
in the European Union. 71% of them express trust in the 
European Union’s future. In 2019 European Parliamentary el-
lections Lithuanians also ellected parties representing utmost 
conventional ideology lines one could hope for.
So what does the idea of Europeanness entails if looked 
through the East Central European eyes? 
Lithuania is a country in East Central Europe that repre-
sents a complex geopolitical environment. Lithuania is a 
small Baltic nation. Yet for many Europeans the country is 
still terra incognita. Because of the absence of geographic and 
historical stability within the region, its peripheral location 
and cultural marginality, Lithuania is often represented in 
a rather mystified, mysterious, sometimes romantic way. If 
looked from Brussels, the country is politically in the East, 
geographically in the middle, and culturally in the West 
of Europe. Thus Lithuanian identity is that of identity of a 
frontier person. For such a person, a geographic border is not 
a place of separation, but a meeting place. As we know it, 
meeting with someone is not always fun and joyful, and often 
has to deal with complex, painful, also tense issues. In this 
way, identity building turns into cultural endeavour, i.e. into a 
critical dialogue and engagement with oneself, and in no way 
does it instigate the leveling of identities. 
One of the most difficult questions for tomorrow’s Europe 
will be this one: How to regain the power of dialogue and 
critical activism without falling into melancholy and nostalgia 
for what has been lost? Democracy is not fireworks or an ac-
tion movie. Finding consensus requires critical awareness and 
time. And the time appears to be ripe to revitalize cultural 
institutions to inspire the recovery of the vanished critical 
openness.
From nostalgia for the  
past to longing for the future
Auksė Balčytienė





Only 42.7 per cent of the Finnish citizens that are eligible to 
vote made their way to the ballot in the 2019 Finnish EP  
elections. Despite the small but obvious increase from the 
previous election (2014, 41%), turnout was modest compared 
to other Finnish elections. The 2019 parliamentary elec-
tion that was held only 1.5 months prior to the EP election 
garnered a 72.1 per cent turnout and in the 2018 presidential 
election 69.9 per cent of the voters made their way to the 
polls. Even in 2017 municipal elections a significantly larger 
group of voters, 58.8 per cent, showed up. Although Finland 
finished below the EU average turnout of around 50 per cent, 
other countries did not do much better. If turnout is treated 
as a proxy for political legitimacy, the Union has a problem.
At least in a fringe country like Finland, the common 
way to address the problem is to point out that the distance 
to Brussels is too long and the voters do not ‘feel’ the EU’s 
presence. While this is no doubt true, there are more concrete 
problems, too. Based on parties’ campaigning efforts and the 
general media coverage during the 2019 campaign, it appears 
that EP elections may fail to attract voters’ attention also 
simply because the election lacks genuine EU-level party agen-
das and politics – a lacuna that gets filled with candidate-cen-
tered career tales, abstract accounts of the EU’s achievements, 
and national politics.
The Finnish media paid a lot of attention to individual 
candidates. The attention centered on well-known hope-
fuls: incumbent MEPs and seasoned MPs who were retiring 
from Eduskunta (the parliament of Finland) or seeking new 
challenges. Another set of candidates that received speci-
al attention were parties’ rising stars, who made a name 
for themselves in the election where the whole country 
operates as a unified electoral district. A major consterna-
tion emerged when it was discovered that 14 MPs who had 
just gained a seat in Eduskunta were also running in the EP 
election – sometimes just to increase the total vote share of 
their party’s list, without any intention to enter the EP after 
the election. In relation to EU politics, probably the most 
significant attention was paid to the nomination of Finland’s 
representative (commissioner) to the European Commission 
– a choice that has more to do with the result of the recent 
parliamentary election, which in general stole a significant 
amount of attention, because government formation was 
underway. 
Aside from few internal matters of the European People’s 
Party (EPP), like the Finnish Alexander Stubb’s race for its 
spitzenkandidat position and the ejection of Fidesz from the 
group, europarties and EP party groups did not appear much 
in the Finnish media prior to elections. Under pressure from 
the nationalist-populist challenge, which was leveled by The 
Finns Party, pro-EU pundits in the social, and sometimes 
in the traditional media too, made a considerable effort to 
defend the EU and advocate voting with ‘pep talks’ that cente-
red on EU’s achievements, especially its role as a maintainer 
of peace and open trade.
The parties did not do much better in projecting the Euro-
pean political agenda and cleavages. In the few party leader 
interviews and debates, domestic issues mixed with EU mat-
ters and discussion on EU politics often deflated to abstract 
debates on the existence of the Union. The major parties did 
put up election specific sections on their web pages, including 
lists of candidates and even specifically written manifestos. 
The content did not, however, mostly make references to 
EU-level party politics, thus maintaining the election’s pre-
dominantly domestic character. The most active campaigner 
in social and traditional media was the Finns Party. To my 
knowledge, it was the only party to publish a nation-wide TV 
commercial, for example.
It is possible that the media, the pundits and the parties 
deliberately projected the European political agendas and lin-
kages in vague terms to attract citizens to participate. It might 
make sense to think that voters get more attached to familiar 
faces and policies than concrete and detailed proposals that 
deal with more foreign matters. But this is not necessarily 
the case. Witnessing professional career politicians to make 
their way to Brussels without having a clear idea of how their 
work connects to EU-level political forces – which, I believe, 
most know to exist – might also be discouraging.  If the voter 
does not really know what he/she is voting for, the decision to 
abstain from voting can even be regarded as understandable.
As has been pointed out often, in order to develop a vital 
democratic process that can maintain the Union’s legitimacy, 
europarties might need to take a more pronounced role in 
simplifying and organizing EU’s complex political reality into 
discernible policy bundles and cleavages that provide genuine 
alternatives and positive motivating contention for the voters. 
A major reason for the increase of overall turnout in the 
2019 EP elections was likely the politicization of the EU itself, 
which resulted from the public organizing of the EU-critical 
movement and its counter-force, the pro-EU parties, especially 
in Green and Liberal camps. 
No democracy without parties? The absence  








The 2019 European elections are over, and, like every time, 
there are many more winners than losers. But there are also 
electoral winners, who are political losers, for now at least. 
This is the case with the ‘populist’ parties, which, according 
to the new received wisdom, have been ‘contained’. It turns 
out, the populists ‘fell short of expectations’. This might be 
true, but those expectations – of roughly one-third of the seats 
or even vying for a majority within the European Parliame-
nt – were based on media hype rather than opinion polls. If 
the populists did fall short, they did so by a few percentage 
points, i.e. within the margin of error of the polls.
In many ways the 2019 European elections were a  
confirmation of the 2014 elections, which might not have 
been the ‘earthquake’ that they were made out to be, but  
definitely constituted a more fundamental break with pre-
vious elections. This year’s elections confirmed the trends of 
increased fragmentation, growing support for populist par-
ties, and the decline of the center-right and center-left blocs. 
However, there were three important developments within 
the populist bloc that, taken together, should fundamentally 
change the narrative.
The first development was that the 2019 European elec-
tions were bad for left populist parties. Where Syriza and 
Podemos had taken Europe by storm in 2014, albeit with still 
relatively modest scores (26.6 and 8 per cent, respectively), 
both took a serious beating in 2019. They not only lost compa-
red to the 2014 European elections, but big compared to the 
national elections in 2015. Both in terms of electoral support 
and populist intensity, the parties are but a shadow of their 
former selves. Podemos split over its populist course, with 
leader Pablo Iglesias preferring a more openly Marxist direc-
tion, while Syriza has continued its populist rhetoric at home, 
but has transformed internationally into the best student in 
the EU class.
The new savior of left populism, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and 
his France Insoumise (Unbowed France), did not deliver either. 
Led by Manon Aubry in the 2019 European elections, FI  
received 6.3 per cent of the vote, 0.3 per cent less than 
Mélenchon got with the former Left Front in 2014. The Left 
in Germany lost almost two per cent, more than one quarter 
of its 2014 vote, while the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, 
despite (or maybe because of) a renewed focus on populism, 
lost two-thirds of its votes. In short, left populism officially 
died in the 2019 European elections.
Similarly, non-radical right populism overall lost momen-
tum too. The Five Star (M5S) movement lost almost 4 per cent 
compared to 2014, and was almost halved compared to the 
national elections just over a year ago. The Finns Party split 
and transformed into a full-fledged populist radical right  
party, gaining almost one per cent. Similarly, Bulgaria 
Without Censorship, which won 10.7 per cent with populist 
radical right IMRO-Bulgarian National Movement in 2014,  
but only the latter was re-elected in 2019.
The second development is that the modest rise of 
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populism was in fact a victory for the populist radical right. 
The biggest scores were by the National Rally (RN) in France, 
the League in Italy, and the new Brexit Party (BP) in the UK. 
However, RN lost 1.6 per cent compared to FN’s 2014 score 
and the BP won ‘only’ four per cent compared to UKIP in 2014 
– the combined score of BP and UKIP was 7.2 per cent higher. 
The only really big winner in a big EU member state was Mat-
teo Salvini’s League, which won 34.3 per cent, a stunning 28.1 
per cent more than the Northern League had won in 2014.
Other populist radical right parties did better in big states 
too, including some relative new ones, like Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) and Vox, which had contested their first 
European elections in 2014, and increased their support by 3.9 
and 4.6 per cent, respectively. And in smaller states new and 
old populist radical right parties won at times big, like the Es-
tonian Conservative People’s Party (+8.7%), Sweden Democrats 
(+5.7%), and Belgium’s Flemish Interest (+7.2). 
There were some significant losses too though. The Danish 
People’s Party, the biggest party in Denmark in 2014, lost a 
staggering 15.8 per cent, while Jobbik was decimated, losing 
half of its vote, under Viktor Orbán’s competitive authorita-
rian regime. In the wake of the “Ibiza scandal,” the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) lost just 2.5 per cent compared to 2014, 
but almost ten per cent compared to the 2017 national elec-
tions.
However, more than anything, the populist radical right 
increased their presence and power within Brussels because 
of the transformation of two governing parties in the East, 
Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. Both 
parties were still considered conservative in 2014, but shifted 
to the populist radical right in the wake of the so-called ‘refu-
gee crisis’ of 2015, and the Jihadist terrorist attacks in Brussels 
and Paris around that time. Despite being confronted with 
a new opposition coalition, PiS increased its support by 13.6 
per cent, while Fidesz built upon its 2014 majority, albeit only 
with 0.8 per cent.
Third, the extreme right remains represented in Brussels. 
While the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) lost 
its one seat, and the Greek Golden Dawn (XA) lost almost 
half of its support, but retained one seat, Marian Kotleba’s 
neo-Nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS) came third with 
12.1 per cent (+10.3). And in the margins, the National Popular 
Front (ELAM) in Cyprus, a Golden Dawn wannabe, won 8.3 per 
cent (+5.3%); not enough for a seat in Brussels, but making it 
the fifth biggest party on the island.
In conclusion, the 2019 European elections confirmed a 
trend that was already visible in national elections in the last 
few years. Left populism is largely irrelevant, having lost its 
2014-15 momentum, while the far right, in all its permuta-
tions, is still on the rise. That its most recent success is seen 
as containment, or even failure, says more over our expecta-
tions than their results. The far right constituted the biggest 
party in five member states (France, Hungary, Italy, Poland 
and UK) and the second or third biggest party in four more 
(Austria, Belgium, Slovakia, Sweden) – and is a (smaller) part 
of electoral coalitions that are among the biggest three parties 
in Croatia and Latvia.
It is time to reflect this change in our political debate, 
most notably by changing the terminology. This is not the rise 
of populism, but of nativism, a xenophobic form of nationa-
lism. The main enemy is not the ‘own’ elite, but the ‘other’ 
non-elite, be it ‘the’ Jew, Muslim or Roma. The backlash is not 
politically diverse, or amorphous, it comes from the right, the 




The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections have been par-
ticularly dismal for the European radical left. It has lost a sig-
nificant amount of popular support, it has lost a considerable 
number of MEPs, and the results tell a cautionary tale about 
the expectations and future prospects of this party family. I 
will first review the dimensions of the defeat and then reflect 
on its meaning. 
The nature of the electoral defeat for the radical left is 
partially conditional on the time point of comparison used. If 
we take the previous 2014 EP elections to diagnose its evolu-
tion, the 2019 EP elections are nothing short of an electoral 
cataclysm. The performance is such that the radical left party 
family can only show the results in Belgium as a spotless 
success: the PTB obtained an MEP for the first time, notably 
increased its popular support, and reached a significant share 
of the vote. Beyond this result, only The Left in Slovenia, AKEL 
in Cyprus (two MEPs), and the Left Party in Sweden (one MEP), 
can claim a relatively positive and flawless result, as they 
were able to increase their vote share even if they did not 
gain representation (Slovenia), or only slightly increased their 
vote share while maintaining the same number of MEPs (in 
Sweden and Cyprus).
The remaining parties offer a somehow sombre landscape. 
Nevertheless, it is advisable to differentiate between parties 
and countries, because in some countries with more than 
one radical left party their fate differed. For example, the 
Portuguese Left Block improved very significantly its results 
(increasing from 1 MEP to 2) but the Portuguese radical left 
slightly diminished its overall popular support due to the 
considerable decrease in the vote obtained by the Communist 
Party. The Danish Red-Green Alliance entered the EP with one 
MEP and a modest 5.5 per cent of the vote, but the People’s 
Movement Against the EU did not. 
In any case, there certainly were very substantial defeats, 
perhaps not particularly so in quantitative terms but very no-
table in symbolic terms and increasingly so once that reality 
settles down in the mind of the observer. The French Commu-
nist Party, running alone, got only 2.5 per cent of the vote and 
lost EP representation. Their former coalition partners of the 
La France Insoumise got 6.3 per cent of the vote. Summed up, 
the figure is higher than their 2014 EP elections one but the 
vote share for Mélenchon’s party is extremely modest given 
the ambitions and rhetoric of its leader, and the Communist 
vote share might be pointing towards irreversible decline. 
Similarly, the struggling Italian radical left got an almost in-
significant result. The decrease in Syriza’s vote in Greece was 
relatively small but very meaningful in political terms and 
is a potentially gloomy anticipation of the party’s troubling 
prospects in the national arena. 
Die Linke in Germany, the Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia, the Left Alliance in Finland, and the Socialist 
Party in the Netherlands obtained bad results (or terribly bad 
results in the Dutch and Czech cases) as their vote share was 
significantly reduced. However, it was the electoral disaster 
of the Podemos-United Left coalition in Spain that possibly 
set the tone of these disheartening elections for the radical 
left – together with the modest results of La France Insoumi-
se, the decline of Syriza, and the decrease of Die Linke. The 
Spanish radical left, the quintessential representation of the 
once upon a time promising left-wing populism, and the most 
recent success story for left-wing radicals, saw its share of the 
vote almost halved in five years: from 18 per cent  to 10 per 
cent, and from 11 MEPs to 6 MEPs. 
Leaving aside the ups (some) and downs (many) of the 
European radical left parties, these elections send a warning 
message to both observers and the parties themselves. The ra-
dical left seems more dependent from the context than some 
voluntaristic views within the parties are prone to think. 
The radical left is a significant actor in West European party 
systems, with considerable resilience, and with an identifiable 
social base of support. But apart from the old French and Ita-
lian cases, the Cypriot case, and the recent showings in Spain 
and Greece its support is far from widespread. It benefitted 
from the economic, social and political crises in the aftermath 
of the 2008 Great Recession but it is retreating towards its 
previous electoral marks. 
Small parties are more dependent on a context that they 
can hardly affect, as the status of small party does not favour 
setting the agenda. Parties’ strategies count, surely. But as the 
consecutive success stories throughout decades have shown 
– e.g. the Italian Communist  Refoundation Party, the Geman 
Die Linke, the French La France Insoumise, or the Spanish 
Podemos – there is no secret formula for the radical left to 
succeed in wealthy and developed societies. The disappoint-
ment around the most recent populist strategy should be a 
reminder of that.
Similar to other left-wing parties, the European radical 
left faces the challenge of stabilizing a social base of support. 
They have counted on the support of an electoral coalition 
formed by some sections of the working class and some 
sections of the middle classes. It is in finding an ideological, 
programmatic and political communication mix that makes 
the preferences of those social sectors compatible where the 
future of the radical left likely resides.  
The radical left in the 2019 European parliament 
elections: an electoral defeat and a cautionary tale
Luis Ramiro






Brexit has made many, particularly in the UK, equate Euro-
scepticism with wanting to leave the EU. But across the EU 
most political parties holding Eurosceptic positions do not 
want to leave it. Although they have fundamental issues about 
what the EU is doing or becoming, most party-based Euro-
scepticism stops short of advocating exit. Being clear about 
what sort of Euroscepticism we observe and seeing how the 
different forms performed in the 2019 European Parliament 
elections allows us to paint a picture of Euroscepticism. And 
if we look at those advocating exit from the EU we find they 
performed extremely poorly and Brexit looks like, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a peculiarly UK issue.
We can differentiate between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscep-
ticism. ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism is where opposition to the EU 
is so strong that exit from the EU is the preferred course of 
action. ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism is where there are fundamental 
and deep-seated objections to the EU but where this stops 
short of wanting to leave. 
The 2019 European Parliament elections took place after 
and during various moments of turmoil in the EU. From the 
after effects of the economic crisis and austerity politics, the 
migration crisis and the on-going omnishambles of Brexit, the 
EU seemed braced for a backlash. A rise in support for parties 
expressing Euroscepticism was widely predicted. And in the 
event political parties expressing Euroscepticism did well in 
many EU member states. But a close look at the results overall 
shows that this was mainly soft Eurosceptics. 
Table 1 below summarises research conducted on political 
parties in each member state and shows the performance of 
all the parties that held this position. It reports their national 
vote share and the number of MEPs that were elected from 
these parties. We need to be a little careful about reading too 
much into the vote shares as most of the parties were not 
only hard Eurosceptic parties and may have gained support 
for their other positions. Only two parties were single issue 
hard Eurosceptic parties - the Danish People’s Movement Aga-
inst the EU which only exists to contest European Parliament 
elections and the UK’s Brexit Party. Nonetheless the size of 
the vote for these parties tells us something about their relati-
ve size and importance.
Looking at the parties and countries we can note that 
party-based Euroscepticism is only present in 10 of the 28 
member states, but it is in larger and smaller member states, 
across East and West and in richer and poorer member states. 
The parties are varied and they are mainly parties on the 
extreme right and left of their respective party systems. It is a 
very patchy and inconsistent picture. 
Looking at the performance we can see that hard Euro-
scepticism is a very marginal force in European politics. Only 
nineteen parties (including some independents) holding hard 
Eurosceptic positions contested the EP election. Looking at all 
the hard Eurosceptic parties and what levels of support each 
Party-based hard euroscepticism in  






Source: The data is based on an expert survey by the author and Aleks 
Szczerbiak conducted in 2018, and supplement with the author’s own 
research and expert input generously given by Aleks Szczerbiak (Sus-
sex), Vainius Bartasevicius (Sussex), Sue Collard (Sussex),  Neil Dooley 
(Sussex), Tim Haughton (Birmingham), Dan Hough (Sussex),  Alenka 
Krasovec (Ljubliana), Ivan Llamares (Salamanca),  Francis McGowan 
(Sussex) Roxana Mihaila (Sussex), Kai Oppermann (Chemnitz), Andrea 
Pirro (Florence) Tena Prelec (Sussex),  Allan Sikk (UCL) , Dragomir Stoy-
anov (Bulgaria),  Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė (Vytautas Magnus)
*Some of the data is based on preliminary results.
**The party stood as part of a coalition with other parties which were 
soft Eurosceptics
***There is a case for also including Labour as a hard Eurosceptic party 
as it is currently committed to carrying out Brexit but is not included 
here as it is fundamentally divided on this issue both between and 
within members and MPs.
Country Party Vote MEPs
Czech Republic Freedom and Direct Democracy 9.1 2
Party of Free Citizens 0.7 0
Denmark Peoples Movement Against the EU 3.7 0
France Workers Struggle  0.8 0 
Patriots 0.7 0
Together Patriots and Yellow Vests 0.6 0
Together for Frexit 1.2 0
Greece Communist Party of Greece 5.3 1
Golden Dawn 4.9 1
Ireland Independents (various) 1.6 0
Luxembourg Communist Party 1.1 0
Netherlands Party for Freedom 3.5  0
Forum for Democracy 10.9 3
Poland Freedom Party**  -  -
Slovakia People's Party 12.1 2
Average (excluding UK) 4.0
Total (excluding UK) 9
UK*** UKIP 3.6 0
Brexit 31.7 29
Conservatives 8.7 4
Democratic Unionist Party 0.6 1
Average (including UK) 5.6
Total (including UK) 43
Table 1: Political Parties Holding Hard Eurosceptic  




of them garners we can see that it is an average national vote 
share of 5.6 per cent.  And most of that comes from one mem-
ber state, the UK. Stripping the UK out of the EU picture, (as 
the UK hard Eurosceptics would wish), shows how the figure 
is even smaller at 4.0 per cent. 
If we take a different approach and treat member states as 
the unit of analysis (rather than the individual parties), aggre-
gate the vote shares and take account of member states with 
no hard Eurosceptics, then across the EU hard Eurosceptic 
parties gain 2.4 per cent of the vote. But if we take the UK out 
they get an average of 0.8 per cent. With or without the UK, 
hard Euroscepticism is currently a highly marginal position in 
EU politics. 
By way of comparison, there are 71 parties holding soft 
Eurosceptic positions that contested the EP elections in all 
member states bar one. The average national vote share for 
each of these parties was 9.0 per cent. Included in that group 
are parties of government in Hungary, Poland, Italy and Gre-
ece. And this group makes up 185 MEPs. The parties represen-
ting soft Euroscepticism are a much more significant force 
and with so many MEPs represent a much more substantial 
presence in the European Parliament.
The most extreme form of Euroscepticism, hard Euroscep-
ticism, is currently a marginal and inchoate force across EU 
member states. Only in the UK does it represent a position 
held by a major party of government. In all other EU member 
states hard Euroscepticism is confined to the margins of poli-
tics and is largely the preserve of the extreme right and extre-
me left. Brexit may be very British phenomenon and, on the 
basis of this data, not the harbinger of a larger force across 
the EU. Or it may be that the observation of the experience of 
the Brexit process from outside the UK has forced hard Euro-















Beata Klimkiewicz & Agnieszka Szymanska
Carlos Jalali





The European Parliament elections are the most important 
moment for European democracy as the European Parliame-
nt is the only institution in the EU, which is directly elected 
by European citizens. The European elections have usually 
been characterized by declining levels of participation and in 
2014 elections the average turnout was just at 42.6 per cent. 
The EU, this time, has paid more attention to increasing the 
participation basically by a) making a more intense infor-
mative election campaign regarding the need for European 
citizens to vote and b) by emphasizing the ‘Spitzenkandida-
ten’ process and the role of popular vote in the appointment 
of the President of the European Commission. Turn out in 
2019 European Elections was indeed increased reaching the 
average of 50.97 per cent at the European level with signifi-
cant discrepancies, though between member states. 
Hence, participation has increased but of course we cannot 
argue that this result is the outcome of a) and b) alone as 
different factors interplay in the electoral attitude of Europe-
an citizens across member states, however such an analysis 
cannot take place in this short commentary.  
In terms of a) the electoral campaign, the European 
Parliament has devoted a number of resources in order to 
inform the European citizenry such as the “What Europe does 
for me”-website and the “This time I am voting”-campaign, 
basically aiming at reaching young citizens, in order to raise 
awareness for European Parliament elections and promote 
voting process. 
The ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ (‘lead candidate’) process (b), is 
a process first followed in 2014 Elections according to which 
each European political party appoints a lead candidate for 
the Presidency of the European Commission ahead of the 
elections. Thus the results of the European elections should 
inform the decision of the European Council on who they will 
propose as the President of the European Commission. Article 
17.7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that the 
European Council shall propose a candidate for the Presiden-
cy of the European Commission after ‘taking into account 
the elections of the European Parliament’ and ‘having held 
the appropriate consultations’. This procedure is expected 
to reinvigorate the European democracy and insulate it with 
stronger democratic credentials, addressing at the same time 
the feeling of ‘disconnection’ between European citizens and 
the EU. The ‘Spitzenkandidaten’ process aims to link the vote 
of European elections with the appointment of the President 
of the Commission thus increase legitimacy in decision ma-
king in the EU. It has also introduced electoral competition in 
the European elections and hence the potential for European 
citizens to be informed of the candidates that compete for the 
Commission Presidency and their position on critical topics. 
However, the process remains controversial among EU 
institutions and in academic studies. Advocates of the process 
refer to the arguments we have already mentioned while 
opposing views are concerned with the effect of the procedu-
re on the institutional balance of the EU and the potential loss 
of the prerogatives of the European Council on this subject. 
Some member states, such as France have expressed a strong 
reservation regarding the process.  The Parliament committed 
to the process in its Resolution of 7 February 2018 while the 
European Council has explicitly pointed out the ‘no automati-
city’ of the process. 
In the aftermath of the 2019 European Elections the pro-
cess and its adoption are still puzzling the EU institutions. On 
Tuesday 28th May 2019 the European Parliament has re-con-
firmed its support for the process. On the other hand, the 
statement of D. Tusk after the informal meeting of EU leaders 
on the same day, does not convey clarity on what may follow 
and how the decision is going to be made in terms of the new 
European Commission leader and the ‘lead candidates’. Mr 
Tusk repeated that there is no automaticity regarding the Spit-
zenkandidaten and ‘no one can be excluded’. The statement 
also underlines that “the European Council should propose 
and the European Parliament should elect” thus making a 
clear point on the different roles of the EU institutions in the 
procedure and the need for the new President to enjoy the 
qualified majority of both institutions.  We may argue that 
there is an ambiguity and a flexibility in the statement that 
create more questions than providing answers.
In the end the procedure followed and the criteria on the 
decision for the President of the European Commission will 
define the future of the Spitzenkandidaten process. There 
seems to be a strong disagreement in how the procedure will 
evolve and to which degree the result of the EP elections will 
actually affect the appointment of the President of the EC.  
However, a contrario interpretation of the specific provi-
sion of the TEU would at least point to the conclusion, that 
the results of the European Parliament elections cannot be 
ignored and not taken into consideration in the final decision 
to be made. So, it remains to see how and to what extent the 
European vote will be (dis)connected to the most important 
position on the EU. 
The ‘Lead candidates’ & the European Commission 
presidency. Are they (dis)connected?
Anastasia Deligiaouri
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Normally, Austria is not important for Europe. Normally, 
people know election results well in advance, provided by 
polling forecast companies. Normally, European elections are 
of secondary importance with low voter turnout in Austria. 
But nothing was normal in this 2019 European elections. 
It all started as if everything was normal. Since October 
2017, Austria was governed by a coalition between conservati-
ve Christian Democrats (Peoples’ Party, ÖVP) and the far-right, 
former Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party (FPÖ). Jörg Haider lethally 
crashed his car in October 2008, and his party collapsed short-
ly after. His successor, Heinz-Christian Strache, a dental tech-
nician, well connected and rooted in more or less clandestine 
Neo-Nazi-organisations in his early years, took over the party. 
And he managed to increase its popular support from election 
to election. In 2017, some 26 per cent of the electorate voted 
for Strache’s FPÖ.
In parallel, conservative political shooting star Sebastian 
Kurz, then 31 years old, broke up the former coalition govern-
ment with the Social Democrats and pushed the conservative 
party to obtain 31.5 per cent of votes in the 2017 elections. 
Within few weeks only, a new coalition was built between 
ÖVP and FPÖ. The interior, defense and justice were all 
handed over to ministers from FPÖ. A significant political mis-
take, as events less than two years later would demonstrate.
Such a right-wing government was enacted already in the 
year 2000 in Austria, followed by EU sanctions and massive 
protests all over Europe. Since then however, such right-wing 
coalitions became a common trend. No protest of conside-
rable size took place in 2017. Sebastian Kurz nominated H.C. 
Strache as Vice Prime Minister, Vice-Chancellor as it is called 
in Austria.
Early 2019, before the European election campaign really 
started, everything seemed normal. The ruling parties kept 
applauding themselves for their reforms, and opposition 
parties kept criticizing the government’s unassuming work. 
Early polling forecasts suggested stable European election re-
sults, similar to the national elections of 2017. But then came 
the, “Black Friday” for the Government on May, 18 and that 
marked the end of the normal. 
Two large and highly reputed quality newspapers in Ger-
many (Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der Spiegel) published simul-
taneously on their websites a video clip from 2017, showing 
H.C. Strache and his political assistant, chatting in a holiday 
home in Ibiza with a (non-visible) attractive lady, allegedly 
the niece of a wealthy Russian oligarch. Obviously drunk and 
exalted, the two men invited the lady to invest in Austria. 
They promised her high-volume state-proliferated contracts in 
logistics (thereby withdrawing contracts from one of Austria’s 
largest builders) in case they would win the elections. And 
they suggested her to take over Austria’s largest and highly 
influential newspaper, Kronenzeitung. They would replace 
two or three critical journalists with streamlined ones. This 
move, they claimed, would surely make them win the upco-
ming elections. This secretly produced video went viral within 
minutes. It took H.C. Strache some twelve hours to publicly 
resign from all his political positions. 
The next day, Chancellor Kurz decided to break the 
coalition with his partner FPÖ by succinctly stating “enough 
is enough”. He also dismissed the FPÖ Minister for Interior 
he nominated one and a half years before, and who would 
have been in charge of investigating the potential criminal 
promises made in the video by his own party leader and 
Vice-Chancellor. Subsequently, all but one FPÖ ministers resig-
ned and were replaced by “experts”, according the procedures 
contained in the Austrian’s Constitution. 
At that time , the public had almost forgotten about the 
European elections on May, 26. The government had collap-
sed, and the notorious rising star, H.C. Strache had resigned 
from politics. Polling companies admitted that their previous 
forecasts were null and void, and that there was not enough 
time left to provide new predictions. For the first time since 
decades, Austrian elections took place without effective 
polling forecasts.
Despite -or rather- because of, the domestic turbulences, 
the election turnout reached 60 per cent, much higher than 
the 45 per cent in 2014. Unexpectedly, however, voters remai-
ned pretty loyal despite the video disaster, and FPÖ lost just 2 
per cent compared to 2014 EU elections. By contrast, Sebastian 
Kurz increased voting shares to the all-time high of 34.6 per 
cent (+ 7.6 per cent) in European elections. 
The victory celebration of Sebastian Kurz on election day 
was overshadowed by the announcement of a vote of non-con-
fidence by opposition parties the following Monday. And 
indeed, for the first time ever in Austria’s post World War II 
order, Parliament dismissed the Prime Minister, by votes from 
Social Democrats and FPÖ, the party which had been the 
governing partner until a few days before. Indeed, nothing 
normal in Austria.
What will follow are general elections in September 2019, 
less than two years after Sebastian Kurz entered into coalition 
with FPÖ, ending in a disaster. Kurz will be held responsible 
for his coalition decision in 2017, but voters do not seem to 
care, making him even stronger in the European elections.
The collapse of Austria’s government shortly before Euro-
pean elections, and the far-right wing mind-set which became 
visible in the Ibiza video, sent signals to all other EU member 
states. All over Europe, politicians, even from the far right, 
distanced themselves from FPÖ and H.C. Strache. For once, 
tiny Austria attracted public spot-lights, but unfortunately, for 
the wrong reasons.
Nothing normal in Austria
Josef Trappel






The election campaign for the European Parliament 2019 
evolved away from the clash of different views on the future 
of Europe. It was held predominantly as a rehearsal for the 
upcoming local and optionally early parliamentary elections 
and was developed primarily online. Participants’ messages 
were dominated by the national topics, namely welfare and 
economics. Important issues such as immigration, environme-
nt protection, and security were marginalized.
318 Bulgarian candidates competed for 17 MEPs in the Eu-
ropean elections in 2019 (13 political parties, 8 coalitions, and 
6 independent). Voters went to the polls for the fourth time 
since Bulgaria joined the European Union in 2007, and for the 
second time it was possible to vote preferentially. 6 288 656 
were those with voting rights. The turnout rate, however, 
at these European elections was 32.64 per cent – the lowest 
one compared to that in 2009 (37.49 %) and in 2014 (35.84 %).  
Indeed, the Election Day was the last of the three holidays 
related to the celebration of the Slavic alphabet (created by 
Cyril and Methodius in IXth century), but the electoral apathy 
was caused mainly by the ineffective pro-European debate. 
The voting resulted in: 6 seats for CEDB (EPP), 5 seats for BSP 
(PES), 3 seats for MRF (ALDE), 2 seats for IMRO-BNM (ECR) and 1 
seat for DB (EPP).
The main intrigue in these elections was between the ru-
ling political party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
– CEDB, part of the European People’s Party and the main opposi-
tion political coalition BSP for Bulgaria, belonging to the family 
of the Party of the European Socialists. Socialists opted mainly for 
the national issues as a rehearsal for the upcoming local and 
possible early parliamentary elections. The campaign of the 
CEDB was positive, pro-European. These two fundamentally 
different approaches undoubtedly reflected on the election 
results of the two main political rivals in Bulgaria.              
Although a leading political power, CEDB suffered image 
damage at the start of the campaign due to accusations of 
corruption raised by BSP. Without any substantial investiga-
tion the suspected were immediately dismissed from service 
by the Prime Minister and leader of CEDB Boyko Borisov. His 
national and international activity supported the positive 
pro-European image of the CEDB messages. That is why the 
withdrawal of sympathizers from CEDB was not transformed 
into a categorical superiority for the BSP coalition. Additional 
difficulties in the left-wing political party strategic behavi-
or were caused by its Parliament boycott for three months 
before the start of the campaign aiming to link a possible 
Euro-election victory with early parliamentary elections. The 
aggressive style of the campaign and the internal contradic-
tions of this coalition culminated during the definition of the 
electoral list, which almost led to the sensational exclusion of 
Sergei Stanishev, current leader of the European Socialist Par-
ty. These internal fights of the socialists actually helped CEDB 
to mobilize its supporters. All these scandals overshadowed 
the debate on the major issues of the EU’s future. 
The CEDB team was led by the acting Commissioner for 
Digital Economy and Society, Maria Gabriel, and included 
other successful political figures. Its potential has evolved on 
the attraction of wider electoral periphery in the urban areas. 
Moreover, the emblematic for the beginning of the democra-
tic processes of 1989 Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and other 
smaller right-wing political formations supported CEDB to win 
the first place in the race. This move disintegrated the tradi-
tional right-wing political space represented by the coalition 
Democratic Bulgaria (DB), which took the last, fifth place in the 
ranking. 
Traditionally, a constant third actor as in all kinds of 
elections was the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) - the 
political referent of the Turkish minority in the country and 
belonging to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. 
It ran a positive campaign, without scandals and political 
mudslinging.
The coalition of the nationalists The United Patriots, repre-
sented in the National Parliament and part of the governme-
nt, failed to maintain its unity and its three political forces 
participated separately in the pre-election race. Only one 
of them – the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
– Bulgarian National Movement – (IMRO-BNM), member of the 
European Conservatives and Reformists, took the fourth place in 
the race, attracting supporters with its messages on limiting 
migration, protecting national interests, and replacement of 
the traditional values. The main slogan of its campaign was 
‘Europe of Fatherlands’.
Although spending a lot of financial and organizational 
resources in the campaign, the coalition of the Bulgarian 
extreme right-wing, represented in the National Parliament, 
populist party Volya – the Bulgarian Patriots (Will), didn’t rank. 
As part of the European family of the Movement for Europe of 
Nations and Freedom, the Volya (Will) political party advocates po-
pulist and reform policies, promotes patriotism, strict immig-
ration controls, friendlier relations with Russia, and the need 
to ”sweep away the garbage of the corrupt political establish-
ment”. The coalition received significant support by Marine Le 
Pen, the leader of the populist and nationalist French National 
Rally and Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Italian right-wing 
political party Lega Nord.  
The European elections 2019 in Bulgaria showed that active 
pre-election campaign does not always bring the expected 
dividends. BSP was the political party that mostly communi-
cated its messages via Facebook, but failed to overcome the 
activity of CEDB and its leader among voters. Despite the 
massive and expensive campaign, Volya (Will) remained under 
the threshold. Facebook messages prevailed over the TV 
commercials, posters and printed materials. The insufficient 
debate on substantial European issues brought about low 
turnout of the voters. 
Bulgaria: Low turnout because  
of insufficient European debate
Lilia Raycheva





Reviving memories of the historically lowest election turnout 
five years ago (18.2%), most commentators have not expected 
the campaign for the 2019 EP election to spark either any 
controversy or much of an interest by the Czech public. It 
was therefore a rather pleasant surprise to see a 10 per cent 
increase in the turnout – up to 28.7 per cent - which was the 
highest ever EP election turnout in the Czech Republic, even 
though still the third lowest in the entire EU this year.   
Record number of 39 parties and coalitions have entered 
the election contest, but the intensity of the campaign was 
very moderate, as evidenced by the relatively low campaign 
spending, as most of the relevant parties have more than 
halved their campaign budgets in comparison with the 2017 
Parliamentary Election; the leading party ANO (member 
of the ALDE group) was estimated to have spent by far the 
highest figure (over 35 mil. CZK), but still well short of the 
statutory limit of 50 mil. CZK (2 mil. Euro). The main election 
debate broadcasted by Czech television on the eve of the elec-
tion was only watched by 6,3 per cent of the audience – the 
rest gave preference either to soap operas or to the national 
team’s game at the World Ice Hockey Championship.
Overall, the campaign itself has been fairly lacklustre and 
predominantly relying upon empty slogans devoid of refe-
rences to specific issues (e.i. “For fairer Europe”, “For better 
Europe”, “We are the heart of Europe, we want to be heard!”), 
focusing on core supporters rather than attempting to mobi-
lize new ones. Perhaps the only exception to the rule was the 
topic of double food quality – with global brands being accu-
sed of exporting lower quality product to the Czech Republic 
– that has resonated among voters across political spectrum. 
The dire lack of original ideas was perhaps most apparent 
with regards to the visual campaign style of ANO, the party of 
the Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, who has unabashedly copied 
the trademark of Donald Trump – the red baseball cap with 
white capital letters, just replacing the words “America First” 
with “Strong Czechia”. This very simple imitation – of course 
skilfully promoted across different media platforms – secured 
Babiš plenty of attention, both from journalists and commen-
tators as well as from social media users; and while it has 
sparked the production of a number of parodies and online 
memes, it has certainly fulfilled its main objective. 
However, the red cap was not the only thing Babiš bor-
rowed from Trump for the campaign. ANO’s main slogan 
for the election was “We will protect Czechia. Strictly and 
adamantly“, a not-too-subtle reference to the migration crisis 
which has been used as a bogeyman in the Czech politics 
for the last several years, despite the fact that there are 
virtually no immigrants in the country. Instigating fear from 
immigration – and particularly the Muslim-led one – has 
proven to be an efficient mobilizing strategy in the last 2018 
Presidential Election, won by the incumbent President Miloš 
Zeman. Given that his voters partly overlap with those of 
Andrej Babiš, it is no wonder that the Prime Minister’s party 
adopted similar strategy for the EP election, and that Babiš 
attempted to pose as the hardliner who will protect Czechs 
from Brussels’ alleged plans to impose immigration quotas 
on member countries. Apart from trying to emulate Trump’s 
nationalistic and protectionist appeal to the voters, Babiš was 
actively striving to avert the challenge from the extremist 
right-wing party Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD), led 
by Tomio Okamura, which has reached over 10 per cent of 
votes in the 2017 Parliamentary Election pretty much only by 
playing the anti-immigration card. In the 2019 EP election, 
Okamura resorted to the same rhetoric, although this time 
he accompanied it by another item from Donald Trump’s 
political marketing repertoire, adapting his signature slogan 
to “Czech Republic First!”.
The bet by the two most prominent Czech populist parties 
on a Trumpian style of campaigning has brought mixed 
results in terms of the election outcomes. ANO’s win was 
widely expected, however the 21 per cent of votes that it had 
received – a steep drop from nearly 30 per cent in the 2017 
national election – fell behind most pollsters’ predictions, 
indicating the declining appeal of Andrej Babiš’s technocratic 
populism and, at the same time, growing dissatisfaction with 
his ongoing business scandals that have prompted investiga-
tion by domestic and EU authorities. With 9.1 per cent, SPD on 
the other hand nearly repeated its result from the 2017 Parlia-
mentary Election, capitalizing on its loyal hard-core electo-
rate, and perhaps also on the support by other right-wing 
populist leaders that came to Prague for Okamura’s election 
The imitation game?  
EP election campaign in the Czech Republic
Vaclav Stetka







rally – Matteo Salvini, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. The 
minor partner in the government coalition with ANO, the 
Czech Social Democratic Party (S&D group), was completely 
obliterated, failing to cross the 5 per cent threshold – a result 
widely attributed to the party’s undignified role in Andrej 
Babiš’s increasingly contested government. Both the two 
main opposition parties – the conservative ODS (ECR group, 
14.5%) and the liberal Pirate Party (14%) – recorded electoral 
gains, and in combination with several smaller parties that 
together received nearly 20 per cent, the outcomes of the 
EP election have been generally interpreted as a victory for 
the parliamentary opposition. This result has undoubtedly 
boosted ongoing public protests against Andrej Babiš and his 
government that have been organized by a civic group called 
“Million Moments for Democracy”, bringing into the streets 
a hundred thousand people less than two weeks after the EP 
election. Looking into the near future, the otherwise unevent-




It should not come as a surprise that European Parliament 
(EP) elections tend to revolve around domestic political issues 
– that is inevitably what is first and foremost appealing to 
voters. The 2019 EP elections in Estonia were no exception. 
To the contrary, in the shadow of the recent parliamentary 
elections in March 2019 and an unexpected coalition that 
formed in their aftermath, involving the right-wing populist 
Estonian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE), domestic politics 
was overwhelmingly present during the EP election cam-
paign. Nevertheless, certain conflicts and oppositions present 
on the domestic arena in Estonia also reflected tensions and 
dilemmas that the European Union as a whole and all of its 
member states are facing. 
In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections, the liberal 
Reform Party (member of ALDE in the EP), who won the 
elections, was side-lined in the government formation process 
and instead a coalition was formed by the runner-up, the Cen-
tre Party (also a member of ALDE in the EP), who joined forces 
with its partner from the previous coalition, the right-wing 
conservative Fatherland (member of European People’s Party), 
and the populist EKRE. The populists had entered parliament 
in 2015 with 8.1 per cent of the vote and had remained in 
the opposition. However, being increasingly successful in 
mobilising the vote of the dissatisfied, they more than doub-
led their support by 2019. This created a liberal-conservative 
opposition on the political landscape with the Centre Party in 
the middle. 
Including the populists in government sparked a wave of 
protest among certain segments of the public and framed 
much of the EP election campaign for the opposition parties 
as they were trying to capitalise on this discontent, but also 
influence the conservative vote. For example, a well-known 
Social Democratic politician called for the conservative 
leaning voters to choose Fatherland for EP rather than EKRE. 
Enjoying a surge of popularity, the Reform Party and its lead 
candidate, the European Commissioner Andrus Ansip, even 
tried to market themselves as a protest party. Coming from 
a party that had been in government from 1999 to 2016 and 
from the candidate who enjoys one of the highest offices in 
the EU, this was a bit ironic. 
The Reform Party did win the EP elections with 26.2 per 
cent of the vote, securing 2 out the 6 seats for Estonia, but 
their popularity at the polls was much less than the overall 
support for the party. With only six seats to distribute and 
the whole country as one election district, the EP elections in 
Estonia have always been much more about particular candi-
dates than parties and their popularity as a whole. 
This is most evident in the fact that the second place in 
the EP elections was taken by the Social Democrats with 23.3 
per cent of the vote. Their support for the EP elections was 
twice as high as their popularity in the context of a national 
election would have been. Virtually all (85 per cent) of the 
Social Democratic vote was gathered by Marina Kaljurand, a 
well-known former diplomat and the Reform Party’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs during the last cabinet of Taavi Rõivas. Her 
outstanding result gave the Social Democrats two seats in the 
European Parliament. 
The two remaining seats were distributed between the 
Centre Party and EKRE. Support for the Centre Party was 
much lower than in the previous EP elections (14.4 instead 
of 22.4 per cent) and some of this loss is attributable to the 
fallout from the controversial coalition with EKRE. Siding 
with the Estonian nationalists was too much for some of the 
Russian voters of the party as well as some of its more promi-
nent members. A Centre Party MP, Raimond Kaljulaid, left the 
party protesting the coalition and decided to run as an inde-
pendent candidate in the EP elections. He managed to gather 
6.2 per cent of the vote, some of which could have gone to the 
Centre Party had he remained in their ranks. 
The two conservative parties, EKRE and Fatherland, finis-
hed one just above (EKRE with 12.7 per cent) and the other 
just below (Fatherland with 10.3 per cent) the vote share that 
would have been likely to guarantee one of the six mandates 
in European Parliament. Should Brexit finally happen, Estonia 
would receive one more place in the European Parliament 
and that one place would go to Fatherland. 
As the scores in the EP elections were settled on other 
grounds, questions directly relating to the European Union 
were never in the spotlight during the campaign. But the 
emerging liberal-conservative divide in national politics also 
carries a European component that exemplifies some of the 
overall dilemmas that the EU is facing. Both Fatherland and 
EKRE emphasised in their EP election manifestos that they 
stand for a Europe of sovereign nation states, indicating that 
they are against further European integration or federalisa-
tion. Even though EKRE has been called a Eurosceptic party, 
they, like many of their populist brethren across Europe, 
seem to be explicitly against only a federal EU with more 
authority conceded to Brussels. This conservative position 
was counterbalanced by the Social Democrats and the Centre 
Party, both of whom would seemingly prefer a much stronger 
and deeper union.  In this way the question of Europe was 
firmly on the agenda, even if it was not at the core of the 
campaign. 
Estonia: Europe on the agenda  








Expectations were low ahead of the May 2019 European 
elections in Finland. Elections to Eduskunta, the unicameral 
national legislature, were on 14 April, and government forma-
tion talks – that normally last around 1-2 months in Finland 
– would coincide with the EP election campaign. Hence there 
were legitimate fears that the media and the parties involved 
in the bargaining over government would understandably 
prioritize the cabinet formation process. A similar situation 
had occurred twenty years earlier in 1999: back then there 
was hardly any European election campaign to speak of and 
turnout dropped to a disappointing 31.4 per cent (including 
only those citizens residing in Finland), the lowest level of 
turnout in European elections held in Finland.
Following the April Eduskunta elections, the leader of the 
largest party, Antti Rinne of the Social Democrats, started go-
vernment formation talks with four other parties: the Centre 
Party, the Green League, the Left Alliance, and the Swedish 
People’s Party. National Coalition, the Finns Party, and the 
Christian Democrats were thus heading for the parliamen-
tary opposition. To be sure, all eyes were on Rinne and his 
unlikely coalition of parties, and for a moment it seemed that 
European matters – which had not really featured at all in the 
Eduskunta election debates – were completely absent from 
the agenda. 
Yet this absence of EU from the national political agenda 
can at least partly be explained by the ‘open list’ electoral 
system. The whole country forms one single constituency and 
citizens vote for individual candidates that are not pre-ranked 
by their political parties. With only 13 seats up for grabs (14 
including the potential ‘Brexit’ seat), candidates thus have 
a strong incentive to highlight their own personal qualities 
(political experience, knowledge of ‘Brussels’ etc.) and issue 
priorities. Party leaders thus stay in the background, leaving 
campaigning to their candidates. This also creates a dilemma 
for the media in terms of fair and equal treatment of the 
candidates. For example, in many of the leading debates, the 
parties were represented by their most famous or ‘leading’ 
candidates, giving them thus additional free exposure. Need-
less to add, those candidates not invited to the debates were 
not pleased. 
The national level debates focussed on several topics, such 
as climate change, immigration, and the general question 
of the desirability of European integration. Particularly the 
left-leaning parties – the Social Democrats, the Greens, the 
Left Alliance – underlined the importance of EU in addressing 
climate change whilst also calling for protection of workers 
and fairer rules for international trade. The radical right and 
populist the Finns Party, not surprisingly, emphasized the 
dangers of uncontrolled borders and immigration, while the 
centre-right parties the National Coalition and the Centre Par-
ty prioritized the benefits of a stronger Europe, both in terms 
of internal market and international politics. With the excep-
tion of the Finns Party, the campaign was thus dominated by 
pro-European arguments and positions. However, as explained 
above, individual candidates have their own campaigns, and 
the positions of the candidates may not follow the party 
line. In fact, particularly parties that are divided over Europe 
have an incentive to field candidates with diverse views over 
integration.        
Turnout was 42.7 per cent (or 40.8 % when counting also ci-
tizens not living in Finland), somewhat higher than five years 
earlier when 41.0 per cent of the citizens cast their votes. Whi-
le this does not represent a spectacular rise by any means, it 
was nonetheless a positive surprise, as most commentators 
were expecting turnout to decrease given the busy electoral 
calendar and the simultaneously held government formation 
talks. It is probable that several factors contributed to the 
higher turnout. Climate change, which had been the top issue 
in the April Eduskunta elections, clearly mobilised voters. 
Various threats to European integration and democracy – 
Brexit, Trump and the rise of populism throughout Europe, 
authoritarian developments in Russia and Turkey, democratic 
backsliding in Poland and Hungary – may have reminded 
voters of the value of the EU. And thirdly, some of the media, 
not least the public broadcasting company Yle, deserve credit 
for running a series of informative stories and debates on 
Europe and the EP as the elections approached.
The results were in line with predictions. The National 
Coalition retained its three seats and emerged as the largest 
party with 20.8 per cent of the votes. Probably benefiting 
from the attention given to climate change, the Green League 
finished second with 16.0 per cent of the votes and three seats 
(including the Brexit seat). The Social Democrats (14.6 %), the 
Finns Party (13.8 %), and the Centre (13.5 %) all won two seats, 
while the Left Alliance (6.9 %) and the Swedish People’s Party 
(6.3 %) held on to their single seats.
To conclude, despite the unfavourable context, the 2019 EP 
elections in Finland produced a higher turnout than five years 
earlier. Perhaps more importantly, while Finnish candidates 
and political parties hardly mentioned their European level 
parties or EP party groups in their campaigns, the elections 
could be considered really ‘European’ in the sense that the de-
bates did focus on European or international issues, with the 
government formation process and other ‘domestic politics’ 
matters not featured in the campaign.
Finland: European elections in 
the shadow of national politics
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In France, a lot was at stake for the 2019 European Parliament 
Election, and indeed a lot has happened, making less and less 
true 1980 Reif & Schmitt labeling of these elections as ”second 
order” – as indeed considered in the past in France where 
political parties often populated their candidates’ lists by 
recycling worn-out politicians. 
First, as in many other European Union countries, eve-
ryone was wondering about a possible increase of the share 
of the extreme-right populist party, the ”Rassemblement 
National” (formerly ”Front National”). They received a lot 
of attention because the party had been blatantly trying to 
capitalize on the long-lasting protests of the ”Yellow Vests”. 
The spontaneous chaotic movement born through Facebook 
pages and Tweets had sorely contested Emmanuel Macron’s 
Presidency during the previous six months.
Second, this was the first nationwide vote since the 2017 
Presidential election, so its outcome was seen as a critical step 
of Emmanuel Macron’s five-year mandate. Bad results for the 
list he supported would have been catastrophic for the remai-
ning part of his presidency, as sometimes midterm elections 
fallouts in the United States. 
Third, Emmanuel Macron 2017 victory, crowning a young, 
never elected, and party-less candidate, had stricken a major 
blow to the former ruling party, the Socialist Party. Many 
were now wondering if the European polling would concur.
At 20.00 on Sunday, May 26th, the first numbers of the exit 
polls flashed on the television screens, and surprised many. 
It became instantly clear that the 2019 European Parliame-
nt Elections had become a major political event in France, 
despite a mostly dull campaign even easily discarded when 
Notre-Dame Cathedral caught fire.
First, the 50.12 per cent participation rate was much 
higher than in the two previous similar elections, when it 
had painfully climbed above 40 per cent. This demonstrated 
that the French citizens had understood the stakes and it 
gives a strong credibility to the competing political parties 
scores with obvious consequences about their potential future 
influence.
Second, while no less than a record number of 34 lists had 
been competing, a mere three managed to dominate, pass the 
symbolic 10 per cent threshold, and altogether gather nearly 
60 per cent of the votes. The list supported by the ”Rassemble-
ment National” arrived first, with 23.31 per cent. It was closely 
followed by the list supported openly in the last days of the 
campaign by President Macron, with 22.41 per cent. Finally, 
the Green Party achieved the third rank with 13.47  
per cent, a fair figure not predicted by most opinion polls. 
Way behind came the two parties which had been sharing 
power in France during the past half-century. For the ”tradi-
tional” Right, the former Sarkozy party now led by Laurent 
Wauquiez collapsed to an unexpected 8.48 per cent (far from 
the opinion polls higher calculations). For the Left, the Socia-
list Party remained at its weakest as in 2017 with a mere 6.19 
per cent. It landed only a leg behind the far-left list supported 
by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, with 6.31 per cent, a free fall after his 
very high 2017 19.58 per cent.
This means that the reshuffle of the French political lands-
cape initiated by Emmanuel Macron in 2017 is now confirmed 
and is even fiercer:
– Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen 2017 duel seems to be 
durably in place, Macron’s own party, ”La République en Marche” 
apparently being the only one able to withstand the Far-Right 
party attempts to grasp power; 
– Being a very close second to the ”Rassemblement National” has 
paradoxically reinforced Emmanuel Macron’s Presidency. It shows 
that he has overcome the Yellow Vests protests with a share of the 
votes neighboring his 2017 successful score for the first round of the 
Presidential election;
– The decay of the Left is now corroborated, while it was partly 
hidden by Jean-Luc Mélenchon good cut at the 2017 vote, in regard 
to the then historic poor result of the ”legitimist” Socialist Party 
candidate, Benoît Hamon;
– A new phenomenon is the dire regression of the Right. ”Les 
Républicains”, the Wauquiez party, has severely dropped from the 
20.01 per cent obtained by François Fillon in 2017 despite his judici-
al tribulations. This means that Macron’s clever 2019 targeting to 
the right has reached its goal and has had the same positive result 
for him that his tearing of the left in 2017, thus compensating some 
losses at his left;
– Finally, the emerging awareness about the climate change has fa-
vored the Green Party, also helped by its pro-European statements 
fitting this very election, and by Macron’s targeting to the right.
Far from second order elections, the 2019 European Parliame-
nt Election has confirmed and even amplified the reshuff-
ling of French Politics led by Emmanuel Macron since 2017. 
Formerly dominated by a longstanding Right/Left rivalry, the 
French political landscape seems now subject for the years 
to come to an opposition between Liberal pro-Europeans on 
one side and Far-Right Nationalists on the other. As for its 
outcome in the near future, it is hard to assess now if Emma-
nuel Macron will manage to conciliate at the same time his 
alternate efficiency in targeting the left in 2017 and the right 
in 2019 in order to win future elections.
France: A confirmation of the  
2017 reshuffling of french politics
Philippe Maarek





In view of increasing populism along with growing nationa-
lism and the drifting apart of the EU countries, the Europe-
an Election 2019 was declared a key election in Germany. 
Moreover, the rise of global issues such as climate change and 
migration as well as the unpredictable US government have 
further highlighted the relevance of a strong force in Europe. 
In fact, in the last weeks before Election Day, interest in the 
election was considerably stronger than five years earlier and 
with 61.4 per cent also led to a turnout above EU average. 
Several factors may have contributed to the turnout that 
was 18 percentage points higher than 2014. In addition to 
mobilization in favor of or against the right-wing populist 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), the abolishment of the threshold 
for European Elections in 2014 may have contributed to an 
interest in the election, because voters have the feeling that 
every vote counts. Since the European Election does not de-
termine a government and a prime minister or chancellor as 
well as the fall of the election threshold invite people to vote 
according to their preferences rather than tactical calcula-
tions. Therefore, voters may have seen the European Election 
as an opportunity to express their opinion about the Federal 
Government after not much more than one year of the grand 
coalition.
Against this background, it was surprising that the cam-
paign started late and remained low-key until shortly before 
the election on May 26. It only gained momentum with the 
incipient discussion about the role of the Spitzenkandidaten 
and the release of the Ibiza video by two German print media 
that disavowed the Austrian vice-chancellor and leader of the 
populist FPÖ Strache and eventually caused the break of the 
Austrian government. 
With the long-time MEP Manfred Weber, a German was 
running as lead candidate of the European Peoples Party (EPP). 
Even though the EPP was expected to experience a loss in 
votes, Weber seemed to have a good chance of becoming the 
next President of the Commission. During the campaign,  
Angela Merkel was accused of not backing Weber whole-
heartedly and finally the French President Macron expressed 
reservations about the Spitzenkandidaten process and declared 
that he would not support Weber.
In addition to a discussion about the legitimate methods 
of investigative reporting and whether the end justifies the 
means, the publication of the Ibiza video sparked speculation 
about its impact on the European Election and the outcome 
for the populist parties particularly. However, just as other po-
pulist parties, the German AfD reacted by calling the incident 
a singular case.
The campaign got a final kick when a 26-year old and until 
then mostly unknown YouTuber released a video under the 
title ”The destruction of the CDU” in which he ranted for al-
most an hour mainly about CDU policy, ending with an appe-
al not to vote for the parties of the governing coalition (CDU/
CSU and SPD) and not for the populist AfD either. Instead he 
endorsed the Greens. The stupendous success of the video 
left the CDU dumbfounded, not knowing how to react on the 
attack. In view of the performance of the CDU in the election, 
the party leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK) impru-
dently criticized the video as a manipulation of public opinion 
(”Meinungsmache”) and asked for more regulation of the web. 
Being understood as an attack on freedom of opinion, the 
remark provoked fierce reactions online and offline providing 
for a blow to AKK’s ambition to become the next chancellor 
candidate of her party.
In Germany, the election results forebode domestic conse-
quences. The outcome for the coalition parties of the Federal 
Government seems to confirm the end of the catch-all parties 
(”Volksparteien”). Whereas the Christian Democrats remained 
the strongest party despite a drop of 7.5 percentage points 
compared to 2014, the Social Democrats only got 15.8 per cent 
recording a loss of 11.4 percentage points. The big winner 
of the election was the Green Party with a share of 20.5 per 
cent and votes mostly migrating from the CDU/CSU and the 
SPD. This not only expresses a low satisfaction with the grand 
coalition in Berlin, but also reflects the fact that environmen-
tal issues have been climbing up on the public agenda and are 
about to replace migration/refugees as most important topic. 
The differentiation of the election results shows that CDU/
CSU and SPD have lost the young electorate. Many of them 
have taken to the streets in the last months challenging the 
government to deal with the burning issue of climate change. 
Thus, the Greta effect has worked in favor of the Greens that 
are traditionally attributed the competence for the environ-
ment. With a vote share that almost doubled compared to 
2014 and ranking second, the Greens have achieved a power-
ful position in the German political landscape that cannot 
easily be ignored.
Even though reaching a two-digit result, the AfD was disap-
pointed about the election outcome. The party’s strongholds 
are mostly in the East German states which points to a polari-
zation between East and West and provides also for a glance 
at the outcome of the election in three of the East German 
states later this year. 









For a nation facing so many diverse and challenging issues 
as well as the realities of its own political size in Europe, one 
might assume a certain amount of bitterness and resentment 
stemming from Greek politics regarding the EU. The statistics 
of the 2019 Spring Eurobarometer show a massive wave 
of mistrust towards the EU with the Greek citizens feeling 
unheard, uncared and unrepresented. It is true that before the 
gruelling Eurogroup meetings and the spectacular and often 
harsh press coverage, Greeks were amongst those highly 
supporting the EU. But given the developmental regional EU 
policies of the 90’s we can see a clear distinction between 
utilitarianism and the overarching support. 
There is also the deeper issue of perception. The country 
has been misrepresented for years by its own politicians, 
academic community, the foreign press and most political 
institutions. At best Greece is seen as an attractive vacation 
destination; at worse as a lawless no man’s land. Culturally, 
historically and politically the country has been cut off from 
Europe. Its geographic location and neighbours haven’t hel-
ped to bridge the gap. The question of West vs. East, North vs. 
South has been a chronic one; and the question that shapes 
the ordinary Greek citizens’ relationship to the EU. And even 
though the legislation coming from the European Parliament 
influences massively the national policies, voters approached 
the EU elections as they have always done. Focusing on 
expressing resentment or admiration, hope or fear, protest 
or support to the Greek government. But this is clearly a top-
down stance rather than just a popular misconception. 
Following the Greek case, it is mostly three external 
factors that pushed the European agenda into almost oblivion. 
First of all was the decision to stack up the European elections 
on the local and regional elections, misdirecting part of the 
electorate as to the purpose of the European elections. While 
the intention of mobilizing the voters on three distinct and 
very important elections is commendable, the combination 
clearly favoured national politics over the EU. Secondly, the 
fact that the political leaders of the government and opposi-
tion made clear that the European elections were really about 
gauging the popular sentiment a few months prior to the 
national ones. For the Greek voters who didn’t have a chance 
to voice their opposition or support since the referendum and 
the elections of 2015, this development was a chance to do so, 
a point advertised repeatedly by the opposition. The govern-
ment found itself on the defensive and stroke back by decla-
ring that voting in Greece or the EU held the same meaning; 
Greeks should choose between the “Greece of the many” and 
the “Greece of the elites”. Lastly, while the candidates for the 
EU parliamentary elections campaigned vigorously, they were 
overshadowed by the two main party leaders who on every 
occasion managed to supplant the EU electoral campaign pre-
senting it as part of the national election process. In a space 
of few months the party leaders campaigned up and down 
the country spreading polarization, promises and grandiose 
proclamations. 
The results were as follows: As polls showed SYRIZA party, 
failing to present as “the party of the many”, was surpassed 
by the opposition New Democracy party by almost 9 per cent. 
With per cent of the popular vote, it is worrisome that the 
New Democracy is but the certain victor of the upcoming 
national election, especially when the national agenda is con-
cerned. The Kin.Al, socialist party, and KKE communist party 
gained only marginally compared to 2014. In regard to the 
previous EP makeup, the big losers were the liberal “Potami” 
party and right-wing populist party of “Independent Greeks” 
who were pushed out on the national controversy as they 
supported the agreement with North Macedonia. Many were 
happy to see the extreme right wing party of Golden Dawn 
losing almost half of its voters. However, the big surprise was 
the far-right conspiracy peddler “Greek Solution” party which 
managed to capitalise on low EU trust. 
Another interesting point is that while facing 10 years of 
austerity, crisis and still a record high unemployment rate, al-
most half of the Greek population respond that remaining in 
the EU has been a positive experience for the country, while 
17 per cent maintain the opinion that the EU has harmed the 
country. No one should be surprised that the Greek citizens 
overwhelmingly feel that their voices and their country’s 
interests are not being heard inside the EU.
It could stand as a point of grace for Greek society that 
despite multiple near bankruptcies and punishing austerity 
programs, the demonization and mockery of the foreign 
press, as well as an unprecedented refugee crisis the society 
showed resilience in resisting to devolve into the extreme far 
right ideology. However, we should not celebrate the Golden 
Dawn losing a significant part of its electoral base from 
previous years. The sudden rise of the “Greek Solution” party 
should hint towards a bigger concern; 4 per cent of the voters 
still support extreme right ideology albeit in the disguise of 
conspiracy theories and pseudo-patriotism.
More importantly, the rise and fall of SYRIZA is a cautio-
nary tale. Greek citizens still have not come to terms with 
the underlying causes and trauma of the harsh austerity 
measures. This dissociation has given spark to flights of 
fantasy. Along the aforementioned distrust to the EU, Greek 
citizens report unprecedented mistrust against the state and 
most of its institutions. This complete dismissal of democratic 
institutions should worry us all. 
Dealing with the outliers
Stylianos Papathanassopoulos







European ballot results for Poland set two important changes 
in previous EC election trends. The first stands for unusually 
high turnout reaching 45,68 per cent (in previous elections 
frequency oscillated between 20 – 25 per cent). The second is 
a heavy dominance of two largest political camps composed 
of the ruling party Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
– PiS: 45,38 per cent) and oppositional European Coalition 
(Koalicja Europejska – KE: 38,47 per cent). In comparison with 
other UE member states, such duopoly seems rather unusual 
as votes tend to split among larger number of parties. 
European elections, but domestic issues
The EP Election campaign in Poland proved to be very dyna-
mic and at the same time sturdily dominated by domestic is-
sues, perceived by many (including politicians of both camps) 
as a last test before the parliamentary elections in autumn. 
PiS decided to win the voters with the message on package 
of social spending policies known as Kaczynski’s high five 
(Piątka Kaczyńskiego), which included e.g. extension of ‘500+’ 
child subsidy program, bonus payments for retirees, income 
tax exemption for workers under 26 years and others. The 
rhetoric of PiS’s success was strenuously promoted by the 
public service television and catholic media (especially the 
radio Maryja and TV Trwam), and has not been sufficiently 
overshadowed by other issues, even with such a range as 
nationwide teachers’ strike or child sex abuse scandal by 
Catholic priests, covered by an independent documentary Tell 
No One (Tylko nie mów nikomu). The film, released just few 
weeks before the elections (on 11 May) by a well-known Polish 
journalist Tomasz Sekielski, has immediately become one 
of YouTube’s most watched films in Poland with millions of 
viewers within a few days after its dissemination and almost 
22 million till today. The documentary spurred a debate about 
an institutional responsibility of Polish catholic church for 
covering up the crimes of disputed priests. Given that the 
church has long been involved in politics and cultivated a 
close alliance with PiS, the debate immediately attained a po-
litical dimension.  PiS reacted very fast to regain control over 
setting the agenda, while Jarosław Kaczyński declared that PiS 
is absolutely determined to eliminate any kind of child sex 
abuse. Polish Parliament hastily introduced changes to the 
Penal Code that, among others, aimed at increasing penalties 
(up to 30 years of prison for perpetrators). The amendment 
process was quite typical for the PiS policy: prompt reaction 
lacked grounding in a careful analysis of the problem. In 
other words, technocratic weakness has not affected political 
efficiency.
KE (European Coalition) was formed from main opposi-
tion parties: centre-right Civic Platform (PO), agrarian Polish 
Peasant Party (PSL), communist successor Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and liberal Modern (Nowoczesna). One of its 
weaknesses from scratch has been an ideologically eclectic 
character, but also a lack of fresh message and policy that 
could challenge the PiS’s cemented position. KE attempted to 
frame its campaign as a choice between joining European ma-
instream politics by Poland, or declining from EU mainstream 
and country’ international standing under the PiS leadership. 
PiS mobilized intensively to articulate its vision of Europe and 
reasserted strong commitment to continued membership in 
the EU. Despite that Law and Justice represents anti-federalist 
orientation emphasizing the strong position of member states 
instead of extending EU competencies, it certainly strives for 
fitting into a popular will and wide support of Poles for the 
EU membership. In this sense, the European Coalition tactic 
proved miscalculated. In 2019, Law and Justice seemed much 
stronger than was in 2015. To win new voters KE needed a 
fresh offer, new strategy and most importantly,  
new leadership. 
Polish people are divided, but have no doubts about europe
Polish society is politically deeply polarized, but EU mem-
bership is definitely not a dividing factor. The political divides 
cut across ideological choices and beliefs, but also two diffe-
rent narratives offered by the media supporting or criticizing 
the current government. The CBOS’s 2018 results of the polls 
show the lowest level of trust to the news media since 2002. 
In the 2019 polls, 80 per cent of respondents declared that 
media coverage of the same issues is so different that it is very 
difficult to find out the truth. Despite these cleavages, Polish 
people see the balance of Poland’s 15-year membership in EU 
as clearly positive. Interestingly, in 2018 Poles trusted in the 
EU more than in their own government, parliament, political 
parties or the media. Furthermore, in 2019 over a half of Poles 
(56% per cent) say they consider themselves to be European. 
In the current political situation, this strong bond of Polish 
society with the idea of European integration is therefore the 
best guarantee of Poland’s presence in European structures. 
There is no political force, which can afford to ignore this 
attachment. At least not yet. 
Poland: Mobilized, divided and EU-positive
Beata Klimkiewicz
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In March 2018, Portugal’s finance minister Mário Centeno 
gave a talk at his alma mater, Harvard University. The theme 
of the talk was post-bailout Portugal, with a revealing title: 
“from sick man to poster boy”.
The title of Centeno’s talk aptly illustrates the chasm 
that separates Portugal at the time of the 2014 European 
Parliament elections to that of the country in these 2019 EP 
elections. In May 2014, Portugal was just emerging from an 
EU-IMF-ECB bailout, with an economy ravaged by the Euro-
zone crisis. Politically, the country was split between those 
that considered the bailout’s austerity a necessary remedy 
for the country’s economic woes, against those that saw it as 
an avoidable, if not pernicious, therapy. This political divide 
percolated through to attitudes towards the EU. Typically, 
among the most pro-EU member-states, Portugal saw a sharp 
decline in support for the European Union during the bailout. 
In a Eurobarometer from June 2014, 31 per cent of Portuguese 
respondents said the EU conjured a negative image for them, 
the fourth highest proportion after Greece, Cyprus and the 
UK, against 30 per cent for whom it conjured a positive image. 
The “sick man” metaphor for Portugal was clear.
Five years later, Portugal appears in the midst of a re-
surgence. The country has been able to maintain balanced 
budgets while gradually reversing austerity. Politically, it is 
one of the few bastions still unscathed by the populist upri-
sing sweeping across Europe. Finally, attitudes towards the EU 
have returned to ante-bailout levels: in a Eurobarometer from 
February-March 2019, Portugal was one of the most Europ-
hile member-states, with some 60 per cent of respondents 
saying the EU conjured a positive image, the second highest 
proportion within the EU, against only 7 per cent that had a 
negative image. This “poster boy” status for Portugal is reflec-
ted in Mário Centeno himself: Portugal’s finance minister was 
dubbed by Wolfgang Schäuble as the “Cristiano Ronaldo of 
the Ecofin”, a reputation that was cemented (alongside with 
the EU’s recognition of Portugal’s turnaround) when he was 
elected President of the Eurogroup in December 2017.
So, what lessons emerge from the 2019 EP elections in this 
EU poster-boy? I would argue that we can note two trends 
that merit attention.
First, rumours of the death of the second-order election 
model may be exaggerated in Portugal. While there is eviden-
ce of greater discussion of EU issues in the media coverage, 
the overall frame for these elections – be it in terms of the 
parties’ campaigns, be it in terms of the media coverage 
– cannot be dissociated from a domestic reading of these 
second-order elections. This is perhaps best reflected in the 
prime minister’s appeal for the EP vote to be cast as a means 
to support his government. The proximity of the upcoming 
legislative elections, to be held in October, certainly reinforces 
this second-order nature. Yet making the EP elections more 
about Europe will also require creating a genuinely European 
public sphere in Portugal, something that remains far from 
emerging. The very low turnout level (officially less than 31%) 
is also a reflection of this.
Second, while it has avoided a major earthquake, the EP 
elections continue to show a fraying of the Portuguese party 
system. Overall, these elections were marked by seemingly 
high party system stability. The six party lists to win EP seats 
are also the lists represented in the national parliament. The 
two most voted parties remain the same since the first demo-
cratic elections of 1975, with one or the other leading virtually 
every government since democratisation. Moreover, the 
party system was able to fend off a seemingly potent populist 
radical right challenge, with the well-funded Basta list falling 
short of winning a seat.
And yet, below this seemingly calm surface, a gradually 
shifting undercurrent emerges. Since 2009, the two main 
parties’ vote share has declined by some 11-12 percentage 
points vis-à-vis their average from 1987 to 2008. In legislative 
elections, their combined vote share in the three legislative 
elections that have taken place (2009, 2011 and 2015) stands at 
65 per cent, against an average of 77 per cent for the earlier 
period. In EP elections, their average fell from 67 per cent in 
the five elections that took place from 1987-2004 to 56 per 
cent in the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. 
It should be noted that these recent elections, from 2009 
to 2015, took place with the spectre of the Great Recession, 
the Eurozone crisis and the bailout looming over Portugal. 
They were elections in a “sick man of Europe”. The 2019 EP 
elections, on the other hand, were elections in a resurgent 
country, a “poster boy of Europe”. This might be expected to 
strengthen support for the two main parties. Yet this did not 
occur in the 2019 EP elections in Portugal: the combined sha-
re of the vote for the two main parties stood at 55 per cent, 
below the average for the 2009-2014 European elections.
So, what do these two trends tell us overall? The first 
implication is that Portugal’s “poster boy” status in terms of 
EU support has potentially shallow foundations. The support 
for the EU appears to be, at least to some extent, predicated 
on the more favourable post-bailout economic conditions. 
However, this support does not emerge out of an engaged 
citizenry or public sphere on European matters, and political 
parties continue to do little to create these. The second is that 
Portugal’s party system – while more stable than many of its 
European counterparts – is perhaps less stable than previously 
thought. Moreover, the two main parties are also the most 
pro-EU parties in the party system. Further erosion of their 
support might well imply changes for the political system’s 
orientation towards the EU also.
Dispatches from the EU’s ’poster boy’: 
The EP 2019 elections in Portugal
Carlos Jalali





Slovenian voters have chosen their representatives in the Eu-
ropean Parliament from the pool of 15 (party) lists that com-
peted for eight seats, among them nine lists of parliamentary 
parties, each with its own list of candidates. With the voter 
turnout of 28.89 per cent, which is 4.34 per cent higher than 
in the 2014 European elections, and more or less the same as 
in 2004 and 2009 elections, the patterns of turnout reveal the 
same story as elections to other chambers. The electoral units 
with the highest turnout are located in around the central 
area of the capital Ljubljana (33.73 %), whereas units with the 
lowest turnout are periferal units in the North-East, around 
Maribor (24.72 %) and Ptuj (24.58 %). 
The apparent victory of this electoral race went to the list 
of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Slovenian 
People’s Party (SLS), with 26.25 per cent of votes. However, it 
needs to be said that SDS entered the race with three MEPs, 
taking SLS on board in order to neutralise the loss of votes at 
the centre-right of the left-right continuum. These strategy 
backfired as fourth-placed candidate from SLS, current MEP 
Bogovič, overtook the third-placed candidate Šulin, also cur-
rent MEP, with the help of preferential vote, thus leaving the 
winning SDS with only two MEPs, both incumbents Zver and 
Tomc. At the centre-left, two seats were acquired by the Social 
Democrats (SD) with 18.66 per cent of the votes, overtaking 
the main governmental party’s List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ) 
that won 15.44 per cent. The remaining seat was acquired by 
New Slovenia – Christian Democrats, 2004 winner of the EP 
elections in Slovenia, with 11.12 per cent of votes. 
Overall, seats are therefore equally distributed between left 
and right, four for the centre-right parties (SDS + SLS and NSi) 
and four for the center-left parties (SD and LMŠ). A clear loser 
of these elections in Slovenia is Levica (eng. Left), which failed 
to win a single seat despite its increasingly important role 
in the national political arena and popularity in the urban 
centres and among youth. Even though forecasts indicated 
at least one seat for them, they managed to get only 6,43 per 
cent, about two per cents short of the threshold. The last 
prognosis from 15 April promised different distribution of 
votes with one MEP being allocated to the abovementioned 
Levica as well as Slovenian National Party (SNS). As a result, 
the results on the election day came as a surprise to many, 
from the SDS, to LMŠ and Levica. 
Campaigns of the three successful centre-right parties 
retained a traditional tendency to address the periphery 
and the rural population. SLS candidates of the SDS+SLS list 
addressed a rural population and agricultural issues, NSi 
gravitated towards Catholics using Christian discourse, while 
SDS generally addressed people with conservative values. 
Successful centre-left parties, on the other hand, addressed 
voters with more progressive cultural views, with preference 
to clearly separate the church and having solidarity high on 
their priority list. 
One of the issues most discussed during the election cam-
paign was the alleged migration crisis or its apparent inevi-
tability. This topic spilled over also to questions related to 
policization of the Southern border and the implementation 
of the ruling of the Court of Arbitration in the case of border 
dispute with Croatia. In general, centre-right parties argued 
for more water-tight approach to border-border control, while 
the centre-left parties defended governments policies of com-
mon or at least harmonised approach to securing the external 
(Schengen) borders. Likewise, governmental centre-left parties 
defended European solutions of the border dispute while 
opposition parties had alternative visions of it. 
Interestingly, none of the parties successfully grabbing 
MEP positions advocated against European Union or European 
integration processes. However, also none of them defended 
the current EU status quo. Quite the contrary, the parties 
competed on their visions of Europe, either by defending 
more law-and-order approach accompanied by more intergo-
vernmental mechanisms (SDS and NSi) or by putting forward 
either more supranational vision of Europe (SD) or more 
effective Europe (LMŠ). 
Compared to the general trends for these elections wit-
nessed across Europe, major contenders that dominated the 
public debates – TV face-offs in particular – did not compete 
or failed to compete on environmental issues (e.g Levica), 
even though this was a strong element of their agenda. To 
be precise, the mainstream media seeking drama and high 
audience ratings simply opted out of environmental debates 
in favour of high MEP salaries, local issues and traditional 
topics that spice up every national or local level elections. As a 
result, these EP elections sadly went by as another second-or-
der race with actors preparing or saving themselves for the 
“real” battle and voters observing fake debates instead of the 
meaningful ones, particularly the ones that are set and solved 
in Brussels.
Did we just do it again?  
A summary of the Slovenian EP elections
Tomaž Deželan 









Sweden has been a member of the European Union for almost 
25 years but the 2019-election was the first where none of the 
established parties argued for an exit. Previously the Left Par-
ty and the radical right-wing party Sweden Democrats have 
promoted a Swexit. The shift in strategy is understandable; 
popular opinion has successively become increasingly positive 
towards the EU and arguing for a withdrawal is currently 
not a winning position. The turbulence surrounding Brexit 
has probably encouraged this policy shift. Hence, we could 
expect an election campaign focusing on broader issues than 
the dichotomous YES or NO-debate. The results, however, 
clearly show that issues concerning the distribution of power 
between the member state and the EU are still central to the 
debate.  
In terms of policy areas, the campaign involved four 
themes. First, most opinion polls in Sweden indicated that 
the electorate prioritized environmental concerns and global 
warming in the EP-election. This was reflected in the political 
parties’ EU-campaigns. They all emphasized the importance 
of a strong union with regard to the environment including 
suggestions such as introducing a European carbon tax as a 
strategy to limit carbon dioxide emissions. This tax already 
exists in Sweden and has broad support. However, the ques-
tion of “exporting” this to the EU triggers the supranational 
or intergovernmental divide; i.e. should the EU be trusted to 
impose taxes or is this a national concern? The critics argued 
that this would open Pandora’s Box as delegating this power 
to the EU would mean a fundamental step towards a more 
federal union. These parties instead promote nuclear energy, 
currently an entirely national concern, as the best strategy to 
fight carbon emissions. 
The second theme, both in terms of public opinion and the 
political parties’ priorities, was migration. Here the diffe-
rences between the parties are a matter of principle rather 
than policy. Again the question involves the EU’s decision 
capabilities. The fundamental conflict on migration, defen-
ding a more open policy versus closed borders, arose in the 
Swedish debate. However, much of the discussion concerned 
who should be able to make binding decisions in this matter 
- the EU or the member states. The Swedish experience from 
2015 and the migration crisis figured in the debate and most 
parties hoped that an agreement concerning binding quotas 
could be reached. 
The social pillar was the third theme offering an oppor-
tunity for the parties on the left to propagate for a stronger 
Europe in terms of welfare policies. The social pillar is an 
agreement between the member states but the EU is not 
able to make binding decisions in this area.  The debate here 
is less about the content of the social pillar and more about 
changing the EU’s role. All parties defend the Swedish system; 
disagreement concerns whether the national system is threa-
tened if the EU becomes more involved in this area. Here the 
complex intertwined dimensions of left and right, respective 
more or less union, become apparent. 
Fourth, as in the latest Swedish general election (Septem-
ber 2018), the fight against crime also became an issue in the 
EP-campaign. Stronger border control, stronger cooperation 
between policy authorities and a European FBI figured in the 
debate. This issue and the migration issue were connected in 
many respects and a more repressive tendency characterized 
the debate. The crime problem could have been linked to 
social inequalities and the need for more socially progressive 
policies in Europe, but this was never really the case. Again, 
this illustrates the dilemma of what the EU’s role should be. 
This brief review of the Swedish 2019 EP-election debate 
illustrates the two-sided nature of EU-politics; the policy as 
such (often triggering the traditional left-right divide) and the 
question of whether the EU should be delegated legislative 
power in the specific area. From a voter’s point of view, this 
constitutes a dilemma. A party might oppose a certain policy 
either because it does not agree on the specific political me-
asure or because it is reluctant to delegate power to Brussels. 
It is often hard for the voter to assess which arguments are 
most relevant in the debate. This problem became obvious 
late in the campaign when it was revealed that an earlier MEP 
belonging to the Christian Democrats had casted votes in the 
EP that indicated a negative stance towards women’s rights to 
abortion. The party had a hectic time explaining that the MEP 
was opposing this issue being dealt with on the European 
level and had nothing to do with party’s position on abortion. 
All the four themes outlined above involved both dimensions 
and this blurs the parties’ message. The problem is accentua-
ted by the parties’ lack of consistency in their view of the EU’s 
role. In one issue the EU is constituted as a threat, whereas in 
another it becomes a solution.
The intertwining of two or more fundamental dimensions 
in EU-politics, while the party system is largely organized 
along a left - right dimension, constitutes a difficult demo-
cratic dilemma. The fact that the parties fail to politicize 
EU-relevant issues between elections makes things even 
worse. Now we have a new group of MEPs – let us hope that 
this also means an intensified debate on important issues that 
will enable the electorate to make wise decisions in the 2024 
elections.  
More or less EU – still the  
fundamental conflict in Sweden
Magnus Blomgren





On 23 June 2016, the voters of the United Kingdom narrowly 
decided that the country should leave the European Union. In 
due course, the then still new Prime Minister, Theresa May, 
formally notified the EU of the UK’s intention to leave under 
the procedure set out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European 
Union – thereby triggering a process destined for completion 
on 29 March 2019, nearly two months before the next schedu-
led European parliamentary elections. There was, accordingly, 
none of the usual long-term preparation for these elections, 
for the UK was not expected to send MEPs to Brussels and 
Strasbourg any longer.
That isn’t how things worked out. The process of nego-
tiating the terms of Brexit with the EU proved tortuous – 
though not as daunting as the task of actually getting that 
deal approved by Parliament. Since 2016 Brexit has emerged 
as the single most salient issue in British politics, subsuming 
all other concerns. What is more, it does not fit neatly into 
the boxes of major party politics, dividing MPs, members and 
supporters in both the Labour and (especially) Conservative 
parties. So vexed is the issue, that the Prime Minister was 
resoundingly defeated three times on her proposed deal in 
the House of Commons, and always by large margins. When 
it became evident that the necessary legislation could not pass 
the British Parliament, the EU finally offered an extension of 
the Article 50 process with a new deadline for ratification of 
31 October 2019. This meant that the UK was obliged to take 
part in the EP elections after all, with voting taking place on 
23 May.
Ultimately, Theresa May paid the price for making several 
major strategic errors. First, she called a general election for 
June 2017, even though she already had a working majority in 
the House of Commons. She lost this majority at that election, 
making the passage of the controversial Brexit legislation 
much more difficult to achieve. More than this, perhaps, she 
lost credibility in the eyes of many of her own MPs and party 
members after having run a campaign widely regarded as 
poor. Second, she set out ’red lines’ on Brexit that few if any 
had initially expected, especially from a ‘Remainer’ politician: 
the UK would not only leave the EU’s political structures, 
but also its Single Market and Customs Union. This had two 
effects: first, it polarized the party, and public opinion more 
widely, between Hard Brexiteers (who shared this vision, but 
then cried ’betrayal’ at any sign of compromise on the Prime 
Minister’s part) and Remainers, who felt ignored. Second, 
it created the seemingly intractable problem of what to do 
about the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland; with one inside, and one outside the Single Market/
Customs Union, how could border controls be avoided and 
trade not disrupted? Having invoked Article 50 without first 
ascertaining the support of Parliament, her authority in party, 
Parliament, government and country ebbed away, as she suf-
fered humiliation after humiliation in the Commons; her MPs 
and Cabinet colleagues openly disagreed with her and each 
other – some resigned from governmental posts, while others 
even defected from the party. 
The Opposition’s position was scarcely much better; while 
leftist leader Jeremy Corbyn remained generally popular with 
his grassroots members (less so with his parliamentary collea-
gues), he dismayed many of them on the issue of Brexit. Polls 
revealed that nearly 90% of the party’s members wished the 
UK to remain in the EU, but he proved reluctant to embrace 
such a clearcut position, perhaps because of his long personal 
history of euroscepticism, perhaps because of his fear of 
losing the support of Brexit-supporting voters in traditional 
working-class heartlands. 
Lack of Labour clarity and internecine Tory paralysis blen-
ded with the unexpected opportunity of a European poll to 
create a perfect electoral storm for the major parties. Smaller 
parties with clearer and more unified positions on Brexit were 
the beneficiaries. Chief among them was former UKIP leader 
Nigel Farage’s newly formed Brexit party. Farage had turned 
his back on UKIP under its new leader (Gerald Batten) for 
lurching too far to the right and its willingness to adopt some 
extremely controversial characters as candidates. The Brexit 
Party had no members and no policies – except one: a de-
mand that the UK should leave the EU on 29 October without 
an EU deal, and engage with the world on World Trade Orga-
nisation terms. In a few short weeks, Farage’s strident popu-
lism worked wonders as the polls indicated voters flocking to 
his banner (mainly ex-Tory supporters). At the opposite pole 
of the Brexit spectrum, those parties with clear pro-Remain 
messages prospered, albeit less spectacularly, largely at the 
expense of Labour. When the votes were eventually counted, 
the Brexit Party topped the poll with 32 per cent of the vote 
and 29 seats, while the Liberal Democrats (and their ‘Bollocks 
to Brexit!’ slogan) came second with 20 per cent and 16 seats; 
Labour trailed behind in third place (14%/10 seats), the Greens 
fourth (12%/7 seats), the Conservatives only fifth (9%/4 seats), 
and the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales gaining 4.6 
per cent and 4 seats between them.  
United Kingdom 2019  







The Danes voted for the European Parliament on May 26, only 
ten days prior to the general election held on Constitution 
Day, June 5. The Prime Minister announced the date in early 
May after months of speculation about the timing of the 
EP election and the electoral term ending mid-June. Many 
pundits found it likely with a double election on May 26. Now 
the two campaigns partly overlapped. The EP election could 
be considered as a very strong indicator of the moods of the 
electorate prior to the general election. The Liberal Prime Mi-
nister, Mr. Lars Løkke Rasmussen, may have hoped for gains 
in the EP election to provide a strong outset for the general 
election. The reflections here seek to evaluate the Danish EP 
election in the lieu of the general election and to compare the 
two electoral results. 
Many scholars, notably Michael Marsh, have pointed out 
how EP elections are very much ‘second-order elections’. 
They reflect the moods of the electorate at the national level 
this argument goes. For many years, Denmark looked like 
an exception to this pattern since it had a different party 
system at EP elections. The electorate has shown itself as 
divided towards the EU at several referendums consistently 
voting ‘no’ to change in the opt-outs negotiated after another 
‘no’ vote to the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum back in 
1992. EU-skeptical lists – the June Movement and the People’s 
Movement against EU – only ran at EP elections and gained up 
to one quarter of the seats. In particular the Social Democrats 
used to have a large group of voters that did not support its 
general positive line towards the Europe divided electorate 
and therefore polled worse well at national elections. Yet, 
an overlap between the national and European Parliamen-
tary elections would indicate a strong national impact. To 
reinforce such a transformation towards overlap between the 
two party systems that already became notable over the most 
recent elections, the Red-Green Alliance for the first time ran 
its own list. Hitherto, it did not, to give room to the People’s 
Movement that has run and elected many RGA candidates 
through the years.
Some commentators and scholars had argued that two 
campaigns at the same time would make the voters weary. 
When the general election finally took place, the turnout 
decreased a little (84.5 per cent in 2019 compared to 85.9 
per cent in 2015). Yet, at the EP election, the turnout at 66.1 
per cent became record-high for an EP election. In general, 
turnout increased throughout Europe, and some of the same 
factors such as Brexit and climate changes may have affected 
the Danish voters. Yet, the turnout increased from 56.2 per 
cent in 2014 – when an EU-related referendum took place 
at EP Election Day. This increase was higher than the EU 
average. Hence, the national election campaign may have en-
ergized the political debate at the desire to give a vote. It was 
possible to absentee vote for both elections at the same time, 
and many used this opportunity with the newspaper writing 
about queuing up at polling stations for this somewhat more 
cumbersome procedure. 
Table 1 below shows the election results for the EP and 
general elections in 2019 and most recently. First, we could 
note that the election results of 2014 and 2015 differ quite a 
lot, still indicating EP elections having its own logic. Using a 
measure to compare two elections - the sum of the absolute 
differences between the parties divided by 2- were 21.3 then. 
It would approximate a net difference for more than one fifth 
of the voters. The two 2019 elections compared the similar 
number is 13.9. This indicates a greater similarity than  
previously. It means that the EP election was a pretty good 
predictor of the result of the general election, with the  
Socialist People’s Party and the Social Democrats as ex-
ceptions. Highly likely, the same factors influenced both 
elections, having climate as an important issue. Hence, this EP 
election produced a result with a close adaption to the general 
national party system, and that the Danish EP elections may 
this time around stronger than previously have become se-
cond-order elections. Since the election led to no seats won to 
the People’s Movement, this effect affected the party system 
actors and may become lasting. 
An EP election in the shadow of a general election
Flemming Juul Christiansen
Roskilde University
Associate Professor in Political Science
Mail: fjc@ruc.dk














Social Democrats 19.1 26.3 21.5 25.9
Social Liberals 6.5 4.6 10.1 8.6
Conservative 9.2 3.4 6.2 6.6
Socialist People’s Party 10.9 4.2 13.2 7.7
Liberal Alliance 2.9 7.5 2.2 2.3
People’s movement 
against EU
8.1 Not running 3.7 Not running
Danish People’s Party 26.6 21.1 10.7 8.7
Liberals 16.7 19.5 23.5 23.9
Red-Green Alliance Not running 7.8 5.5 6.9
The Alternative Not running 4.8 3.4 3.0
















The UK should not have participated, the country should have 
left the EU on March 29. That it did not is a source of anger 
for some, relief for others. Both sides of the Brexit divide are 
fearful of the future, if the UK leaves or remains, and increa-
singly entrenched in their opposition to the argument of the 
other side and to the main protagonists. Since the June 2016 
referendum result was announced with a narrow majority 
voting to leave the EU, there have been continual protests by 
both sides of the divide. The Remain side has been successful 
in getting the High Court to ensure parliament votes as well 
as building support in the country for a second or confirmato-
ry referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU and/or the 
terms of leaving. Leave supporter attitudes have meanwhile 
hardened, with increasingly vociferous calls for the UK to 
leave with no deal. 
Divisions within society are mirrored within the two major 
parties. The Conservative government, with no working 
majority, has found it impossible to reach a deal that satisfies 
either side: in fact the public wrangling between party 
factions has contributed to the societal polarization. Labour 
meanwhile attempted to suggest they could negotiate a better 
deal and focused more on exploiting divisions in the gover-
ning party to force a general election in the belief they would 
win. Hence, neither party are perceived as prepared to deliver 
Brexit or represent those opposed to fulfilling the referendum 
result. 
The election campaign thus saw clear battle lines drawn. 
Labour and the Conservatives largely offered a continuation 
of their existing stances. Conservatives pledging to push 
ahead with the deal as the only option available; Labour 
arguing May’s deal was a bad deal, that they wanted a closer 
relationship and might support a confirmatory referendum if 
they were unhappy with the outcome of future negotiations. 
With the Conservative deal seen as dead, killed by a hostile 
parliament, and Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn seen as at best 
lukewarm on the European Union, perceiving it as many on 
the left do as a ‘capitalist club’, neither offered the certainty 
that either Leave or Remain supporters sought.
Numerous vox pop sessions by the main UK broadcasters 
portrayed the electorate as angry. Neither camp felt represen-
ted and their palpable frustration at the legislative deadlock 
which has spilled over into confrontations online and on the 
streets was predicted to see the major parties suffer at the 
ballot box. This was proven correct as Labour secured 13.7 per 
cent  (down 11 per cent on the 2014 contest), the Conservati-
ves 8.8 per cent (down 14 per cent). 
The anger of Leave voters provided the momentum for 
Nigel Farage to launch the Brexit Party in November 2018. A 
vote for Brexit, Farage pledged, was a vote to leave with no tie 
to or deal with the EU and every vote for his party was a vote 
against a second referendum. Supported by his former party 
UKIP he built a platform around the notion that UK politics 
was broken. Anger at austerity policies, wasteful spending 
by government and a dearth of normal politics due to being 
all-consumed by finding a deal, all of which were tropes 
expressed by voters, were channeled by Farage into building 
support for the Brexit party. Having won 30.5 per cent of the 
vote he stated if the UK does not leave by the new deadline, 
October 31, the result would be mirrored at a subsequent 
general election. 
Anger among Remainers was similarly channeled in the 
populist slogan of ‘Bollocks to Brexit’, this is unusual in that 
this was the heart of the normally moderate Liberal Democrat 
party campaign. Party leader Vince Cable, flanked by Guy 
Verhofstadt (former Belgian prime minister and European 
Parliament’s representative on matters relating to Brexit since 
2016), declared of the Brexit debates in parliament “The same 
slogans, no new arguments and very unproductive. That’s 
why people are getting angry, they know the arguments, 
they’ve heard them, they aren’t going anywhere”. Building 
on the longstanding pro-European credentials of the party 
he channeled the anger of Remainers who felt ignored, were 
seen as a minority despite the close result, and were often 
dismissed using the Remoaner label. Their second place was 
cataclysmic yet at 19.6 per cent  not a ringing endorsement for 
their stance. Although combined with fellow Remainers the 
Green, Scottish Nationalist and Plaid Cymru the vote share 
was 34.9 per cent close to the pro-Leave vote.
The result did not dissipate the anger. Both sides claim 
victory, the main parties hold firm, and with a Conservative 
leadership battle seemingly taking the party towards a harder 
Brexit stance the anger will likely worsen. Both sides are 
unwilling to debate but seek arguments that confirm existing 
prejudices. The contest thus sees the UK as divided, and as 
angry, as it was previously. 
Voter psychology in the age of anger: UK 2019
Darren Lilleker







European parliamentary elections have never been a very 
prominent topic. On the contrary, they have regularly been 
considered less important than national elections and gener-
ally been characterized by lower voter turnout, half-hearted 
party campaign activities, less known top candidates on party 
lists and lukewarm news reporting during the final weeks 
before election day.
Based on these circumstances, scholars in political com-
munication and political science have usually referred to 
European elections as ‘second-order’ elections characterized 
by low-key campaigns. In such elections, voters, parties and 
the media act differently and more randomly compared 
to elections that are perceived as more important. Voters’ 
decisions are more unpredictable and partly based on other 
considerations.  Political parties often campaign in a less 
professional way when it is more important to mobilize core 
voters and party members, than to target new segments of 
the electorate in competition with other parties. And finally, 
news media coverage is less extensive and generally more 
dominated by game frames than issue frames in election 
campaign reporting. Consequently, European elections often 
see surprising results and successful performances of new 
political parties.
The reasons for such ‘second-order’ mechanisms put-
ting European elections in the shadow of national political 
conflicts have been addressed from different viewpoints. A 
common explanation points at the complex structure of EU 
decision-making processes and the limited political power of 
the European Parliament in comparison to national legislatu-
res. European voters are perceived as less familiar with poli-
tics at that level, less aware of what is at stake and thus less 
expected to go to the polling stations. Additionally, political 
parties in several member states are critical to the European 
Union, and in some cases also want their country to leave the 
union. 
Another dimension is focusing on the total electoral 
context and the relations between national elections and 
European elections in the electoral cycle. When European 
elections are taking place shortly before national elections 
the former may serve as a test run or poll, where parties are 
innovative in their campaign strategies and practices, and 
both voters and news media have forthcoming national elec-
tions top of the head during the European election campaign. 
On the other hand, European elections soon after national 
elections are expected to be less interesting by all main actors 
in the political communication system.
However, the outcome of the European elections 2019 
does not completely confirm the idea of these elections as of 
‘second order’ nature. Party campaign data and media content 
data are still to be further analyzed in member states, but 
voter turnout figures already show a greater interest in these 
elections as previously.
When comparing voter turnout in all member states between 
2014 and 2019 the average turnout increased from 42 per cent 
to 51 per cent. In fact, voter turnout between the two latest 
European elections increased in 20 of the 28 member states 
of the union. The increase was general and not limited to 
specific geographic areas. There were no significant diffe-
rences between older and newer EU member states, and no 
correlation between the developments in countries ruled by 
left-wing or right-wing national governments.
Furthermore, improved voter turnout could be noted in 
different electoral contexts. The biggest increase in voter 
turnout happened in Spain, where national elections were 
held just about four weeks before the European elections. The 
second biggest increase occurred in Poland where national 
elections are coming up later this year. Sometimes interest 
in European elections could be explained by the intensity of 
domestic political affairs, sometimes not.
More systematic research is definitely needed on the latest 
European elections to examine their ‘second order’ charac-
ter. As long as almost every second EU citizen do not vote in 
European elections they are certainly of less importance than 
most national elections. On the other hand, the new voter 
turnout trend in most EU countries could be interpreted as if 
more voters have realized that important political issues such 
as climate, crime and migration actually need to be handled 
at the international level by international political bodies. 
Still, it is reasonable to believe that the single most impor-
tant factor behind increased voter turnout is election cam-
paign dynamics between national and EU perspectives, where 
political arguments and debates are intertwined between 
political levels during the campaign. In most EU countries, 
European elections are framed as a contest between the usual 
national parties. When national politicians for domestic 
purposes successfully frame European elections as decisive 
– and their outcome of great national interest – more voters 
probably feel there are good reasons for them to vote.
Second thoughts on these ‘second order’ elections are 
nevertheless welcome. Not so much because European 
elections are becoming more important per se, but because 
campaign dynamics between European and national agendas 
are becoming much more relevant to consider. Sometimes ‘se-
cond order’ elections might be embedded in ‘first order-style’ 
election campaigns.
Second thoughts on second-order elections
Lars Nord






In the popular media, the European Parliament election 2019 
was widely anticipated to be a watershed moment for Euro-
pean integration, with Eurosceptic forces likely to make large 
gains, potentially paralysing European policy-making.
And with good reason: Anti-EU parties made substanti-
al inroads in national contests in the years preceding this 
EP-election, from the National Rally (previously the National 
Front) reaching the final round of the 2017 French election for 
the first time since 2002; to an 8 per cent upswing in vote sha-
re for the AfD in the 2017 German federal election; to Norbert 
Hofer, of the Austrian far-right FPÖ, coming within a whisker 
of becoming Austrian president in 2016. Elsewhere, the 2018 
Italian election led to the formation of what has been termed 
a ‘populist’ government, and the 2016 UK referendum on EU 
membership resulted in a majority voting to leave. Combined 
with the known tendency for voters to punish governing 
parties in European elections, from which Eurosceptic parties 
tend to profit, it was clear that much of the pre-election evi-
dence supported the Eurosceptic breakthrough hypothesis.
However, this simple narrative has not ended up fitting 
the story of the EP election 2019. What is clear is that the 
previously dominant centre-left and centre-right parties, the 
Socialists and Democracts (S&D) and European People’s Party 
(EPP), have lost their combined majority in the Parliament. 
But rather than voters turning only to anti-EU parties, a va-
riety profited from the shift away from the mainstream.  The 
most salient example is perhaps Germany, where although 
the AfD was able to increase its share of the vote by 4 per 
cent, the Greens benefited most, with a 10 per cent upswing 
in vote share over 2014. And although in France the National 
Rally won the largest share of the vote with 23 per cent, this 
was 2 per cent down on their 2014 result. Elsewhere, it was 
a disappointing night for the far-right Danish People’s Party 
(DF), coming in fourth place after winning the most votes in 
2014 and experiencing an 11 per cent drop in vote share; the 
Freedom Party of Geert Wilders lost all four of its seats; and 
the Spanish far-right Vox party won three seats, but still lags 
far behind seats of pro-EU centrists parties (PSOE, 20; Partio 
Popular, 12). Hardly, then, a runaway victory for the Euroscep-
tic alternative.
There were notable exceptions, however: the newly for-
med Brexit party dominated the UK election, winning 31 per 
cent of the vote. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s anti-immigration Le-
ague party received 34.3 per cent of the vote, a huge upswing 
of 28 per cent since 2014.
Though Eurosceptic parties did, as predicted, dominate in 
some national contests, it must be concluded that the  
EP election 2019 was not the widespread breakthrough that 
many expected. 
Key to understanding these results, I would argue, are 
the changing issue priorities of voters. In the first part of 
this post, I listed some of the recent successes of Eurosceptic 
parties in national contests (the inspiration for the Euroscep-
tic breakthrough hypothesis at the EP election 2019). Note, 
however, the timeframe: most of the large gains for Euroscep-
tic forces occurred either during or shortly after 2015/16 – the 
peak on the refugee crisis. The impact of this event on the 
issue priorities of voters – and in turn their voting behavior 
– cannot be underestimated: the impact of this event was a 
convergence of national politics across Europe to focus in on 
this issue, from which anti-immigration, anti-EU parties sub-
stantially profited. For example, according to Eurostat data, by 
2015, a full 75 per cent of Germans and 60 per cent of Danes 
named immigration one of the two most important issues 
facing their country, and over 50 per cent did so in Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands – in none of these countries did 
more than 40 per cent do so in 2014.
However, as revealed by new citizen-level data collected 
before the EP election campaign began as part of the RECON-
NECT project (see www.reconnect-europe.eu), immigration is 
now and was far from the only issue on voters’ minds heading 
into the 2019 EP elections. In fact, in Germany and Denmark, 
where the issue of immigration has been particularly salient, 
climate change that topped the priority list of those survey-
ed (17 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively). Meanwhile, 
unemployment is revealed to have been most important for 
voters in Italy (22 per cent) and Spain (24 per cent), health 
care in Poland (20 per cent) and Hungary (25 per cent), and, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, given recent “gilets jaunes” protests, 
inequality in society in France (20 per cent). In none of the se-
ven countries studied (Denmark, Germany, France, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland and Spain) did immigration top the list.
All this suggests that with the passage of time, the issue 
priorities of voters in European countries are becoming more 
heterogeneous, as the converging influence of the migration 
crisis fades. This shift likely explains not only the lack of a 
Eurosceptic breakthrough during the 2019 EP election, but 
also the divergent fortunes of anti-EU parties across national 
contexts. In the UK, for example, the issues raised by the 2016 
migration crisis appear to have been uniquely ‘fixed’ on the 
agenda by lack of a resolution to the Brexit referendum result. 
Meanwhile, in most other countries, where there is more flex-
ibility in this regard, politics appears to have moved on, with 
new and varied issues coming to the fore, and new parties to 
act on these (e.g. the Greens in Germany). Unless another 
European-wide event leads to a convergence of voter atten-
tion, this fragmentation of political narratives is likely to con-
tinue, and the simple Eurosceptic breakthrough narrative less 
and less correspondent to the realities of European politics.








Much previous research on European Parliament elections 
has focused on the question of whether voters are driven by 
attitudes towards the EU and European issues, or whether 
they are ‘second-order’ contests where voters are more 
concerned with domestic issues and the performance of the 
national government. The general consensus is that the EU 
attitudes and issues have gradually grown in importance over 
time, particularly as European integration has become more 
politicised and contested. Ireland is an interesting test-case in 
relation to this question for several reasons. 
First, Irish public opinion is strongly pro-EU, and integra-
tion has not become politicised by populist right-wing parties 
as it has in many other countries. The closest thing Ireland 
has to a significant Eurosceptic party is Sinn Féin, but this par-
ty has gradually softened its position on the EU over the years. 
Thanks to Brexit, the EU has never been more prominent 
in the minds of Irish voters, but support for the EU has only 
grown over the course of the Brexit negotiations.
Second, even national parliamentary elections in Ireland 
are very focused on personalities and questions of governme-
nt performance rather than policy or ideological differences. 
Ireland, therefore, represents something of a ‘least-likely’ case 
to find evidence of voting based on attitudes towards the EU 
and European policy issues. 
The results of the 2019 election in Ireland are very interes-
ting, as they suggest that European elections may actually be 
becoming more ‘first-order’. The green wave that swept across 
Europe reached the shores of Ireland, where the Green Party 
recorded their highest-ever share of the vote in any election 
(11.4%). As the response to challenges such as climate change 
are increasingly decided at the European level, it is entirely 
appropriate that these issues should feature in European 
elections. 
The outcome of the election also reflects public opinion 
on the EU in Ireland, particularly if we compare it with the 
previous European election. The 2014 election took place 
following three years of the EU-IMF bailout programme, and 
attitudes towards the EU were decidedly lukewarm. That elec-
tion was notable for the strong performance of Sinn Féin. Five 
years on, Irish voters are considerably more positive in their 
opinions of the EU and European integration, and pro-integra-
tion parties such as Fine Gael (the self-styled ‘party of Europe’) 
increased their vote share significantly, while Sinn Féin’s vote 
fell sharply.  The result goes against what we would expect 
in a second-order election, where government parties tend 
to perform poorly. Fine Gael, who have been in government 
since 2011, won the election decisively and came away with 
five out of thirteen seats.
It is possible that domestic political issues could also expla-
in some of these changing patterns. Indeed, similar (but more 
muted) trends can be seen in the local elections which were 
held on the same day.  It is therefore necessary to dig a bit 
deeper to examine to what extent attitudes towards EU issues 
influenced how people voted in Ireland in 2019.
To this end, I have analysed data from a very large opt-in 
survey from a voting advice application called WhichCandidate. 
I compared the importance of attitudes towards a range of 
issues (the EU, the environment, attitudes towards minorities, 
religious issues, economic issues), and controlled for previous 
vote, education, geographic location, and age.  
This analysis shows that support for European integration 
was indeed a very strong predictor of voting for Fine Gael 
and the Green Party in this election, and a strong predictor 
of voting against Sinn Féin and Independent candidates.  For 
example, respondents who were pro-integration were on 
average 14 per cent  more likely to vote for Fine Gael than 
respondents who were against further integration – regardless 
of whether or not they voted for the party in the last national 
election. Across parties, the effect of attitudes on European 
integration on vote choice was more than twice as large as 
the effect of attitudes on domestic economic issues such as 
tax and spending. Attitudes on environmental issues were 
also an important influence on vote choice, particularly for 
the Green Party.
The evidence, therefore, suggests that, even in a least-li-
kely case such as Ireland, European elections have gradually 
become more ‘first-order’. Voters are influenced by parties’ 
positions on questions of European integration and by policy 
issues that have a strong European dimension, such as climate 
change.  It may have taken forty years, but European Parlia-
ment elections are finally becoming normalised.
European elections gradually becoming  
less ‘second-order’ in Ireland
Rory Costello






The election May 26th 2019 was the sixth national election to 
the European Parliament since Sweden joined the EU in 1995. 
As in previous Swedish EP elections, the campaign was short 
but intensive, this time resulting in a record high turnout 
(55.3 per cent). Most notably, the campaign was carried out  
in the context of the most pro-EU sentiments hither to:  
According to the Swedish television exit poll (SVT/VALU),  
the share of EP-voters supporting a Swexit was at a record  
low 11 per cent. However, Swedish voters do not express any 
desire to push the EU integration further, and they have no 
wish to introduce the euro as currency. It was also an elec-
tion taking place less than nine months after the domestic 
elections, and after an unusually prolonged and conflictual 
government formation process.
As regards standard indicators of electoral behaviour, the 
exit poll showed an expected high proportion of late deciders 
(41 per cent deciding in the last week). At the same time there 
was an unexpectedly low proportion of voters deviating from 
their national preference in their final party choice (24 per 
cent), suggesting a more nationalized vote than at previous 
Swedish EP elections. 
In line with the general expectations, large parties on the 
national level performed badly compared to the national 
elections (see table 1). The Social Democrats received a record 
low 23.5 per cent but still managed to defend its five EP seats. 
Thanks to a late recovery in the final week, the Conservative 
party won 16.8 per cent of the votes and gained a seat. While 
liberal and green parties had momentum on the European le-
vel, the two Swedish liberal parties – the Center party (+1 seat) 
and Liberal party (-1 seat) – remained at status quo, while the 
Green party lost two of its four EP seats (the Green party will 
however gain a third seat after Brexit). The Sweden Demo-
crats won 15.3 per cent of the votes and gained one more seat. 
Taken together, the three conservative parties in the party 
system – Christian Democrats, Conservatives, and Sweden 
Democrats – gained 11.4 percentage points more votes than 
in 2014, and three more Swedish EP seats. This can mainly 
be explained by a general shift to the right in public opinion 
and an increasing ideological polarization along the cultural 
value dimension. These trends are also reflected in the issues 
voters reported as most important for their party choice (see 
table 2). Migration, crime and gender equality were higher 
on the agenda this time – three issues that all belong to the 
cultural dimension. Classic issues pertaining to the traditional 
left-right dimension – such as economy, unemployment, and 
social welfare – were all trailing behind in saliency when 
voters made up their minds on how to vote. Furthermore, 
issues that have been salient in recent EP elections – such as 
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Table 1. Election results in Swedish EP-elections 1995-2019 (per cent).
Comment: The list of party groups show the belongings for national parties in the period 2014-2019, and may be subject to changes in the future. 
The election result for Sweden Democrats in 2019 (15,34%) have been rounded up to 15,4 to make the sum per cent to 100,0. 
Source: Election Authority (www.val.se); Statistics Sweden (www.scb.se); Swedish National Election Studies Program (www.snes.gu.se). 
1995 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 2019 seats 2014-2019 Party group
Left Party 12,9 15,8 12,8 5,7 6,3 6,8 1 ±0 GUE/NGL
Social Democrats 28,1 26,0 24,6 24,4 24,2 23,5 5 ±0 S&D
Green Party 17,2 9,5 5,9 11,0 15,4 11,5 2 -2 Greens/EFA
Center Party 7,2 6,0 6,3 5,5 6,5 10,8 2 +1 ALDE
Liberal Party 4,8 13,9 9,9 13,6 9,9 4,1 1 -1 ALDE
Christian Democratic Party 3,9 7,6 5,7 4,7 5,9 8,6 2 +1 EPP
Conservative Party 23,2 20,7 18,2 18,8 13,7 16,8 4 +1 EPP
June List - - 14,5 3,5 – – – IND/DEM
Pirate Party - - - 7,1 2,2 0,6 – Greens/EFA
Sweden Democrats 1,1 3,3 9,7 15,4 3 +1 ECR
Feminist Initiative - - - 2,2 5,4 0,8 0 -1 S&D
Others 2,7 0,5 1,0 0,2 0,8 1,1
Sum per cent 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Turnout 41,6 38,8 37,9 45,5 51,1 55,3
The citizens
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Table 2. Most important issues for party choice in Swedish 
EP-elections 1995-2019 (per cent)
Comments: Question wording is “How important were the following 
issues for your choice of party at today’s election to the European 
Parliament?”. Five response options were offered: “very important”, 
“rather important”, “neither important nor unimportant”,”rather 
unimportant”, and “very unimportant”. Entries are percentages 
‘highly important’.
Source: Swedish Television Exit Poll (SVT/VALU) 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009, 
2014, and 2019.
Issue 1995 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019
1 Peace in Europe 66 66 61 55 59 58
2. Democracy in the EU 59 53 55 50 51 54
3. Environment 56 45 47 53 51 51
4. Gender equality - 37 42 42 45 49
5. Crime prevention - - - 42 40 48
6. Social welfare - 48 50 44 47 42
7. Asylum-seekers/migrants - 19 26 26 37 41
8. Energy and nuclear power - - - 38 39 38
9. Economy 54 47 46 47 45 37
10. National independence 48 43 47 388 39 37
11. Quality of food - - - - 46 33
12. Unemployment 53 50 46 47 47 31
13. Drug policies 46 - 47 32 30 30
14. Defence issues in the EU 34 31 30 26 26 26
15. EU’s external policy - - - 31 28 24
16. Free movement in the EU - - - - 30 23
17. Business policy/conditions - 27 29 22 26 21
18. Euro as Swedish currency 33 29 36 32 28 21
19. Internet copyright issues - - - - - 18
20. Agricultural policy in the EU 23 21 25 22 21 17
food quality, euro currency, and the free movement of labour 
– were considered much less important for party choice this 
time around. 
Up until now, EP elections in Sweden have been the most 
candidate centred elections in an otherwise very party orien-
ted political culture. The party lists are closed, but the pre- 
ferential vote is perceived to be more powerful in EP elections 
since Sweden is one constituency. The parties’ top candida-
tes have low levels of recognition in the general public, but 
appear in televised debates and is therefore allowed a rare 
opportunity to make an impression. We know from previous 
studies of EP elections that more than a few candidates have 
been successful in attracting more votes for their parties or, 
conversely, make party sympathizers hesitant to vote for their 
own party.  
However, the 2019 EP election was not the candidates’  
election in Sweden. There was a record low share of voters  
(39 per cent) taking the opportunity to cross a specific can-
didate, compared to over 50 per cent in previous elections. 
The top candidates for the Liberal party (Karin Karlsbro) 
and the Social Democratic party (Heléne Fritzon) received 
fewer than ten per cent preferential votes from their party 
voters. In combination with the five per cent threshold in 
the preferential voting system, the parties’ ordering of the 
candidates remained unchanged this time. In addition, there 
was a record low proportion of voters (14 per cent) stating that 
the parties’ candidates was a ‘very important’ reason for their 
party choice (SVT/VALU). 
In sum, the Swedish EP elections of 2019 had an increased 
turnout and a very EU-positive electorate, yet the campaig-
ning had a more national focus with less colourful and suc-
cessful candidates. The main result of the election was gains 
for the three conservative parties. 
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European elections in Romania were captivating for three 
reasons:  
Firstly, the 2019 European elections in Romania were about 
saying NO to corrupt politicians. The governing Social Demo-
cratic Party led by Liviu Dragnea has been humiliated by the 
opposition parties (Liberals and a new opposition coalition 
USR PLUS). After a long trial and many pressures exerted on 
the judges, Liviu Dragnea’s conviction for corruption was up-
held by the High Court one day after the European elections. 
Like in the mafia movies, the Social Democrat leader has been 
‘escorted’ to jail by journalists and protesters who wanted to 
hand him a few personal hygiene objects for his detention 
days. Romanians had enough of seeing corrupt and convicted 
politicians leading state institutions. As after the collapse of 
communism when citizens celebrated on the streets of Bucha-
rest singing ‘Ole ole Ceaușescu nu mai e’ (Ceaușescu is gone), 
the same song could be heard now with a different name 
attached to it ‘Ole ole Liviu Dragnea nu mai e’.
Secondly, the 2019 European elections in Romania were 
about saying YES to forbidding any politically targeted 
changes to justice laws. To enable this vote, the president 
(who comes from the opposition party) called a national 
referendum on justice for the same date as the European 
elections. Citizens were thus able to vote on three ballot 
papers (one for the European Parliament and two others on 
separate questions about forbidding amnesty for corruption 
and government emergency ordinances on justice laws). The 
current government tried several times to modify the penal 
code and the justice laws in order to soften the fight against 
corruption for which the EU has praised Romania since 
2012. Government initiatives against the implementation 
of anti-corruption measures culminated with the process of 
revoking the director of the anti-corruption agency as well 
as the Romanian General Prosecutor. In an upsurge of civic 
consciousness, Romanians took it to the streets in a series of 
protests against the government. The referendum result was 
a strong, affirmative vote for an independent judiciary. What 
will happen next is still in the hands of the Parliament where 
the president needs to go with a proposal for constitutional 
change to reflect the result. 
Thirdly, the 2019 European elections in Romania were about 
saying again YES to Europe. In large numbers (higher than in 
most EU member states), Romanians went to vote and recon-
firmed commitment to European values. Since the collapse 
of communism, not much political competition existed in 
Romania about European integration. Most political parties 
favoured both country’s accession to NATO and the EU. Euro-
scepticism was always mild and majority of citizens nowadays 
still declare high attachment to Europe. Over the past two 
years however, following on the steps of Hungarian or Polish 
populist discourses, the Social Democrats played a double 
game in Bucharest and Brussels. At home, the EU started to 
be portrayed as the enemy while in Brussels commitment to 
reforms was always reassured. Like in the Hungarian case, 
the European Commission took measures. Firstly, signs of 
disapproval towards justice reforms were made public, then 
the Romanian government was threatened with official proce-
dures which would remove the country’s right to vote in the 
Council. Additionally, the European Parliament parliamentary 
groups initiated talks to exclude the current governing Ro-
manian parties from their ranks. In light of all these events, 
Romanian citizens reaffirmed their place in Europe by voting 
overwhelmingly for Europhile parties. 
Needless to say that, for all the above reasons voters 
mobilized and presence at the poll stations was over half of 
the total citizens with a right to vote. As in the previous 2016 
parliamentary elections, diaspora cued for hours in most 
major European cities. For the second time, the ministry of 
external affairs was at fault with the organization of the pol-
ling stations abroad. Many Romanians were denied the right 
to vote as the polling stations either did not have the capacity 
to fasten the pace of voting or were not given permission to 
extend the voting time. In spite of all this, diaspora humilia-
ted the Social Democrats by placing them last in their voting 
preferences. And so, many are waiting for future electoral law 
reforms to include the options of electronic and postal voting. 








The official elections campaign started – in accordance with 
XXXVI. Act of 2013 on election procedure – 50 days before the 
election day, namely on April 6. It was also the date when the 
parties, determined to participate in the elections, could get 
the letters of recommendation from the National Election 
Bureau, needed for collecting at least 20.000 signatures from 
eligible voters. The lists of signatures could be submitted 37 
days before the elections to the National Election Bureau, 
until April 19.
President János Áder announced May 26 to be the EP 
elections day in Hungary, as elections should be held just on 
Sunday.
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán delivered a speech on April 5, 
making it clear that the governing coalition would campaign 
under the slogan “Hungary comes first for us in Brussels as 
well”, thus officially undertaking the confrontation with 
Brussels, and continuing the anti-immigrant media campaign 
in which the governing coalition accused the US liberal 
billionaire George Soros and EU Commission chief Jean-Clau-
de Juncker and Juncker’s deputy Frans Timmermans of 
supporting illegal migration in Europe. It was the part of the 
permanent campaign, using the slogans “Let’s stop Brussels” 
and “Don’t let Soros have the last laugh”. This narrative had 
a huge influence on the vast majority of voters who live in a 
“well-isolated media bubble”, dominated by pro-governme-
ntal media organizations. Almost 80 per cent of Hungarian 
national media are under governmental control. The freedom 
of speech and press is endangered.
The opposition is in minority, hardly having any media 
voice that could criticize the high level of corruption and the 
predominant propaganda of Fidesz-KDNP. The opposition 
parties worry more about emigration than immigration, 
and express their positive support for Hungary being an EU 
member state. The pro-EU attitude reaches 65 per cent among 
Hungarian eligible voters.
The governing parties’ campaign, which can be characteri-
zed as an Eurosceptic anti-immigrant rhetoric, started under 
the slogan “Let’s support Viktor Orbán’s program and stop 
immigration”. The campaign led by Fidesz-KDNP was fairly 
successful in mobilizing the citizens. Even on the election day, 
the parties’ politicians exhorted the voters to vote for Fidesz, 
saying the present election´s stake was much higher than 
ever before.  Their activists visited citizens in their homes, 
called them by phones, they motivated and encouraged them 
in every possible way. The highest voting activity could be 
observed in the regions where the sympathy towards Fidesz 
was very high.
In Hungary, three million eligible voters could elect 21 
members to the European Parliament in 2019. The partici-
pation rate was higher (43.36 per cent) than in the last two 
EP elections, including Hungarians living or residing abroad 
(among them Hungarians with double citizenship in the neig-
hbouring countries). 80—90 per cent of them participated in 
the Hungarian elections. More than 20.000 Hungarians voted 
abroad.
Nine parties managed to collect the necessary amount of 
letters of recommendation: MSZP—Párbeszéd (Hungarian 
Socialist Party—Dialogue for Hungary), MKKP (Hungarian 
Two-tailed Dog Party), Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hunga-
ry), Fidesz—KDNP (Alliance—Christian Democratic People’s 
Party), Momentum (Momentum Movement), DK (Demo-
cratic Coalition), Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland Movement), 
Munkáspárt (Hungarian Workers’ Party), LMP (Politics Can Be 
Different).
Out of the nine parties just five could reach the 5 per cent 
threshold, necessary to receive a mandate. The results are 
as follows: Fidesz—KDNP have 13 MEPs (52.62 per cent), DK 
4 MEPs (16.09 per cent), Momentum 2 MEPs (9.83 per cent), 
MSZP 1 MEP (6.62 per cent), Jobbik 1 MEP (6.37 per cent).
The Hungarian EP elections ended with the overwhelming 
victory of Fidesz—KDNP, as it was expected and forecasted by 
the different public-opinion polling companies.
The financing of the campaign costs is vague. (The num-
bers are estimations: DK spent 150 million Forints, MSZP – 50 
million, Momentum – 10 million, Jobbik – 5-10 million, the 
amount of expenditure is unknown for Fidesz). There are not 
exact numbers, but the media representation of the different 
parties show disproportion. The main media channels for po-
pularizing the parties’ programs used to be the billboards and 
flyers, a very low number of video clips on some TV channels 
and social media. The governing parties’ billboards were in 
majority, the DK, the MSZP, Mi Hazánk Mozgalom also had a 
few billboards, the rest of the parties used the electric poles 
for placing their flyers.
The main messages of the different parties corresponded 
with their party programs. The Fidesz—KDNP applied several 
slogans: “Hungary is the first for us” and “The child is the 
first. The action plan for family protection starts in July”, 
“Fidesz: this is also organized by Soros” and “The migration 
should be stopped”, DK: “Europe, we stay!”, Momentum: “We 
should not give our future!”, MSZP: “Homeland, Love, Europe. 
In Europe for the benefit of our homeland, at home for the 
European values”, Jobbik: “Safe Europe, Free Hungary!”, LMP: 
“Europe will be green or it won’t exist”, Munkáspárt: “Europe 
should be ours!”, MKKP: “Beer for free in Europe as well, 
immigration, emigration”.
The final results of the EP elections campaign met the 
expectations. However, there were some novelties. The high 
participation rate of the eligible voters was unexpected, and 
the elections demonstrated a rearrangement of the political 
forces in the opposition.
European parliamentary  
elections of 2019 in Hungary
Jolán Róka






The recent elections to the European Parliament were suppo-
sed to be a serious test before the elections to the Polish Sejm 
and Senate which are going to take place in autumn. The 
previous EP elections had not evoked a lot of interest among 
the Poles. Also, political parties had not paid much atten-
tion to the event and there had been no strong candidates 
or dynamic campaigns. This time it was different. The most 
prominent opponents declared their full engagement as the 
stake was high – winning a pole position before the coming 
parliamentary elections.
   All political parties delegated their most experienced 
and recognizable politicians to become candidates. The group 
included former prime ministers, as well as current and 
former ministers. The leaders of the major parties made their 
voice heard in the campaign, and so did the President of the 
European Council Donald Tusk.
The 2019 EP elections witnessed the highest turnout in 
history (45.68%), which is almost twice as high as the numbers 
in previous years. This proves extraordinary mobilization of 
the voters and makes it possible to see these elections as a 
real trial of strength. That is why it is obvious that this time 
EP elections in Poland were not second-order elections.
The elections also slightly modified the Polish party scene, 
especially considering new parties and party coalitions. The 
main rivalry took place between Law and Justice (PiS), which 
finally won 45.38 per cent of the votes, and the European 
Coalition (38.47%), which gathered some of the centre and left-
wing opposition formations (PO, PSL, SLD, N and the Greens), 
and which had been established especially for the purpose of 
starting in these elections. The latter also served as a populari-
ty test of other newly established formations. The third score 
belonged to Robert Biedroń’s centre-left-wing Spring (6%), 
which became one of only three formations that won seats.
The remaining parties did not go above the electoral 
threshold and their situation before the coming elections is 
not too optimistic. Just below the threshold, (4.55%) there was 
Confederation KORWiN Braun Liroy Nationalists, a right-
wing Eurosceptic alliance. The initiative of bringing together 
conservative-liberal and nationalist milieus did not bring the 
result they had expected. Also, the score of Kukiz’15 (3.69%) 
must have disappointed its members and supporters. It only 
confirmed that this parliamentary formation has been losing 
voters, which should be a serious warning before the autumn 
elections.
Assessing the profiles of voters of the two main forma-
tions, obvious differences can be noticed. Less educated pe-
ople and those living in smaller towns and villages were more 
willing to vote for PiS. A higher level of education and living 
in a bigger city meant that voters were more inclined to vote 
for the European Coalition.
Looking at the position of party leaders, the 2019 EP 
elections did not promote new figures. In the main parties, 
leaders played their roles according to a well-known pattern. 
Relative success, namely three seats, can be attributed to 
Robert Biedroń and his new party initiative. Disappointment 
awaited leaders of the Confederation and those who joined a 
new initiative led by Robert Gwiazdowski.
The EP elections brought about the need to restructure the 
government, which had already been heralded anyway. Five 
ministers and three deputy ministers won their seats in the 
EP. A situation which is in fact favourable for the governing 
party as it means a new beginning and changes in the go-
vernment easily explained by the natural need following the 
elections.
Winning the recent EP elections PiS confirmed its domi-
nant position. The results indicate that it will be very difficult 
for the opposition to take over power in autumn. Despite 
establishing a coalition with one list of candidates, they did 
not manage to threaten the governing party. An attempt at 
winning over centre and left-wing voters has not brought the 
expected effect. The only harbinger of possible changes is Ro-
bert Biedroń’s Spring, which is aspiring to become the third 
political power in Poland. However, all things considered, the 
main rivalry will still be going on between PiS and PO.
EP elections as the forerunner  
of the Polish parliamentary elections
Maciej Hartliński 
Professor in Political Science
University of Warmia  





Coupled with more flexible voting behavior and the declining 
binding power of established party-milieu ties, the established 
parties in Western democracies are under considerable com-
petitive pressure. This applies in a specific way to Social De-
mocratic parties. For them the situation is precarious because 
they have lost voters to all relevant new competitors in recent 
decades, with the consequence that they are in a steady 
decline and the biggest losers in the European Elections in 
2019. In the 1980s and 1990s voters who favor post-materialist 
values turned their backs on the social democratic parties and 
voted for the Greens or similar post-materialist parties. Now, 
in addition to these voters, large parts of the more vulnerable 
in society, as well those of a lower educational level within 
the middle class, are casting their votes in favor of Populists 
on the left (with their economic perspective) and in particular 
on the right (with their more socio-cultural perspective). A not 
insignificant number of these were former social democra-
tic voters. These voters have strong concerns about relative 
deprivation, they distrust globalisation, are sceptical about 
EU integration, feel uncomfortable about the overall erosion 
of the post-war welfare state and increased inequality, and 
dislike labour migration and refugee migration in general. 
Still Green parties are able to attract voters with post-material 
values, in particular young ones, who are concerned about 
climate change and all of its implications for the future. For 
example, in Germany one third of the young voters between 
18 and 25 at this European Election voted for the Greens but 
only 10 per cent for the social democrats. Similar success for 
the Greens with young voters is to be observed in France 
as well. The consequences are clear: The traditional social 
democratic electorate has been split, fragmented and shrunk. 
The alliances between workers, the academic and professional 
middle classes and the trade unions seems to have been torn 
apart.
Thus, in addition to the major reduction in support in the 
socio-cultural milieu of employees belonging to trade unions, 
the social democrats declining share of the vote is due to 
diverse social and political reasons. Three of them are worthy 
of emphasis here. 
First, the feelings of social and political insecurity expe-
rienced by the population groups that have been unsettled 
by the effects of economic changes due to the globalisation 
of markets. These population groups fear losing their social 
status, have only low expectations for the future and place 
little trust in traditional parties and political actions. Further, 
these groups, which have socially and culturally tended to 
lean towards social democracy, have experienced difficulties 
in the labour market, have been in insecure employment at 
least once in their professional lives and/or feel subjectively 
threatened about their standards of living being maintained. 
Social democracy’s shift towards the ‘third way’ and the am-
bivalence that accompanied this development have strengthe-
ned its rejection by the group. Social democratic parties see 
the primary consequences of globalisation, such as free trade 
and free movement, as positive, while many of their previous 
voters are skeptical of these developments and can be consi-
dered as gobalisation skeptics. A fairly large number of them 
were non-voters before turning to populist parties. The result 
is a gap between the attitudes and opinions of their former 
loyal voters and the social democratic party elite, leading to 
many former social democratic voters from the lower strata 
of society switching their sympathies to populists or simply 
refraining from voting. Additionally, many social democra-
tic party leaders have failed to acknowledge that people’s 
concerns about immigration might be legitimate in their own 
right and that these are not simply to do with social security. 
Another development was partially overlooked by the 
party elite of some social democratic parties, namely a kind of 
electoral substitution: Middle-class voters have clearly become 
the largest share in the social democratic electoral base in 
many countries. Notwithstanding, parts the party elites still 
perceive themselves as a workers’ party, but their own social 
background is entirely different. A loss of credibility within 
both voting groups (workers and middle-classes) was the 
result. The clear return of the social democrats to a traditio-
nal welfare state policy, which has been observable in many 
countries since 2009 as result of the financial market crisis, 
has evidently not yet helped social Democratic parties to 
achieve election success.
Further, due to their cultural and political self-perceptions, 
the academic subsection of social democratic voters tends to 
place itself to the left-of-centre, not only in socio-economic 
terms, but also in socio-cultural ones. However, this area of 
political terrain more frequently disappoints supporters, as 
social democratic parties (as potential parties of government) 
often have to act in a pragmatic fashion. Notably, this vulne-
rability affects conservative parties less. This high probability 
of failing to meet supporters’ expectations has become a real 
issue for contemporary Western social democratic parties.
 
The decline of Social Democracy  
in Western Europe
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Slovakian public likes European Union. It has been repeatedly 
proven by the Eurobarometer surveys. Here are some recent 
findings: according to Eurobarometer 91.1 (Spring 2019), up 
to 78 per cent of people in Slovakia think that the country 
benefits from membership (EU 28 average is 68 %); over 50 per 
cent view membership as a good thing, and if a referendum 
on EU membership would be held, only 11 per cent of citizens 
would vote to leave. 
However, all these positive views and attitudes do not 
automatically turn into an active interest in European agenda 
and in electoral turnout when it comes to European parlia-
ment.  Slovakia has had the lowest turnout in every European 
Parliament election since it joined the European Union. In 
2004, just shortly after the EU accession, only 17 per cent of 
eligible voters took part; five years later 19 per cent in 2014 it 
was only 13 per cent. In 2019 participation increased to 22.7 
per cent, but since participation increased in all member 
states, Slovakia remained on the tail again. 
The roots of notorious disinterest in elections and the EU 
disconnect are not easy to explain, several factors sign it. In 
particular, elections to the EP are perceived as secondary not 
only by voters but also by political parties. It means that the 
campaign is considerably less intense than in the national 
elections. Moreover, until recently, the European agenda was 
not the issue of party competition – all parties were similar in 
their position towards the EU, they all supported it, so-called 
´permissive consensus´ prevailed. Other arguments include 
the fact that, even after 15 years of membership, the public 
perceives the EU as something distant, not related to their 
everyday life, as a ”great unknown” they do not know and 
therefore do not care about. Other aspects relate to the overall 
political and social climate - many people are angry with po-
liticians, frustrated by corruption scandals, they do not trust 
politics in general and all these result into the civic passivity.
The increase of turnout from 13 to almost 23 per cent was 
mainly due to the fact that the European agenda became the 
subject of electoral competition, moreover, we have seen 
a significant polarization between parties that are clearly 
pro-European and those on the other side of the ”barricade”. 
On the unambiguously pro-EU pole stands the newly emer-
ging liberal party Progressive Slovakia (not represented in 
the national parliament yet) in the coalition with party Spolu 
(Together). On the opposite side there is radical right-wing ex-
tremist People’s Party-Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), that in 2016 initia-
ted a referendum about EU-Exit – Slovakia leaving the EU and 
NATO – but failed in collecting enough supporters. Now, the 
party eased the hard EU-reject position and campaigned with 
a slogan ´Slovakia first, only then Brussels´. All in all the 2019 
EP elections were more than ever about the European Union 
what increased the mobilization. The pre-election political 
and public discourse was more about the future integration - 
whether the EU’s competences should be strengthened or, on 
the contrary, national states should have more competences. 
The public discourse also included the spread of various EU 
myths brought about by various websites and radical media, 
in particular, the alleged ”dictate of Brussels”.
There were 31 political subjects running in the EP elec-
tions, representing a wide range of ideological positions: from 
mainstream center-right, socialists and liberals to far-right na-
tionalist groups. Clearly pro-European coalition of Progressive 
Slovakia and Together has become a surprising winner – they 
won 20 per cent of the vote (four out of 13 - ev. 14 after Brexit 
- Slovakia’s mandates in the EP). It defeated the long-term fa-
vorite of all elections since 2006, the ruling party Smer-Social 
Democracy, which received only less than 16 per cent of vote 
(three mandates). Other smaller coalition parties - the Slovak 
National Party and Most-Híd - did not even exceed the 5 per 
cent threshold. This fiasco of the strongest government party 
and coalition as a whole will undoubtedly have consequences 
for further political developments, especially in the context of 
the next year’s parliamentary elections. The extremists – ĽSNS 
– got 12 per cent  votes (two mandates). The electoral gain of 
this party was expected with huge concern. Nevertheless, the 
result might indicate that right-wing extremism has reached 
the limits of its electoral support. In addition, another Euro-
sceptic party ´We are a family´ which declared to belong to 
European nationalists like Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini 
ended up below 5 per cent threshold. There are three other 
oppositional parties which gained the EP seats - Christian De-
mocratic Movement, represented in the European Parliament 
since 2004 (member of the EPP); Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 
and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OLaNO), 
both ECR members. 
MEPs from Slovakia will continue to be represented in 
the mainstream party families - the EPP and the Socialists, as 
well as in ECR. The newcomer – Progressive Slovakia will join 
ALDE (or what it will be in the future). The affiliation of two 
extremist MEPs is open. It can be expected that, through their 
presence in the EP, they will seek to increase their relevance 
in domestic politics, with a view to the national elections 
in spring 2020. The group of Slovakia´s MEPs remains quite 
fragmented regarding the parties´ attachment. Comparing 
to previous electoral cycles we see a significant generational 
change, furthermore, there are two prominent environmental 
experts and activists, what will strengthen the competences 
in „green“ issues, which have so far been completely absent 
from the thematic portfolio of  the Slovak MEPs.
Public’s perception of the EU  
and turnout in the EP election  
Olga Gyarfasova
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Have the members of Swedish political parties become less 
interested in EU membership since Brexit? After the 2016 refe-
rendum on European Union (EU) membership in the United 
Kingdom (UK) there was widespread media speculation that 
other EU Member States might follow the UK’s example and 
move to depart the EU. Sweden was one of the countries put 
forward as potentially susceptible to a Brexit contagion effect, 
not entirely without reason. Sweden was relatively late in joi-
ning the EU, it is geographically removed from the continent, 
and Swedes opted not to adopt the Euro as their currency by 
referendum. Two parliamentary parties in Sweden are also 
EU-critical, The Left Party from the economic left and the 
Sweden Democrats from the socio-cultural right, creating 
the possibility for mobilization against the EU from diverse 
perspectives in the ideological spectrum. 
We can address this question by looking at the opinions 
of an understudied group of political actors, the members 
of political parties. My colleague Ann-Kristin Kölln and I 
have fielded two rounds of surveys targeting all members 
of political parties in Sweden with representation in either 
the Riksdag or the European Parliament. Our first study was 
conducted in 2015, a year before Brexit, and our second study 
was conducted in the spring of 2019, allowing us to compare 
the EU preferences of party members before and after the 
initiation of Brexit. In 2015 all parties except Center and the 
Sweden Democrats participated and in 2019 only the Sweden 
Democrats chose not to take part in the survey. We asked 
the members to answer two questions related to the EU. The 
first asked respondents to indicate whether they believe that 
Sweden’s membership in the EU is either “Good,” “Bad,” or 
“Neither good nor bad.” The second question asked the party 
members to evaluate on a ten-point scale whether the process 
of European integration “has gone too far” (0) or “should go 
further” (10). 
Beginning with the Good/Bad question, in 2015 just over 54 
per cent of the roughly 10,000 Swedish party members that 
participated in the survey reported that Sweden’s mem-
bership in the EU was good. Over 24 per cent of respondents 
thought that EU membership was bad, and over 21 per cent 
thought that membership was neither good nor bad. This con-
trasts rather sharply with the responses in 2019. In the most 
recent survey, over 69 per cent of the 16,000 respondents re-
ported that Swedish membership in the EU is good, just over 
11 per  cent indicated that it was bad, and just over 19 per cent 
reported that it was neither good nor bad. This represents a 
substantial increase in positive evaluations of EU membership 
and an almost equally large decrease in negative evaluations 
of EU membership between 2015 and 2019. 
The members of every party in the survey were more likely 
to evaluate the EU favorably in 2019 compared to 2015, but 
this trend was particularly pronounced for the parties of the 
ideological left. In 2015, only 8 per cent of Left Party (V) mem-
bers saw EU membership as a good thing. In 2019, this increa-
sed to nearly 29 per cent of V members. There are comparable 
increases in EU favorability for the Social Democrats (52% in 
2015, 77% in 2019), The Greens (48% in 2015, 77% in 2019) and 
the Feminist Initiative (33% in 2015, 64% in 2019). 
The question about the pace of European integration also 
shows little decrease in support for the EU. In 2015, the mean 
position of all party members that answered this question 
was 4.58 on a 0-10 scale. In 2019, the mean increased slightly 
to 4.9, a modest increase in support for furthering integration. 
The only parties to register a slight decrease on this question 
between 2015 and 2019 were the Christian Democrats and the 
Moderates, the two more socio-culturally conservative mem-
bers of the former centre-right Alliance. On average, Swedish 
party members are not likely to say that the development 
of the EU has already gone too far, nor are they particularly 
likely to push for further integration than currently exists 
today. Overall, this suggests that party members in Sweden 
are rather content with the pace of European integration and 
favorably inclined to their country’s membership in the EU, 
and this has strengthened in the years since Brexit.
Caveats, of course, apply. Our surveys targeted the entire 
membership populations of the Swedish parties, but not all 
members responded. In 2015, we found response rates to be 
comparable to the gender and age make-up of the parties’ 
membership bases, but we have not yet calculated this for 
2019. Further, the absence of the Sweden Democrats means 
that we miss the most EU-critical party in the Swedish system. 
That said, these results indicate that for the members of the 
other Swedish parties, there is more support for EU mem-
bership in 2019 than there was in 2015.
 
 
Comparing the EU attitudes of Swedish  
party members before and after Brexit
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In the run up to the 2019 EP elections two party families recei-
ved special attention from commentators and journalists. On 
the one hand they have focused on the greens, arguing that 
a green wave was about to hit Europe. On the other hand, 
they have discussed the growing support for populist radical 
right parties, claiming that a populist surge was materializing. 
These competing narratives raise an important question: Are 
the successes of green and populist radical right parties by 
any means related? 
In the political science literature, the emergence of green 
and populist radical right parties has often been discussed in 
tandem. Scholars have argued that the success of these two 
party families can be seen as two sides of the same coin. The 
Italian political scientist Piero Ignazi, for example, claims that 
populist radical right parties emerged in the 1980s in reaction 
to the rise of green parties in the 1970s, with both kinds of 
parties benefitting from the fact that non-materialist issues 
became more important in post-industrial societies. On these 
issues, some voters approve of cosmopolitan and libertarian 
policies, whereas other voters support authoritarian and 
nationalist policies.  Green and populist radical right parties 
are the primary representatives of these two groups of voters, 
taking opposite stances on non-material issues. Green parties 
favour sustainable development, lifestyle diversity, humane 
migration policies and bottom up democracy, while populist 
radical right parties campaign for a sharp reduction in the 
influx of immigrants and their mandatory integration, law 
and order policies, and cultural and lifestyle homogeneity. On 
questions pertaining to the future of the European integration 
project the two party families tend to have polar opposite 
ideas. 
If the rise of the populist radical right and greens were 
indeed related, we would expect that in the 2019 EP elections 
these two party families display growth patterns that are 
roughly similar. At a first glance the results of the 2019 elec-
tions for the EP seem to support that expectation (see table 1). 
Green and populist radical right parties have on average gai-
ned similar levels of electoral support in these elections, with 
a 14.1 per cent vote share for green parties and a 14.3 per cent 
vote share for populist radical right parties. Moreover, the 
average percentage point by which these parties have grown 
is also roughly similar, with 3.3 percentage point growth for 
green parties and 3.0 percentage point growth for populist 
radical right parties.
However, these averages fail to show the marked diffe-
rence in the growth patterns within the two party families. 
For green parties the 2019 EP elections have been the most 
successful to date. With the exception of the green parties in 
Sweden (-3.9) and Austria (-0.4), they have all improved upon 
their vote share compared to the 2014 elections. Moreover, 
green parties benefit from equal levels of support across 
Western Europe, with their vote shares consistently ranging 
between 10 and 20 per cent. The largest parties can be found 
in Belgium (19.9% for Ecolo), Germany (20.5% for Die Grünen) 
and Luxembourg (18.9% for Dei Greng), the smallest is the Ne-
therlands (10.9% for GroenLinks) and Spain (10.1% for Iniciativa 
per Catalunya Verds).
The picture is far more complex on the other side of the 
political continuum. Populist radical right parties have grown 
considerably in Belgium (+12.3), Italy (+28.2), Spain (+6.2) 
and the United Kingdom (+30.7). Other populist radical right 
parties have lost a fair amount of votes compared to the 2014 
elections. The group of losing parties includes UKIP (-23.6), 
the DF (-15.8) and the PVV (-10.1), as well as their Greek, French 
and Austrian compatriots. Two populist radical right parties 
(ANEL and the PVV) have experienced such substantial losses 
that they are no longer represented in the EP. Other populist 
radical right parties have made such large gains that they 
represent more than one in three voters in their respective 
countries (e.g. the Lega and the Brexit Party).   
What is more, gains and losses of green and populist 
radical right parties are hardly correlated. The countries 
in which green parties fared particularly well are not the 
countries in which populist radical right parties triumphed. 
Point in case is Italy, where the Lega became the largest party, 
but the greens did not obtain any seats. Conversely, Ireland 
and Luxembourg green parties were successful, while no 
populist radical right parties are present. Thus, it appears that 
the ‘green wave’ and the ‘populist surge’ are at not directly 
related, at least not at the aggregate level. Moreover, many 
populist radical right parties experienced a peak in support in 
the previous EP elections, while the 2019 elections were the 
most successful to date for green parties.
Green wave or populist surge? 
Sarah de Lange






Table 1. Support for green and populist radical right parties in the 2019 EP elections
* No longer represented after the 2019 elections for the EP and therefore not included in the averages.  
Source:  https://election-results.eu/national-results-overview/
Vote share compared 
to 2014 Vote share Green party Country
Populist radical 
right party Vote share
Vote share compared 
to 2014
-0.4 14.1% Grune Austria FPO 17.2% -2.5
+8.2/+1.7 19.9%/12.4% Ecolo/Groen Belgium VB 19.1% +12.3
+2.2 13.2% SF Denmark DF 10.8% -15.8
+6.7 16.0% VL Finland PS 13.8% +0.9
+4.5 13.5% EELV France RN 23.3% -1.6
+9.8 20.5% DG Germany AfD 11.0% +3.9
- - - Greece ANEL* 0.8% -2.7
+6.5 11.4% GP Ireland -
- - - Italy Lega 34.3% +28.2
+3.9 18.9% DG Luxemburg -
+3.9 10.9% GL Netherlands FvD/PVV* 11.0%/3.2% +11.0/-10.1
- - - Portugal -
+0.1 10.1% ICV Spain VOX 6.2% +6.2
-3.9 11.5% MP Sweden SD 15.3% +5.6
+3.9 11.1% GPNI UK Brexit Party/UKIP 30.7%/3.2% +30.7/-23.6
+3.3 14.1% average 14.3% +3.0
The parties
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On 8 April 2019, representatives from the Danish People’s Par-
ty, the Finns Party, and the Alternative for Germany, appeared 
alongside the League leader Matteo Salvini in Milan to anno-
unce that they would be part of a new European Parliament 
(EP) group after the elections called European Alliance for 
People and Nations (EAPN). They also signed an agreement, 
in which they pledged ‘to unite the patriotic and conservative 
forces in the European Parliament that are at the moment 
split over different groups’. 
This referred to the fact that in the 2014-19 EP, radical right 
populists were mainly divided between three groups: Euro-
pean Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy (EFDD), and Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF). For example, if we look at the three radical 
right populist parties that topped the polls in their respective 
countries in 2014, we find the Danish People’s Party sat in the 
ECR, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the EFDD, and the 
French National Front in the ENF. 
This was nothing new. As Annika Werner and I discuss in 
our forthcoming book, these parties have long been divided 
due to conflicting nationalist agendas and fears of being  
tainted domestically by association with other European  
radical right populists that have extreme pasts and reputa-
tions. 
However, if the 2014-19 parliament saw such divisions 
persist, it also saw greater unity than ever before thanks to 
the ENF group which contained five prominent radical right 
populist parties: the French National Front, the Italian League, 
the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Austrian Freedom Party and 
the Flemish Vlaams Belang. Moreover, the ENF has been the 
first group only containing radical right populists to reach the 
end of an EP legislature intact.
The EAPN will, therefore, be a type of ENF+. Geert Wilders’ 
Dutch Party for Freedom will not be there (since it did not 
win seats this time), but the other ENF parties will be joined 
by the Danish People’s Party, Finns Party, Alternative for 
Germany, along (probably) with several new parties in the 
EP from central and Eastern Europe such as Estonia’s EKRE 
(Conservative People’s Party of Estonia) and the Czech SPD 
(Freedom and Direct Democracy). 
Given that the Danish People’s Party and Finns Party joined 
the ECR in 2014 to improve their domestic image by sitting 
alongside the UK Conservatives and not having anything to do 
with parties like the National Front, why have they now de-
cided to embrace their commonalities with the ENF’s radical 
right populists? 
There are two main reasons. The first is the presumed 
departure, thanks to Brexit, of the UK Conservatives. As  
leading figures from the Danish People’s Party and Finns  
Party explained to us in interviews for our book, being along-
side the UK Conservatives was considered a signal to their 
domestic medias, political elites and the voters that  
they were fully legitimate parties and to be taken seriously. 
That ‘respectability bonus’ is now gone.
Second, the parties of the ENF have themselves become 
more respectable. The Austrian Freedom Party and the League 
both became parties of government (again) during the 2014-19 
EP. And the more time passes since the end of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen’s time as leader of French National Front, the more 
respectable the party becomes (helped also by his daughter, 
Marine Le Pen, denouncing his anti-Semitism and removing 
him from the party).
Nonetheless, there will still be divisions on the radical 
right as the Polish Law and Justice, the Sweden Democrats 
and Hungary’s Fidesz have all have said they will not join 
the EAPN. For Law and Justice, even though it has become 
fully radical right populist since 2014, the closeness of parties 
like the French National Front and Italian League to Russia 
remains a red line. 
Similarly, for the Sweden Democrats, as one of its leading 
figures, Mattias Karlsson said in an April 2019 Facebook post: 
‘the future is not to isolate itself in a purely nationalist group 
with more or less radical and Putin-friendly parties’. Indeed, 
it is interesting to note that the Sweden Democrats, as part of 
their intended journey from pariahs to potential partners for 
the Swedish centre-right, now pursue a more moderate path 
at European level than the Danish People’s Party, which had 
long been its model. 
As for Fidesz, if it did have to find a new home in the EP 
given its tense relationship with the centre-right European 
People’s Party group it currently sits in, one would expect it 
to be alongside Law and Justice in the ECR, especially in the 
light of Fidesz leader Viktor Orbán’s recent comment: ‘I have 
nothing at all to do with Madame Le Pen. Nothing’.
In short, it seems likely that in the new parliament, there 
will be one large ideologically homogenous radical right 
populist group, the EAPN, but also an ECR that is smaller and 
more ideologically heterogeneous, but also significantly more 
radical right populist, than it was in 2014.
Moreover, even if they are not all sitting together in a sing-
le group, we should see more inter-group cooperation on the 
radical right than was the case in the 2014-19 parliament. Law 
and Justice’s leader Jarosław Kaczynski has met this year with 
both Salvini and Orbán and all three have talked of the need 
to collaborate on issues like ‘growth, security, family and the 
Christian roots of Europe’. So, while they may continue to sit 
in different parts of the European Parliament choir, radical 
right populists in the coming years will increasingly be in 
agreement about their choice of hymns.
Will radical right populists finally all sit  








The Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) emerged from 
the Christian Democratic Group, founded in 1953. It was the 
biggest group at formation but was the second-biggest group 
by the time of the 1979 elections. In 1999 the centre-right EPP 
Group became the biggest group in the European Parliament 
(EP) for the first time since 1979 and it has been the largest  
political group in the EP since 1999. The position of the 
biggest group enabled it to be a force at the very forefront of 
the European Union (EU). Yet, the EPP Group was divided on 
many issues of the day, reflecting the broad range of parties 
represented there. During the course of the 1990s the EPP, 
group and party, underwent a difficult internal process of 
deepening versus widening with the challenge of incorpora-
ting (liberal-) conservative parties. Now the biggest group  
it increasingly looked like a conglomerate, consisting of 
a number of different and distinct parts that were loosely 
grouped together.
The implosion of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana party 
in the early 1990s strengthened the position of the Germans 
in the Group considerably, at the expense of the Christian 
Democrat centre. This shift to the right within the EPP was 
exacerbated by the strengthened role of the Spanish Partido 
Popular, along with the inclusion of conservative (some- 
times very pro-market oriented) political parties from various 
countries.
The traditional home, ideological grouping, for Christian 
Democrats the EPP Group enlarged to include also conserva-
tive parties. Ultimately this was a means to an end: to gain as 
much influence in the EP and in inter-institutional relations 
in the EU. All of this translates into a power-seeking beha-
viour. In a nutshell, as strategic actors, political parties or 
groups can be conceived of as office-seeking, policy-seeking, 
or vote-seeking. And, ultimately, as power-seeking. The EPP 
Group epitomizes this tendency toward power; to influence 
policy and so on.
However, this growth in size and influence came at a price; 
as the Group expanded it became less cohesive. It came to 
encompass a broad range of parties: from Christian democra-
tic ones to liberal or conservative ones. This same tendency 
was visible in the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement. While 
the EPP greatly benefited from EU enlargement this further 
reinforced the disparity within the grouping. 
In view of the May elections, the EPP on March 20th voted 
to suspend Fidesz, Hungary’s ruling party of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán, as a protest against the measures by the Hung-
arian government to undermine the rule of law. Whereas 
several member parties of the EPP, mostly from the Benelux 
and Nordic countries, called for Fidesz’s expulsion the out-
come was a temporary suspension of Fidesz. This is a telling 
illustration of ideological division within the EPP but also of 
its power-oriented approach. These days we do not hear much 
of any federalist ambitions. Yet, the EPP faces a dilemma. For 
its own credibility as a leading force of European integration 
the EPP cannot allow parties to fight against this.
The outcome of the EP election in May further strengthe-
ned Fidesz and parties right-of-centre, which will work for 
re-nationalization within the EU. Whereas the election shrank 
the overall share of the EPP, to around 24 per cent or 179 
seats, as expected it remained the largest group at the EP. 
While this broad centre-right grouping is set to retain conside-
rable influence, it finds themselves in a very different party 
landscape, with anti-integrationists gaining strength. It is an 
increasingly fragmented and polarized party landscape. This 
situation will have consequences, not least for the extensive 
cross-party collaboration that has characterized deal-making 
in the EP and is set to continue. Even more than before the 
EPP Group will be under pressure to seek cross-party consen-
sus, reaching out to other political groups. It looked likely 
that decision-making will become more difficult. At the same 
time, there is some core consisting of mainstream parties. The 
EPP Group, with the German CDU/CSU still the largest delega-
tion although diminished, is set to take on a leading role, in 
its own interest but also so that the EU can move forward and 
further deepen integration. Whatever happens next in this 
adventure there is no doubt that the EPP Group will play a 
significant role in it. After all, it is the biggest. Again.
The Group of the European People’s party: 
Biggest again
Karl Magnus Johansson





One of the key predictions in the run-up to the 2019 European 
Parliament elections (EP) was that far right populist parties 
would claim a sweeping victory that would allow them to 
disrupt European politics for the next five years. However, 
their success was much more modest than expected. In fact, 
there was a great degree of variation in support for the far 
right during the elections. 
By far the most successful party was Matteo Salvini’s Itali-
an Northern League that managed to increase its share of the 
seats in the EP legislature from five to 28. Nigel Farage’s Brex-
it party came first in the UK with approximately 32 per cent 
of the vote. Despite the fact that the party was only registered 
in February 2019, it succeeded in capitalising on the govern-
ment’s inability to fulfil its Brexit mandate. In France, Marine 
Le Pen’s National Rally also topped the polls with 23 per cent. 
However, the National Rally did worse compared to its 2014 
EP election performance, despite the fact that the campaign 
had become a popularity contest between Le Pen and Macron. 
The elections also reaffirmed Orban’s electoral dominance in 
Hungary who received 52 per cent of the vote. 
The electoral results were not as impressive in other 
European countries, such as Sweden, Finland and Germany. 
Although the Swedish Democrats received 15.4 per cent of the 
vote, which is about six percentage points higher than their 
2014 electoral performance, they lost ground compared to the 
national election that took place in September 2018. Similarly, 
the Finns Party experienced a drop in its support compared to 
the April 2019 domestic election. The Alternative for Germany 
modestly increased its vote share from 7 to 11 per cent, failing 
to capitalise on the poor electoral performance of both the 
centre-right and centre-left in Germany. 
The far right declined in a number of countries. Most nota-
bly, support for the Danish People’s Party fell by approximate-
ly 16 percentage points. In Austria, a scandal related to party 
leader Heinz-Christian Strache halted the momentum of the 
Freedom Party. 
In the Netherlands and Greece, we saw the fragmentation 
of the far right vote. The Dutch Party for Freedom collapsed 
to only 3.5 per cent of the vote. Thierry Baudet’s party, Forum 
for Democracy, on the other hand, gained three seats, which 
suggests that Geert Wilders’ supporters are switching to this 
new party. Finally, in Greece, although the Golden Dawn lost 
almost half of its voters compared to 2014, the newly formed 
Greek Solution gained 4.18 per cent of the vote, which transla-
ted into one seat in the EP. 
What do these electoral results mean for politics in the EP? 
Now that the dust has settled, far right politicians are 
seeking to form potential alliances in the EP. The Brexit party, 
in particular, faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the future of 
the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), the EP 
alliance that hosted Farage in the past, is uncertain because 
many of its member parties did not receive enough votes. On 
the other hand, joining Salvini’s nationalist group also entails 
working with Marine Le Pen who Farage deemed ‘too extre-
me’ in the aftermath of the 2014 elections. 
Assuming that these parties succeed in forming a coalition, 
the group would have approximately 100 MEPs. The group 
would include members from the Northern League, the Na-
tional Rally, the Alternative for Germany, Austria’s Freedom 
Party, the Finns party, the Danish People’s Party, Estonia’s 
EKRE and the Brexit party. This suggests that they would be 
allocated more committee chairs, which is where they can 
possibly make some difference in EP legislative politics. 
That said, we should not exaggerate their potential impact. 
First, far right MEPs tend to channel most of their resources 
into the domestic arena thus deprioritising their work in the 
EP. Second, far right parties tend to be divided on a number of 
issues related to their economic and social portfolios, which 
is likely to result in low levels of voting cohesion in the EP. 
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, for them the ‘nation 
comes first’ in all political decisions which by definition 
undermines transnational cooperation. Parties, such as the 
French National Front (now National Rally) and the Austrian 
Freedom Party, have attempted to work together in the past, 
e.g. when they formed the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty 
EP political group in 2007. However, the group dissolved only 
a few months after its establishment, following a dispute 
between some of its members. 
Far right parties are thus potentially unlikely to disrupt 
how the EP works. However, they are being increasingly 
successful at changing the political debate, i.e. what we talk 
about and what are our priorities. Far right parties have ente-
red the mainstream in a number of countries, most notably 
France, Italy, Austria and Hungary, and they have stable and 
consistent support elsewhere. Their differentiation between 
in-groups and out-groups is increasingly becoming legitimate. 
What is more, although they are increasingly steering away 
from a policy that supports the dissolution of the EU, they 
now seek to change EU politics ‘from within’. This adds a dif-
ferent type of challenge to the future of European integration. 
 
Support for the far right in the EP elections:  
What do the results mean for European politics?
Sofia Vasilopoulou






Once again, commentators feared a Eurosceptic wave at the 
2019 EP elections as polls predicted a surge of support for 
radical populist parties. This wave was largely contained: the 
success of the populist and Eurosceptic parties needs to be 
nuanced but their consolidated presence in the EP can still 
have an impact on European politics.
Eurosceptic and populist consolidated their position at the 
latest EU elections. If we take together parties belonging to 
the radical left group GUE/NGL, to the radical right ENF, the 
so-called eurorealists from ECR and the populist anti-esta-
blishment group EFDD along with non-attached, Eurosceptics 
now have around 230 seats in the European Parliament. It is a 
slight increase compared to the previous legislature.
But this overall assessment needs to be qualified. While 
radical left parties suffered significant losses, going from 52 
to 38 seats, the radical right was one of the main winners of 
the elections. The ENF group (which has now become Identity 
and Democracy group) doubled its share of seats and has 
become the fifth largest group, just behind the Greens, with 
73 seats. Of course, radical and populist parties did not fare 
well everywhere: in Denmark for instance, the peoples party 
arrived fourth compared to its first position five years ago.  
But in large member states, like France and Italy, radical right 
parties won the elections. In Spain, for the first time, a radical 
right party managed to win seats in the EP and in Germany, 
the AfD gained extra seats. In Austria, despite the “Ibiza-scan-
dal”, the FPÖ scored well and in Belgium the radical right 
enjoyed a renewed success. And although it is a particular 
context, the Brexit party of Nigel Farage – which could either 
join the ID group or stay in the EFDD group – also topped the 
polls and arrived first in the UK with more than 30 per cent of 
the votes. 
In addition to that, Eurosceptic parties from other groups 
also fared well. The Czech ODS doubled its score from 2014 
while the Polish PiS is now by far the dominant party within 
the European Conservatives and Reformists. The 5 star move-
ment, although less successful than its coalition partner the 
Lega, arrived third at the elections. 
The success of these parties came with a moderation of 
their Eurosceptic positions. Against the background of the 
uncertain Brexit situation, citizens seem more attached to 
European integration and the principle of supranational 
cooperation. These parties reacted with a softer Eurosceptic 
position: contrarily to 5 years ago, most of them switched 
from a radical position (arguing in favor of either an exit from 
the EU or the Eurozone,) to a more reformist rhetoric, arguing 
they will change the EU from within. Combined with the 
politicization of migration, this shift seems to have paid off in 
many countries.
Although some politicians and commentators noted with 
a sigh of relief that the surge of support for the Greens and 
the Liberals counterbalanced the success of Eurosceptic 
parties, one should still bear in mind that almost one-third of 
European citizens who decided to vote turned to a Euroscep-
tic, populist and radical party. Combined with the losses of 
the two main political families, it is a strong signal of popular 
discontent and a warning against “politics as usual”.
The main challenge for these parties, especially from 
right-wing Eurosceptics, is to achieve political relevance at the 
EU level. To do so, they would need to form a cohesive, stable 
and significant political group. The radical left group is rather 
cohesive but is going to be the smallest group in the chamber. 
But since there is no cordon sanitaire against radical left, 
these parties could have some limited impact on particular 
issues where they manage to be part of a winning coalition 
on the left. For right-wing Eurosceptics, Salvini and Le Pen 
have so far managed to attract 11 parties, which would bring 
together around 73 seats. However, in order to really make a 
statement, they would need the support of large governmen-
tal Eurosceptic parties like PiS or Fidesz. Moreover, cohesion 
remains a tricky issue for nationalist Eurosceptics. They tend 
to share the same opposition to the EU but are much more 
heterogeneous in what they actually support (be it on the EU 
budget, economic policies, values, external relations, etc). 
Furthermore, they tend to focus on their national interests, 
which can lead to recurring tensions. But despite these 
obstacles, if they indeed become the fourth largest group, 
they will be able to claim positions within the EP in terms of 
rapporteurships and chairmanships of committees, through 
which they could potentially have some legislative or political 
influence.
More generally, the consolidated presence of Eurosceptic 
parties and the fragmented character of the new Parliament 
will increase the pressure on the other groups and will make 
it more difficult for them to find coalitions. And if the Parlia-
ment becomes a difficult institutional partner, its voice might 
get lost in the decision-making process.
Last but certainly not least, Eurosceptics will continue to 
have an (indirect) impact on the European agenda in the near 
future, especially now that they are also represented in the 
Council. There has been a clear mainstreaming of Euroscep-
ticism over the last decade, with mainstream parties using a 
more critical framing and rhetoric towards the EU and key 
political issues such as migration and trade. It is likely that 
the (relative) success of Eurosceptic parties, especially of the 
radical right, will continue influencing European politics, es-
pecially when it comes to borders control, national sovereign-
ty and budgetary decisions.
Eurosceptic parties at the 2019 elections:  
A relative success
Nathalie Brack
Assistant Professor in Political Science





One of the most important drivers of change in European 
party systems is the appearance of new political parties. They 
can bring new issues to the forefront of the political debate 
and force established parties to adapt to changing voter 
demand. While forming a new party is relatively easy in most 
EU member states, very few of these newcomers ever enter 
parliament. They face hurdles ranging from formal electoral 
rules to difficulties in attracting voters’ attention and support. 
Ever since the first direct elections to the European Parli-
ament (EP) in 1979, each round of elections has seen parties 
that were not previously represented in the EP or its national 
parliament gain representation. These newcomers range from 
parties that have become important actors over time in their 
respective country, such as France’s Front National that ente-
red the EP in 1984, to ‘one hit wonders’ that serve one term in 
the EP and then disappear from the political scene. 
Why do new parties seek representation in the EP? The 
answer to this can vary. For some, such as UKIP or the Danish 
June Movement, the EP is important in itself. This is the arena 
where the party wants to be successful, either in order to take 
part in policy-making or because it is a suitable platform for 
promoting its ideas. For most, it is simply one out of several 
arenas where they participate in elections – they happened to 
be successful at the European rather than the national level. 
Out of 50 new parties that entered the EP in 1979-2009, 40 also 
took part in subsequent national elections, hoping to trans-
late their success at the European level to a more permanent 
position in their national party system.  
Why do voters opt for these parties at a higher rate in EP 
elections than in national elections? It is not entirely clear 
that we do! As discussed in several Euroflections contribu-
tions, European elections are seen as second order with less 
being at stake, freeing voters to vote with their heart rather 
than strategically, which should benefit newcomers. It has 
been well established that small and non-government parties 
do comparatively better in European elections, but not all 
these parties are new. In some elections the “old” opposition 
parties are the primary beneficiaries of this tendency to vote 
against the current government. 
New parties have been elected to the European Parliament 
in every election since 1979. The number of such new entrants 
has increased over time. In 1979 only two new parties were 
elected. In 2004, this number had jumped to 19. In one sense 
this is not surprising, since the number of member states, and 
thus the number of party systems, had increased. The majori-
ty of the newcomers were from the new member states that 
joined that year, prompting debate and speculation on the 
instability of eastern European party systems. The following 
election, however, only five new parties entered the EP.  2014 
was something of a record year, with 21 newcomers. Out of 
these, eight were German, partly as a result of the German 
Constitutional Court striking down the electoral threshold 
that had previously been in effect. 
The new parties that have entered the EP are a diver-
se group. They represent every shade of the ideological 
spectrum, from radical left to far right. Most of them are not 
far outside of the established party systems. They are seeking 
to refine existing ideologies, rather than launching new ones. 
The majority are formed by experienced politicians, rather 
than pure grass root movements. Some were formed right 
before the election, others have participated unsuccessfully 
for many years. The new parties are not, however, equally 
common in all member states. Size seems to play a role here, 
together with formal electoral rules and general party system 
instability. Italy tops the list with a total of 14 new parties, 
followed by France and Germany, with eleven and ten parties 
respectively. Five countries has never elected a new party to 
the EP. Several of the EU:s smallest members, such as Luxem-
bourg and Malta, are among this latter group.
The 2019 European elections yielded substantially fewer 
newcomers compared to 2014. With the caveat that not all 
final electoral results were announced at the time of writing, 
twelve new parties were elected. At first glance, this might 
seem contradictory to the dominant takeaway from the 
election, the decline of the established parties. As pointed out 
above, the main beneficiaries of such a change are not always 
the new parties. Populist right, greens and liberals already 
represented in the EP or their national parliament have in 
many cases increased in size. In this sense, the 2019 elections 
represent a shift of balance within the existing party systems, 
rather than new additions. An additional possible explana-
tion is that several member states had seen newcomers in 
recent national elections. One example of this is Spain’s Vox. 
It entered the national parliament just months before the EP 
elections, and thus ceased to be “new” in the sense used here. 
There are however some notable newcomers. Volt Europe, 
ran candidates in eight countries, and saw one MEP elected in 
Germany, making it arguably the first instance of a pan-Euro-
pean party represented in the EP. France was the only country 
with more than one successful new party, likely reflecting the 
upheaval in the French party system over the past few years. 
In sheer size however, none of the other new parties can com-
pare with the Brexit party. Headed by the former leader of 
UKIP, Nigel Farage, the party became the largest party in the 
UK. It remains to be seen if and how these parties will influen-
ce European politics, and if any of them will be successful at 
the national level. 
New parties in the European parliament
Sofie Blombäck






In Portugal, the 26th of May European elections to choose 21 
MEPs were held in the shadow of the forthcoming October 
legislative elections. The EP election was seen as a moment 
for verifying the strength of the socialist government party 
(PS- Partido Socialista), as well as its coalition partners in 
parliament, the BE (Bloco de Esquerda) and PCP (Partido 
Comunista Português). It also tested the new leader of the 
main opposition party (PSD- Partido Social Democrata), Rui 
Rio’s ability to present a galvanizing alternative on the Right. 
Given the second-order nature of these elections, they could 
favour new parties. Polls suggested extreme-right Basta!, the 
right-wing Aliança, or the PAN (Partido Animais e Natureza) 
could perhaps win one MEP.
An analysis of topic salience of European issues in the two 
main newspapers (Público and Diário de Notícias) one month 
before the elections, showed that the EU was more salient 
than in previous legislative elections. It was also more salient 
than in Spain or Ireland during the same period. Yet, it does 
not seem to be a very polarising topic. Indeed, opinion polls 
suggest the Portuguese have returned to pre-crisis levels of 
attitudes towards Europe. These are characterised by being 
overwhelmingly positive, i.e. in favour of remaining in the 
EU, as well as in the euro. They are also relatively uninfor-
med. 
To understand support for the EU in Portugal, we need to 
consider that economic growth and low unemployment levels 
that have returned to the country in recent years. In addition, 
the only staunchly Eurosceptic parties, the BE and the PCP, 
have been supporting the minority socialist government in a 
parliamentary coalition since 2015. This support has meant a 
softening of the hard left Eurosceptic stance in Portugal. 
Within this general context, the pre-campaign period was 
marked by a key event that served to ‘nationalise’ the cam-
paign further. Namely, on 2nd May the two main right-wing 
opposition parties, the centre-right PSD and the conservative 
CDS-PP voted for an increase in teachers’ salaries (held back 
since 2005 due to wage freezes) alongside the BE and the PCP 
in the Committee stage in Parliament. The Prime Minister 
António Costa reacted immediately, stating that the govern-
ment would resign if this law was approved in the final vote 
in Parliament. After fumbling, both PSD and CDS-PP retrac-
ted their vote. This move positioned the Socialist party as 
the ‘only’ economically responsible party in Portugal. Some 
polling firms had indicated the PSD might be catching up 
with the Socialists on vote intention, especially given the fact 
that the PS had as lead MEP candidate a lacklustre Socialist 
ex-Minister who seemed less than able in debates and other 
campaign activities. After this episode, polls indicated that 
this process of PSD catching-up stalled. 
On the day, and following the second-order model, the 
biggest winner was abstention which reached 69.25 per cent 
of the electorate, the highest level ever recorded in EP or 
national elections in Portugal. This record number was in part 
due to fact that for the first time, all Portuguese citizens living 
abroad with a valid citizen’s card were automatically enrolled 
as electors, thus adding 1 million electors to the register, 
where only 1 per cent of citizens abroad actually voted. Consi-
dering only the national territory, there was a slight increase 
in the absolute number of votes from 2014, with turnout still 
low in comparative terms at 35 per cent.   
 In terms of results, Prime Minister Costa claimed victory: 
the PS increased its vote share from 31.5 per cent to 33.4 per 
cent and elected an extra MEP. With a total of nine MEPs, 
they remain the most voted party, despite being the incum-
bent now whereas they were in opposition in 2014. The 
two Left coalition partners of the government experienced 
different results: while the Communists fell from 12.7 per 
cent to 6.9 per cent of the vote, and saw its MEPs decline from 
three to two, the BE improved its electoral performance vis-
à-vis 2014, from 4.6 per cent to 9.8 per cent and managed to 
elect an extra MEP, having equalled representation with the 
PCP. The Communists have been suffering electorally since 
forming the coalition with the socialists: first in local and now 
European elections. On election night, faces were sombre at 
their headquarters. 
On the Right, no party could claim victory: the PSD won 
22 per cent and the conservative CDS-PP (Partido Popular) 
6.2 per cent whereas running jointly in 2014 as incumbents, 
following the implementation of the troika agreement they 
had reached 27 per cent of the vote. Each party kept their seat 
representation, respectively six and one MEPs. Not only did 
the mainstream right in opposition do badly, the newcomers 
on this side of the ideological spectrum did not achieve any 
representation. The populist extreme-right Basta! Coalition, 
won a meagre 1.5 per cent of votes, making Portugal one of 
the very few countries in the EU without any extreme-right 
populist party with representation. 
Yet, following the second-order model, votes did increase 
for a small opposition party: indeed, the PAN- Party of Ani-
mals and Nature, managed to win 5 per cent of the popular 
vote (where in 2014 it only received 1.4 per cent of the votes) 
and elect its first MEP. 
Taken together, the 2019 election in Portugal seems to 
correspond to the second-order model when we consider 
turnout, albeit to a lesser extent when we consider punish-
ment of incumbents, and support for opposition parties. The 
reasons for that rest with the election cycle, as well as politi-
cal circumstances. The proximity of the legislative election, as 
well as the teachers’ pay episode served to turn this election 
into a stage rehearsal for the October elections.
EP elections in Portugal 2019: A stage  








In Spain, the recent European elections saw a distinct turn 
away from the centre and far-right, as well as from the  
far-left. The conservative People’s Party, PP (Partido Popular), 
suffered losses, most likely due to political scandal: At the end 
of May 2018, one year before the European elections, the High 
Court (Audiencia Nacional) condemned the Spanish ruling PP as 
being guilty of benefitting from “an institutionally-established 
corruption system” that worked for years to illegally fund the 
party. This was one of the most severe corruption cases in 
Spain to date, in which 29 of the 37 accused politicians were 
found guilty. In response to the scandal, Pedro Sánchez, from 
the centre-left opposition party Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party, PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) launched a 
‘vote of no confidence’ (moción de censura) against the then 
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. This initiative surprisingly was 
backed up by the Catalan and Basque nationalist politicians 
and eventually succeeded: Rajoy, who had always been  
regarded as an ‘administrator’ rather than a political leader 
with an ideology, could not withstand the political pressure 
and was forced to step down. The possibilities of forming a 
government were few for Sánchez because of the disputes 
and demands that he had to deal with from different political 
groups; still, he managed to form a government in June 2018. 
It was several months later, when the state budgets Sánchez 
presented were refused, that he was forced to call for general 
elections (his term of office was supposed to end in March 
2020).
In order to not have both national and European elections 
on the same day, Sánchez appointed 28 April as the day for 
the Spanish general election and 26 May (like in most EU 
states) for the European election.
This also gave Spain time to decide on how the new  
political order and groups would reflect the country’s 
representation in the EP. In recent years, two new parties 
had entered the political scene: the far-right party Vox was 
established in December 2013 and in 2014 Podemos emerged 
as the ‘new’ far-left party. In regional elections in Andalusia 
in December 2018, four decades of PSOE government made 
way for a coalition of the People’s Party, Ciudadanos (Citizens) 
and Vox. In these elections, Vox managed to enter a regional 
parliament for the first time with 12 seats, a good number for 
any party that enters for the first time a regional parliament 
of 109 seats. In an attempt to not lose more voters to the  
far-right party Vox in the national elections, the new  
conservative leader Pablo Casado hardened his political 
discourse and positioned himself and his party more to the 
far-right, even though this strategy – and that of Podemos  
leader Pablo Iglesias, who repeatedly accused Pedro Sánchez 
of making alliances with conservative party Ciudadanos  
– then proved not to have worked at all.
In effect, the general election results were a disaster for 
the far-right and far-left Spanish political parties: Of a total of 
350, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party obtained 123 seats 
(way up from 85 in 2016) while the People’s Party obtained 66 
seats (way down from 137 in 2016), conservative Ciudadanos 
57 seats (up from 32 in 2016), far-left Podemos 42 seats (down 
from 71 in 2016), and far-right Vox 24 seats (none in 2016).
Partly as a consequence of the failure of PP and the far-left 
and far-right parties in the general election, the PSOE won 
20 seats in the European election 2019 (6 more than in the 
EP election of 2014) which brought them closer to the 2009 
results of 21 seats. The conservative People’s Party, on the 
other hand, has been on a losing streak for ten years: from 23 
seats in the European election of 2009, to 17 in 2014, and only 
12 seats in 2019. 
Far-right party Vox was able to get 3 seats in the EP, 
which is seen by them as a victory as they won zero in 2014; 
however, both far-left Podemos, which got 6 seats (only one 
more than in the 2014 EP election) and Vox have faced bad 
results in the EP election, similar to the ones they obtained in 
the Spanish general election.
The European election also saw pro-independent Catalan 
leaders Oriol Junqueras and Carles Puigdemont gain seats in 
the EP, even though Puigdemont is living in self-exile in  
Belgium after being the subject of several legal charges,  
most of them connected with the Catalan independence 
movement. Junqueras is currently being prosecuted in Spain 
for the same reasons.
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the 
EP election in Spain is that Pedro Sánchez has been able 
to overcome his initial period of uncertainty and has been 
established as a pro-European rising leader. Furthermore, the 
first PSOE representative in the list for this European election 
is Josep Borrell, former President (2004-2007) of the EP and an 
experienced and respected politician. 
The message is clear: Overall, and unlike France and Italy, 
Spain currently is a centre-left pro-European country.
Spain: A clear centre-left victory
Karen Arriaza Ibarra
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The 2019 European elections were characterized by higher 
turnout than usual in most Member States and also in France. 
The participation went up for the first time in history and 
was the highest in 25 years (50.1%). It seems that both external 
and domestic factors have played an important role for the 
increase in participation. Concerning external factors, after 10 
years of political crises in Europe (eurozone crisis, migration 
crisis, Brexit, etc.), European issues have eventually started to 
affect public opinion and permeate national political debates, 
including in France. Moreover, the international context 
also played a role and the new global challenges raised by 
Putin and Trump’s administrations, in particular, might 
have nudged French voters into seeing the European Union 
as the most relevant government level capable of action in 
current world politics. In terms of domestic factors, France 
seems to have followed a pattern of “expressive voting” in 
the latest EU elections. In terms of vote shares, the opposition 
far-right party Rassemblement National-RN (23.3%) came first 
by narrowly beating the President’s party, La République en 
Marche-LREM-MODEM (22.4%), in the context of a campaign 
dominated by the omnipresence of Emmanuel Macron which 
has limited LREM’s ‘semi-defeat’ but failed to prevent the 
‘semi-victory’ of the RN. Also, the ‘expressive voting’ pattern 
was driven by the Greens (EELV). They obtained the 3rd place 
(13.5%) ahead of the conservative right party Les Républicains- 
LR (8.5%), and of the leftist parties France Insoumise-FI (6.3%) 
and the Parti Socialiste-PS (6.2%) thanks in particular to the 
mobilization of young voters (see for instance the relevance 
during the campaign of the youth demonstrations during ‘the 
Fridays for Future’ and the popularity breakthrough of the 
young Swedish activist Greta Thunberg).
The French case in 2019 EU elections is particularly impor-
tant for testing the relevance over time of the second order 
elections’ model, especially in the light of the end of Macron’s 
presidency honeymoon period. French politics and public 
opinion have mostly seen EP elections as mid-term ones, with 
the debate and the results dominated by the domestic politi-
cal cycle, a lower turnout than in legislative and presidential 
elections, and overall greater support for opposition, small 
and fringe/new parties. While the 2019 EP elections seem to 
confirm this voting pattern, there are new elements emerging 
in French EU-related politics.
First, within an already busy electoral calendar where 
national (2017) and subnational elections (2015, 2020) are held 
over two rounds, there seemed to be little impetus for many 
voters to go to the polls yet again for a supranational election 
that is thought not to really matter so much. However, this 
time the turnout passed the 50 per cent limit for the first time 
since 1994. The social anger incarnated by the ‘Yellow Vests’ 
seems to have led the electorate to the polls, with more than 
45 per cent of voters among workers, 10 per cent more than 
in 2014 (IPSOS). Strong environmental concerns also drove 
young people to the polls, whose participation has grown 
sharply: 40 per cent of voters were <35 year old (+13% than in 
2014).
Second, while the electoral campaign has been dominated 
by national issues, for the first time since 1979, the heads of 
the French party lists participated in a televised debate on 
April 4. However, in a sign of the consistency in the electo-
rate’s apathy, the debate attracted only 1.9 million viewers 
(9 % of the audience). In addition, the electoral campaign has 
been dominated by the race for first place between the two 
frontrunners: the RN and LREM, which have been neck-and-
neck in the opinion polls since the beginning of the year. The 
campaign has been structured as a personal duel between Le 
Pen and Macron, due to the RN’s strategy to establish itself as 
the main opponent to Macron and his government, and the 
latter’s strategy to appear as the only credible shield against 
populism. European issues were solely discussed in terms of 
the capacity of (the two main) French parties to build new 
alliances in the next European Parliament.
The pattern of ‘sanction vote’ for the government seems 
only partially confirmed. Le Pen benefited greatly from the 
framing of the debate, by gathering the votes of those who in-
tended to sanction the President. But this ‘useful’ vote caused 
in particular the collapse of LFI (6.3%). For the two mainstream 
parties, the PS and LR - which had dominated the political 
game since 1958 - the decline is consistent (the PS made less 
than half of its 2014 score, 13.9 per cent, as did LR, which 
scored 20.8 per cent in 2014), and small, fringe and opposition 
parties did quite well, such as the EELV. In a very polarized 
debate, organized as a referendum of rejection or support of 
Macron, they seduced the electorate by offering a credible 
alternative to the electorate. The RN benefited from the 
solidity of its electorate: 78 per cent of FN voters in the first 
round of the 2017 presidential election voted for the RN list. 
And the RN has been able to broaden its base by capturing the 
social anger that has been expressed in recent months and in 
particular by attracting the vote of French people feeling close 
to the ‘Yellow Vests’ movement: a recent IPSOS survey showed 
that 44 per cent of them voted RN in May. 
In 2019, Macron seems to have managed to destroy the old 
left-right cleavage and is now at the center of the political 
spectrum, facing one single real political force: Marine 
Le Pen’s RN. In this political context, he has succeeded in 
making the European integration question a political issue 
capable of structuring a new political cleavage at the heart of 
French political life.
The 2019 EP elections in France:  
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In Italy, European Parliament elections have always been 
scarcely Europeanized, i.e. the electoral competition is tra-
ditionally run by parties on nationally relevant issues, with 
little attention paid to themes and arguments relating to EU 
institutions and policies. To an even lesser extent, Italian 
parties plan their electoral strategies and draft their electoral 
programmes in accordance with their European Parties of 
reference: the level of ‘Europartization’ of the Italian parties 
has always been tragically low.
In this contribution, we want to assess whether the 2019 
European Elections followed these well-established trends. We 
focus on the relevant Italian parties that ran the campaign to 
verify: 1) to what extent their electoral supply reflected that 
of their respective Europarties; 2) if a relation exists between 
the level of ‘Europartization’ and the electoral performance of 
the parties; 3) if the level of Europartization is positively cor-
related with party position towards the EU and party age. The 
analysis is based on the data gathered for the voting advice 
application NavigatoreElettorale.it. In particular, we consider 
Italian parties’ logos, electoral manifestos and party official 
websites to assess the presence of explicit references to the 
Europarty they belong to. 
Our results show that a clear relation between the level of 
Europartization and the electoral performance of the Italian 
parties does not emerge. For example, the least Europartized 
parties in our sample performed differently. On the one hand, 
the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) – the only Italian party with no 
affiliation to any Europarty – had an extremely disappointing 
electoral result (as the party lost 15.6 per cent compared to the 
2018 Italian general elections). On the other hand, the Lega of 
Matteo Salvini – which refers to the Movement for a Europe 
of Nations and Freedom (MENF) only on its website – was the 
indisputable winner of the 2019 European Elections. Moving 
onto the most Europartized parties – the Partito Democra-
tico (PD), Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), +Europa (+EU), Europa Verde 
(EV), La Sinistra (S), Pirati (P) and CasaPound (CP) – one finds 
great variation in terms of their electoral performance. For 
example, the PD – member of the Party of European Socialists 
(PES) – performed better than what was expected, by over-
taking the M5S. Differently from other European countries, 
however, neither the green party EV, nor the leftist S and not 
even the liberal +EU obtained good results, as they did not 
get any representative in Brussels: yet, EV and S drafted their 
manifestos upon the platforms of the European Greens and 
that of the Party of the European Left, while +EU explicitly 
recalled the European Democratic Party (EDP) in its logo. An 
even worse electoral failure was registered by the Pirate Party 
(P) and neo-fascist CasaPound, despite both referred to their 
respective Europarties (European Pirate Party and Alliance of 
European National Movements) on their logos: the Pirates also 
adopted a common European programme across Europe.
Not even party positions towards the European Union 
seem to be strictly correlated with the level of Europartiza-
tion. On the one hand, pro-EU parties are all Europartized 
(albeit to different extent); on the other, some hard euroscep-
tic parties, such as FdI and CasaPound, refer to their corres-
ponding Europarties in their electoral logo: CP even affirms to 
‘act as a representative and on behalf of AEMN’. 
Party age seems to be the only variable that partially helps 
influencing parties’ level of Europartization. In fact, while all 
the newest parties (both pro-Eu or anti-Eu, either left or right) 
show the highest Europartized profiles, the oldest ones (such 
as Lega and FI) are more reluctant to exhibit their European 
affiliations. This may be interpreted as an attempt by newer 
(less institutionalized) parties to gain legitimacy from already 
existing organizations (the corresponding Europarties).
A strange case (and an absolute novelty) is represented by 
two small parties, which did not pass the electoral threshold: 
the Partito Comunista (PC) and the Partito Animalista (PA). In 
fact, both have included in their electoral logos references to 
other national ‘sister’ parties, respectively the Greek Commu-
nist Party (KKE) and the Dutch Party for the Animals (PvdD). 
The reason is that the Italian electoral law for the EP elections 
exempts parties to collect signatures, if they are explicitly 
linked to at least one member of the Italian or European 
Parliament.
Overall, our analysis confirms that the level of Euro-
partization of Italian parties is still rather poor. This is not 
surprising at all, as the EP elections continue to be ‘second 
order elections’. Even the electoral results (in particular the 
overtaking of the Lega on its governmental ally, the M5S) may 
have important consequences on national politics, rather than 
on the role of the freshly elected Italian representatives in the 
new European Parliament.
Do europarties matter? The (scarce)  


















On January 25th 2015, the anti-bailout left-wing Syriza became 
the first populist force gaining office in a Eurozone country, 
Greece, after the outbreak of the Eurozone debt crisis. It recei-
ved 36.3 per cent of the vote and formed a coalition with the 
anti-austerity right-wing party of Independent Greeks due to a 
lack of an absolute majority.
On September 20th 2015, in spite of its U-turn to the 
bailout package, SYRIZA managed to be re-elected taking 35.5 
per cent of the electorate and creating a coalition with the 
Independent Greeks as well. 
However, almost four years later, on May 25th 2019, the Sy-
riza-led government became the first populist force losing an 
electoral contest, this time for the European Parliament (EP). 
It saw its vote share to fall by 11.7 points, compared to the pre-
vious national elections, taking only 23.8 per cent, while the 
center right New Democracy won by receiving 33.1 per cent. 
It was the worst ever electoral defeat for a governing party 
in the history of Greek European Elections since the entry of 
the country in the European Union in 1979. Due to the heavy 
loss, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras called on the same night 
for early national elections set for July 7. 
The arisen question is why Syriza lost the election. There 
are three interrelated reasons. 
First, in European elections voters do not vote to elect 
government, so there is less incentive for them to back gover-
ning parties in general. In addition, when European elections 
take place towards the end of the governing term, the politi-
cal conditions are usually less favorable for the government 
which is likely to suffer electoral losses. In the case of Greece, 
the polls for the EP took place four months ahead the official 
end of Syriza’s governing term. 
Second, according to the pre-election opinion polls, the 
great majority of the public prioritized the economy as the 
most important issue in the country. Most of them evaluated 
the state of the economy negatively and they feel pessimistic 
about the future. In this context, around six in ten stated they 
would vote in order to protest against the government. More-
over, it is indicative, as the exit poll suggests, that from those 
who determined their vote “a long time ahead” of the Europe-
an election (65 per cent), SYRIZA took only 26 per cent, while 
ND received 39 per cent. In addition, the left-wing governme-
nt lost across all age cohorts and almost all professions.  
A striking example of the public frustration with the state 
of the economy was the voting behavior of pensioners. Even 
though Syriza provided them with handouts a few weeks 
ahead of the EP poll, pledging to improve their income 
further after the election and projecting the leader of ND as a 
pro-austerity neoliberal figure willing to impose pension cuts, 
pensioners turned their back to the government. According 
to the exit poll, among pensioners Syriza received only 27 per 
cent of the vote, while ND took 40 per cent. 
Third, it is possible to argue that Syriza’s brand suffers by 
a lack of credibility, especially in the area of economic policy 
due to its governing record. More specifically, in January 
2015, Syriza came for the first time in power on an anti-bai-
lout platform promising to write-off public debt, scrap the 
Memorandum, abolish the austerity measures and liberal 
reforms while promoting an expansionary policy of tax cuts 
and spending increases. Although it made a U-turn to a third 
bailout package including tax hikes, spending cuts and liberal 
reforms, Syriza managed to be re-elected by projecting itself 
as a less pro-austerity force compared to its main rival ND and 
thus capable of promoting a ‘parallel’ (to the Memorandum) 
program aiming to protect the most vulnerable. However, 
after four years in office it seems that Syriza failed to deliver 
on most of its promises alienating a large part of its electoral 
base. According to the exit poll, only roughly half (58 per 
cent) of those who backed it in the September 2015 elections, 
voted again for it. As a result, its main electoral motto in the 
European election, “now it is the time for the many” did not 
reach its audience.   
In conclusion, it appears that a combination of low-stake 
election, frustration with the economy and lack of a credible 
brand contribute to the explanation of the first defeat of 
populists in Greece. It remains to be seen whether a second 
consecutive defeat will follow in the upcoming national poll 
or Syriza will manage to recover.
The first defeat of populists: The case of Greece
Panos Koliastasis





The results of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament 
(EP) in Germany will be regarded as a major watershed in the 
development of the Germany party system. For the first time 
in the history of the Federal Republic, the Social Democrats 
(SPD), one of the two dominant parties of German postwar 
history, finished in third place in a nationwide election. They 
were overtaken by the Greens who scored a record nationwi-
de result of more than 20 per cent, while the SPD reached 
only 15.8 per cent. At the same time, the Christian Democrats 
(CDU), under their new party chair Annegret Kramp-Karren-
bauer, also suffered a record low result and finished clearly 
below the 30 per cent mark; this includes the share of their 
Bavarian sister party CSU which registered a small gain. The 
immediate fallout of the result was the resignation of SPD 
party leader Andrea Nahles from all offices following a week 
of intense criticism from all parts of her party. Also, CDU 
leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer was confronted with 
substantial criticism from her own ranks. 
As always, single results need to be interpreted with care 
as they are the product of structural and contingent factors. 
Some contingent factors may change quickly and hence faci-
litate change in the opposite direction. So why could the EP 
elections of 2019 mark a turning point in the development of 
German party politics? For a start, EP elections are still second 
order elections which makes it easier for voters to engage in 
expressive voting. This is true despite the ‘Spitzenkandidaten 
model’, because most voters understand that the EP elec-
tions are not really about electing a European government. 
This would suggest that we should not read too much into 
this result. Also, both CDU and SPD struggle with leadership 
problems. While the SPD has been plagued by it for some 
time, the CDU entered a difficult interregnum after Chancel-
lor Merkel stepped down from party chair in December 2018 
but announced that she intended to remain at the helm of 
the federal government until the end of term in 2021. Her 
successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer has had a rocky start 
as party chair and does not look like a natural Chancellor 
candidate for 2021. Arguably, Chancellor Merkel’s decision to 
stay out of the CDU/CSU election campaign also did not help. 
To be sure, leadership quality is a contingent factor and can 
change quickly. 
However, the writing has been on the wall for some time: 
For many years, all structural indicators of party system 
stability have shown that the previously hyper stable German 
party system had entered a state of flux and inherent instabili-
ty. To be sure, this may have been inflated by the specifics of 
an EP election. Yet, the previous dominance of the proverbial 
German catch-all parties has been melting away for two deca-
des now. In the 2017 Bundestag elections, the Grand Coalition 
parties CDU/CSU and SPD barely crossed the 50 per cent 
threshold while they would cross the 90 per cent mark in the 
1970s and 80 per cent for most of the 1980s.
Since then, the party system underwent fundamental 
change. The erosion of the traditional cleavage system has set 
voters free to choose, and increasing numbers of them have 
abandoned their traditional party loyalties or never developed 
them in the first place. The growth of postmaterialist values 
helped the rise of the Greens, the repercussion of German 
unification and, somewhat later, the neo-liberal turn of the 
SPD allowed the postcommunist Left to consolidate and the 
combined effects of the Euro crisis and the 2015 migration 
crisis led to the establishment of the right-wing populist 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is particularly strong in 
the East German Länder. 
This makes party strategy and party leadership clearly 
more consequential. Germany is now governed by the 3rd 
(no longer so) Grand Coalition since 2005, which has pushed 
voters to other parties, not least because the Christian Demo-
crats under Merkel’s leadership moved to the centre of the 
political spectrum and the SPD increasingly lacks a clear mis-
sion. With the Grand Coalition occupying the centre ground, 
the dominant conflict axis is now between the Greens and the 
AfD, which became the strongest party in two East German 
Länder. While the Greens benefit from the growing concern 
with climate change and an attractive leadership team, the 
AfD can count on voters who are skeptical about immigration 
and European integration. A quick recovery of the Grand Co-
alition parties is unlikely because both suffer from leadership 
problems. Chancellor Merkel’s presidential style of governing 
has become paramount through her decision to relinquish 
party leadership without resigning from Chancellorship. This 
leaves her party without unified leadership and direction 
while the SPD is likely to enter into another damaging debate 
about leadership and coalition strategy. The weakness of the 
SPD and the decline of the CDU and CSU mean that the Grand 
Coalition parties have no longer majority in the electorate. 
Thus, a coalition of Greens and Christian Democrats becomes 
more likely, but might need additional support by the FDP. 
Future coalitions will increasingly need three partners, which 
will make coalition formation more cumbersome and always 
carries the risk of disappointing substantial portions of the 
electorate. Above all, the EP election results may change the 
language of politics: The SPD is no longer a serious conten-
der for Chancellorship in Germany. The Social Democrats 
may even be no longer one of the parties that are central to 
coalition considerations if they do not get their act together 
quickly. There are, however, no conclusive answers in sight as 
to what this might or should mean.
The German party system falling apart
Thomas Poguntke
Professor of Political Science
University of Düsseldorf & Düsseldorf 





Belgium is one of the founding Member-States of the EU, and 
its citizens are amongst the most Europhile in Europe. The 
country sends 21 MEPs in the EU Parliament, among which we 
find leading figures, such as ALDE group chair Guy Verhofstadt. 
The outcome of the European election in Belgium overall 
matches global trends: the rise of non-traditional forces, espe-
cially the Greens and the Radical Right family, at the expense 
of traditional forces. The Liberals (ALDE) lost 2 seats out of 6, 
the Socialists (PSE) lost 1 seat out of 4 and the Christian-demo-
crats (PPE) managed to keep their 4 seats, despite a decrease 
in electoral support. The Greens increased their number 
of seats from 2 to 3 seats, the Radical Left (GUE-NGL) won 
their first seat and the Radical Right (ENF) embodied by the 
ultra-nationalist and populist right party Vlaams Belang showed 
the most notable increase (from 1 to 3 seats, +7.8 percentage 
point of the votes). The Flemish regionalist party N-VA (ECR), 
which can be classified as ultra-liberal on socio-economic mat-
ters and conservative on values, lost 1 out of 4 seats.
However, these aggregate trends in fact hide impor-
tant within country variations and increasing polarization 
between the regions and communities of the Belgian federation.
Such as in 1999 and 2014, federal, regional and European 
elections took place on the same day. On May 26, Belgian 
citizens were called to the polls to renew not only their repre-
sentatives at the EU level, but also their representatives in six 
other parliaments: the Chamber of representatives (federal 
level), the regional parliaments of Wallonia (French-speaking) 
and Brussels (bilingual), the Flemish parliament (exercising 
both regional and community competences), the parliament of 
the German-speaking community (directly elected) and the par- 
liament of the French-speaking community (indirectly elected, 
composed by the 75 Walloon regional deputies and 19 of the 
72 Brussels regional French-speaking deputies). The Euro-
pean election is also structured along subnational lines: 12 
MEPs are elected in the Dutch-speaking community, 8 in the 
French-speaking community, and 1 in the German-speaking 
community.  
In Wallonia and Brussels, where most French-speaking 
citizens live, a majority of voters supported left-wing parties, 
either the Greens, the Socialists or the Radical left (around 
54-55% of the votes). This is reflected in gains in the EP: the 
French-speaking green and radical left parties each gained one 
seat. Despite significant losses, the Socialists remain the first 
party in Brussels and Wallonia, followed by the Greens which 
made a remarkable breakthrough at all levels of power. The 
PTB also significantly increased its share of votes and seats 
and became the 4th party in Wallonia, the 5th in Brussels. In 
Flanders, less than 25 per cent of voters supported a left-wing 
party. The main winner of the election is the Vlaams Belang: it 
now represents almost 1 voter out of 5 in the Flemish region 
(18.5 %) compared to less than 1 out of 10 in 2014 (6%), whereas 
the radical right remains irrelevant in the two other regions. 
Together the VB and the N-VA won around 43 per cent of 
the vote in Flanders. Both parties defend strong nationalist 
stances and ethnocentric positioning, and full autonomy for 
Flanders. Two cities diverge from this picture: Ghent and Leu-
ven, two university hubs, where the Greens came out as first. 
Given the peculiar context of this “triple” election, these 
outcomes should not be read as pertaining to the Europe-
an level. Europe was virtually absent from the campaign, 
although some party manifestos dedicated a chapter or some 
lines to expose how they would implement their policies 
at the European level. Even if the N-VA defends a kind of 
Euro-realism, and the VB adheres to the ENF project of a “Eu-
rope of Nations”, the electoral campaign was rather centered 
on internal debates. Dominant issues first included climate 
change, as symbolized by weekly demonstrations organized in 
the last months by young people inspired by Greta Thunberg. 
Right-wing parties reacted to this “green wave” by warning 
against taxation increases resulting from green policies. Other 
debates centered around socio-economic issues (pensions, 
purchasing power) and crystallized over the reconduction or 
opposition to the incumbent federal right-wing government. 
Hence, the composition of the future coalitions at different 
levels, and especially at the federal one, dominated the cam-
paign, each party expressing some ‘veto’ against one or the 
other party (e.g. the Francophone Socialists and N-VA rejecting 
any possibility of alliance). At the start of the campaign, mig-
ration was thought to be the number one issue, but at the end 
did not appear so central… at least in traditional media. Cam-
paign expenses revealed that VB ranked at the top of expenses 
dedicated to social media campaign, with more than 400 000 
euros spent on Facebook adds between early March and the day 
of the election. In comparison, the N-VA, the first party of the 
country, spent less than 170 000 euros in the same period.
The VB massively broadcasted tough messages against illegal 
migration, on the loss of traditional values and putting forward 
welfare chauvinism (“Eerste onze mensen”, “First our people” was 
their official moto). This campaign strategy may partly expla-
in its breakthrough. According to a pre-electoral survey, the 
main divergences between Flemish and Walloon voters relate 
more to the priorities they give to specific issues, than to their 
opinion on these issues: immigration, social security and fisca-
lity appeared as the main priorities for Flemish voters; while 
employment, environment and social security arrived first for 
Walloon voters. Hence, it seems that parties on both sides did 
well to capitalize on these opinions – or maybe fuelled them.
Overall, the campaign and the outcome revealed a strong 
polarization between a left-wing progressist front, that scored 
high among French-speaking voters, in Brussels and Flemish 
cities such as Ghent or Leuven, and a right-wing nationalist 
front that almost reached a majority in Flanders. These internal 
divergences well reflect what occurred in the rest of Europe. 
But “Europe” was definitely not the main divisive issue. 
Belgium: Increasing polarization at  
the heart of Europe, but not over Europe
Caroline Close
Assistant Professor in Political Science




Where once European integration was scarcely controversial 
in Dutch politics, reservations have dominated for quite some 
time – also in 2019. In January this year, Prime Minister Mark 
Rutte admitted that he considered the European elections to 
be ‘not so relevant’, and that national elections were more 
important. Shortly before the European elections, the House 
of Representatives of the Dutch Parliament passed a motion 
with a two-thirds majority in which the removal of the phrase 
‘[creating] an ever closer union’ from European agreements 
was proposed, as this phrase could contribute to ‘an unneces-
sary and undesirable restriction of the sovereignty of member 
states’. Against this background, the campaigns for the Euro-
pean elections in the Netherlands took place. In the provincial 
elections that were held two months earlier, the populist and 
Eurosceptic and up till then quite marginal party Forum voor 
Democratie (FvD) was surprisingly voted as the biggest party, 
closely followed by the conservative-liberal VVD party led by 
Prime Minister Rutte. As a result, and on the basis of opinion 
polls, everyone assumed that the European elections would 
also turn out to be a duel between these parties. 
Eighteen parties participated in the European elections; 
two less than in 2014. This number included all thirteen 
parties represented in the House of Representatives. Although 
two Dutch politicians were Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates 
of a European political party) – Frans Timmermans (PvdA) 
of the Party of European Socialists and Bas Eickhout (Groen-
Links) of the European Greens – the European elections were 
not of much interest to most voters. This was partly due to 
the unfamiliarity of the lead candidates. Opinion polls show 
that the voters scarcely knew most of the candidates – which 
is also due to the fact that Dutch parties rarely appoint pro-
minent politicians as European candidates. An exception was 
Timmermans (PvdA), Vice Chair of the European Commission 
since 2014 and former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The PvdA 
candidate was the only one known by a (large) majority of the 
voters. A quarter of voters knew D66 candidate Sophie in’t 
Veld; the other candidates were known by no more than 10 
per cent of the voters. 
Insofar as the election campaigns were conducted, they 
revolved around topics like migration, the climate and the 
possibility of a ‘Nexit’. Only when the SP personally attacked 
Timmermans in an advertisement did the campaigns cause a 
stir. The SP painted him as a greedy Brussels bureaucrat who 
wanted to make Europe a super-state in which the Nether-
lands would disappear. This type of ‘negative campaigning’, 
quite unusual in the Dutch political culture, seems to have 
done more harm to the SP than to Timmermans. The latter, 
who made a strong impression in the campaign with all of his 
experience, did not hit back. 
Remarkably absent in the campaign was Geert Wilders of 
the right-wing populist and Eurosceptic PVV, who had been 
completely drowned out in the media by his competitor, 
FvD-leader Thierry Baudet. The latter entered the news in a 
controversial manner by spreading a far-right video in which 
asylum seekers were associated with rape and murder, and 
by calling into question the right to abortion and euthanasia. 
Baudet was challenged in a live debate by Prime Minister 
Rutte, who feared that his VVD party would be defeated by 
the FvD once again, just as it had in the provincial elections. 
While Rutte thus offered a platform to his populist rival, he 
hoped to foster a duel through which to win the elections. 
The debate was shown live on television on the evening 
before the elections. Prior to this broadcast, twelve European 
candidates of the most relevant parties held their own – frag-
mented – debate, which in fact proved to be no more than a 
pre-programme to the showdown between two national (and 
for the European Parliament, unelectable) party leaders. 
The results of the European elections delivered big sur-
prises. Neither the VVD nor the FvD came out as the biggest 
party, despite their fuelled duel, but instead the party depre-
ciated by many: the PvdA, with six seats (double the amount 
that they achieved in 2014). Research shows that many voters 
chose this party because of Timmermans. An even more 
notable result was that the anticipated populist attack on 
the pro-European block did not materialize. The Eurosceptic 
anti-establishment right- and left-wing parties PVV and SP 
disappeared from the European Parliament (losing their four 
and two seats respectively), while newcomer FvD lagged be-
hind the high expectations by achieving just three seats.  The 
pro-European parties won 20 out of 26 seats, three more than 
in 2014. Their proportion thus rose from two-thirds to around 
three-quarters of the seats allocated to the Netherlands in the 
European Parliament – the Dutch voters chose Europe. They 
also let their opinions be heard more than in 2014: turnout 
was almost five per cent point higher, and with a total turno-
ut percentage of 41.8 per cent, it rose above 40 per cent for 
the first time since 1989. 
Gerrit Voerman
Professor of Development and functioning 
of the Dutch and European party system
University of Groningen
Mail: g.voerman@rug.nl
Dutch voters choose Europe
The parties
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Britain’s election to the European Parliament in 2019 was a 
thoroughly strange affair. The country had realised only a few 
weeks beforehand that it would take place, as Britain would 
not, after all, have left the European Union by then. Despite 
the verdict of a national referendum in 2016, political dead-
lock over its terms had blocked departure. 
The failure to deliver Brexit was a political catastrophe for 
the governing Conservatives. They duly received 9 per cent 
of the vote in the election, by far their worst score ever in a 
national poll. The party had produced no manifesto, barely 
campaigned and was engulfed in chaos. Its own leader and 
incumbent prime minister, Theresa May, announced her re-
signation the day after the vote, even before the results were 
published.
To put it extremely mildly, then, the Conservatives never 
wanted to fight the European election. What is more, the big-
gest opposition party, Labour, was only slightly less reluctant. 
It too was divided on Brexit. It took just 14 per cent. 
Given the main parties’ ambivalence, why did turnout 
reach 37 per cent, higher than in all but one of Britain’s eight 
previous European elections? One reason is that, beyond the 
big two, several other parties took part very enthusiastically 
indeed. 
The obvious beneficiary of the unexpected electoral oppor-
tunity was, paradoxically, the six-week-old Brexit Party. This 
was no surprise. Its name was its platform. The obstruction 
of Brexit, and the political self-harm committed by both the 
Conservatives and (quite separately) the UK Independence 
Party, presented UKIP’s wily former leader, Nigel Farage, with 
an open goal. Up front in his new team, he could hardly miss. 
It took 31 per cent. At least as significant, however, was the 
success of parties on the other side of the Brexit argument. 
Between them, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens, who 
had attracted fewer than one in ten votes in the 2017 national 
parliamentary election, did slightly better than the Brexit 
Party.   
Political scientists often refer to European elections as 
‘second-order’. No government is produced, so many voters 
take the chance to ventilate preferences that they would 
suppress in a national election. They tend subsequently to 
revert to their usual voting behaviour. That might happen 
again in Britain after 2019. Or it might not. For the European 
election activated mechanisms – defection, vote-seeking and 
issue-entrepreneurialism – that could have a profound effect 
on national party politics, and on Brexit itself, well into the 
future.
Again, these mechanisms were most apparent on the 
pro-Brexit side. As the election approached, Conservative 
politicians at national level began to worry about Farage’s 
new party. Their customarily most supportive newspaper, the 
Daily Telegraph, began to sound dangerously sympathetic to it. 
Indeed, the paper frequently gave a platform to Farage him-
self. As leading Conservatives joined the race to succeed May, 
some began to mimic his call for a swift departure from the 
EU, regardless of the economic and political consequences. 
On the other flank, meanwhile, the pro-EU parties had 
always faced a dilemma. They would have loved to see Brexit 
simply called off. But they had been hesitant to say so directly, 
for fear of appearing to disrespect the popular will expres-
sed in the 2016 referendum. Their tactical solution was thus 
to press for a new referendum. They talked of democratic 
principles and how, before such a big step for the country, the 
electorate’s opinion really ought to be double checked. But 
their support for a ”public vote” was essentially instrumental: 
they hoped that a new referendum would this time produce 
their preferred result. 
As the 2019 campaign developed, the mechanisms of politi-
cal competition swept away such scruples. 
Three months before the European election, a handful 
of Conservative and Labour politicians formed another new 
party, this one pro-EU. They saw a golden chance to establish 
their brand in the campaign. As it turned out, they failed. But, 
in early spring, they voted against every version of Brexit, 
even those that envisaged close ties to the EU subsequently. 
This blocked parliamentary compromise. Perhaps more im-
portantly, their presence spurred on their centrist rivals, the 
Liberal Democrats, to adopt more militant positions. 
In their 2017 manifesto, the Lib Dems had deigned to 
‘acknowledge the result of the 2016 referendum, which gave 
the government a mandate to start negotiations to leave [the 
EU]’. In 2019, by contrast, their strategic goal was crystal clear. 
Never mind the referendum. Their European manifesto decla-
red: ‘a vote for the Liberal Democrats is a vote to stop Brexit.’ 
In a ‘special edition’, they even referred alliteratively to Brexit 
with an expletive. The Lib Dems’ electoral success, in turn, 
emboldened the anti-Brexit forces within Labour. After the 
vote, it looked inconceivable that the party’s leadership could 
consent to Brexit in any form without a further referendum.
Ostensibly, the European election did not affect the lower 
chamber of Britain’s parliament, where a path out of the 
Brexit crisis would eventually have to be found. The House 
of Commons still contained three party-splitting factions. Yet 
after the 2019 campaign and result, the pro-second-referen-
dum faction had more or less become the anti-Brexit faction. 
The pro-Brexit faction had more or less become the Brexit-at-
any-price faction. The prospect of agreement between either 
group and the third, more pragmatic faction, which had 
seemed close just a couple of months previously, had all but 
vanished. The irony, then, is that no European election had 
meant so much for Britain as that in 2019, the one that the 
country was never supposed to hold. 
Britain: Political parties polarising
Nicholas Aylott






The Danish EP election was held in the shadow of the general 
election, which the Liberal Prime Minister, Lars Løkke  
Rasmussen, chose to call for nine days after the EP election. 
EU is a cross-cutting issue in the Danish party system. All  
Danish parties have both pro-EU and anti-EU voters among 
their electorates. Since 1986, Danes have been divided 
fifty-fifty on EU integration. Most referendums have been 
close. However, the Brexit (tumult) has increased the Danes’ 
preference for EU. Danes have increased their support for 
European integration, and opinion polls show that two out of 
three do not support a ‘Daxit’. The EP election results reflect 
this. Parties opposing European integration lost.
First of all, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) 
was trashed. In 2014 they gained four seats. Times were good 
for them at the time due to electoral dissatisfaction with the 
Liberals (Venstre) and party leader Lars Løkke Rasmussen. 
Danish People’s Party front runner Morten Messerschmidt set 
the record with 465,758 votes – more than former PM Poul  
Nyrup Rasmussen in 2004 (407,966). However, since then, 
Danish People’s Party has been plagued by accusations of 
economic fraud in EP (MELD/FELD), and they are in decline  
at the level of the general election as well. 
Secondly, a 40-yearlong era of the representation of the 
People’s Movement Against EU (Folkebevægelsen mod EU) 
ended. At the first three EP elections, they were represented 
with four out of the 15-16 Danish EP seats. After the 1993 
referendum, the opposition to European integration spilt 
in the June Movement (Junibevægelsen) and the People’s 
Movement, and both gained two seats in 1994. In 1999 the 
June Movement gained three and the People’s Movement 
only one. However, the anti-EU stance has diminished since. 
The People’s Movement has been represented with only one 
seat since then, a seat they lost in 2019. The obvious expla-
nation for this loss is that the left-wing Red-Green Alliance, 
represented in parliament since 1994, presented their own 
list (in election coalition with the movement) and got a seat. 
Hitherto they had not presented their own list but supported 
The People’s Movement Against EU. Hence, the EU sceptic 
mandate moved from the cross party (but left of center) list to 
one of the established parties. 
The Liberals lost a seat in 2014, at least partly due to 
the unpopularity of their chair, and got only two. This was 
drastically turned around in 2019. With 23.5 per cent and four 
seats (including the 14th Brexit seat), the Liberals become the 
largest party. On this basis they get a substantial boost in the 
final phase of the national election campaign. No doubt this 
will rejuvenate the campaign and be a substantial part of the 
storytelling. 
The main contender for the keys to the Prime Minister’s 
Office is the Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet). They lost 
a seat in 2014 and got three. The result of 2019 is status quo 
with 21.5 per cent and three seats. Both the Socialist People’s 
Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti) and Social Liberals (Radikale 
Venstre) are, together with the Red-Green Alliance, the 
obvious parliamentary support of a Social Democratic led 
government. The Socialist People’s Party lost a seat in 2014 
and was represented with only one. In 2019 they doubled 
their representation. The Social Liberals is the most pro-EU of 
the Danish parties. In 2014 they regained their representation 
in the EP, which they lost in 2009, and ten years later they for 
the first time got two MEPs elected.  
In sum, ‘red bloc’ increased their vote share and may 
promote this in the rest of the general election campaign. 
Hence, the national election campaign will see a competition 
between Liberals’ storytelling of increase and the biggest par-
ty and the storytelling of ‘red bloc’ of increase and the biggest 
bloc. While the status quo of the Social Democrats is not bad, 
the rest of the results may challenge them further. Their main 
contender for the PM office, Liberals, got a boost, as did the 
parties who want to have a say on a possible Social Democra-
tic led government.
Just to mention the remaining results: Conservatives (Det 
Konservative Folkeparti) kept their single seat in 2019. Former 
chair, minister and vice-PM Bendt Bendtsen had resigned 
and replaced by a less well-known candidate. Since Conser-
vatives are the only Danish member of the EPP group, this is 
important not only for the party but also for a broader range 
of interests. 
The Alternative (Alternativet), the Green party created in 
2013, represented in parliament since 2015, did not gain repre-
sentation in their debut, and neither was the third time the 
lucky time for (economic right-wing) Liberal Alliance. 
The turnout at the EP election in 2014 (held with a referen-
dum on the EU Patent Court) was 56.3 per cent. The increase 
in 2019 was marked. Two thirds of the voters (66 %) turned up 
at the ballots (or had postal voted prior to the  
election), which is a Danish record. And a large majority of 
them voted for the pro-EU parties. Hence, the 13 Danes who 
take up their seat in the European Parliament for the coming 
five years have a strong mandate from the Danish electorate. 
Declining Danish EU skepticism
Karina Kosiara-Pedersen






Finland is set to take over the EU-presidency from Romania 
on July, 1, 2019, which comes at a perfect time since the 
EU membership has never been more popular among the 
Finnish public. The EU´s popularity did not, however, transfer 
into a particularly high turnout during the EP-elections, 
even though it increased slightly from 41 to 42.7 per cent. 
Nonetheless, this was substantially below the EU average of 
51 per cent. Generally, Finns are very active when it comes 
to political participation clearly suggested by the 72 per cent 
turnout in the Parliamentary elections in April 2019 and the 
69.9 per cent turnout in the Presidential elections of 2018, but 
the European elections have always been a case apart when 
it comes to turnout. Overall, around 1.8 million Finns voted 
in the European elections, which was around 1.3 million less 
than the amount who watched the ice hockey world cham-
pionship final between Canada and Finland on the election 
night of the May, 26. One might thus argue that in Finland 
the EP-elections of 2019 could be considered as a second-order 
event even during the election night. 
Nevertheless, the final months of domestic politics leading 
up to the European elections were very eventful in Finland. 
The former centre-right government led by Juha Sipilä (Centre 
Party, ALDE) disbanded prematurely in March when it became 
clear that they would fail to pass what would have been the 
biggest administrative reform ever conducted in Finland. 
Additionally, Parliamentary elections were held on April, 
14. Therefore, part of the explanation for the low interest in 
the European elections is related to the overlap between the 
campaigning for the European elections and ongoing govern-
ment-negotiations between the Social Democrats, the Centre 
Party, the Green League, the Left Alliance and the Swedish 
People´s Party. Thus, instead of campaigning during the 
crucial weeks leading up to the European elections, the most 
influential politicians from these five parties were instead 
sitting behind closed doors in Helsinki. 
Given that the Parliamentary election had just been con-
ducted, with only six weeks separating these two elections, 
the media’s attention only shifted to the European election 
some two weeks before election day. A great deal of the media 
coverage also focused on why it is important to vote in the 
European elections. Alas, given the low turnout, these efforts 
seem to have been in vain. Among policy areas relevant for 
the elections, Finnish media mainly discussed climate change 
and efforts to combat it. This, of course, was the main policy 
theme in most European countries.
As to the election results, the clear winners for the fifth 
straight European elections were the National Coalition Party 
(EPP). All of their three incumbent MEPs managed to renew 
their mandates. The success of the National Coalition Party 
can largely be explained by the facts that their voters usually 
have pro-EU attitudes and regard the EU as an important 
issue. The party that best mobilizes their core voters, a task 
that is arguably the easiest for the NCP, predominantly wins 
European elections in Finland. However, the green wave that 
swept through Europe also reached Finland. This manifested 
itself in the fact that the Green League (Greens-EFA) increased 
their vote share significantly and became the second largest 
party in the European elections (two seats plus the Brexit-se-
at). The success of the Green League can also be explained by 
their very pro-EU supporters and by the fact that they had a 
very strong list of candidates. This list included four incum-
bent MPs, one two-term MEP and a former party-leader. The 
Social Democrats (S&D), which won the Parliamentary elec-
tions, finished third and managed to renew their two manda-
tes. The Finns Party (ECR) also successfully renewed their two 
mandates and slightly increased their vote share, while both 
the Left Alliance (GUE-NGL) and the Swedish People´s Party 
(ALDE) renewed their single mandates despite losing vote 
shares. The only party that lost a seat after the elections were 
the Centre Party (ALDE) whose vote share declined significant-
ly. The poor performance of the Centre Party was also to be 
expected, considering that they suffered a similar defeat in 
the Parliamentary elections. 
Overall, Finland elected seven incumbent and six new 
MEPs, seven of which were females. It is customary in Finland 
that the largest party in the national Parliament picks the 
national EU Commissioner. Because Finland has never had a 
female Commissioner, there are speculations that the next 
Commissioner will probably be either the former party leader 
Jutta Urpilainen or the re-elected MEP Miapetra Kumpu-
la-Natri. According to other post-election speculations, former 
Prime Minister Alexander Stubb (National Coalition Party, 
EPP), is considered a potential compromise choice for the new 
President of the European Commission. 
In conclusion, the European elections of 2019 in Finland 
were overshadowed by an array of preceding political events 
(and an ice-hockey world championship on election night), 
chief among which were the Parliamentary elections. The 
European elections thus, as always, remained in the margin of 
Finnish political attention and the results overall did not alter 
much compared to previous European elections. Nevertheless, 
European politics is set to take the centre stage of Finnish 
politics when Finland take over as hosts of the EU-presidency. 
Finland is thus set to play an important role in setting the 
guidelines for the future of the European Union. Regardless of 
the unexciting elections, thus, interesting times lie ahead for 
Finland and its relation to the EU.
The European elections 2019 in Finland 
– not even a second-order election
Kim Strandberg
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As attention has shifted in recent years onto social media, 
deliberate and sometimes illegal attempts have been made to 
manipulate democratic votes through targeted social media 
propaganda. Since these problems came to widespread public 
attention in 2016, there has been a sustained attempt to 
deal with this problem, whilst maintaining a free and open 
internet:
Platforms such as Facebook changed their rules on politi-
cal advertising to ensure more transparency, and have created 
repositories of advertisements such as Facebook Ad Library. 
They have also sought to change the business environment 
for such advertising, for example by not paying commission 
to ad sales teams for political ads. Facebook and Twitter also 
devote significant resources to spotting ‘inauthentic activity’ 
and ‘platform manipulation’ for example through automated 
‘bots’ and fake accounts, moderating speech that breaches ru-
les on hate, flagging and filtering fake and quality news. And 
platforms are now giving more attention to the sensitive chal-
lenges of responding in real time in elections: for example, in 
France Facebook has permitted the ‘embedding’ of regulators 
in internal ‘war rooms’ during elections.
Parties and campaigns have tightened their procedures 
regarding data use and consent following findings that wi-
despread data breaches had occurred. Following the UK elec-
tions of 2017 almost all parties had paid costly fines for data 
breaches (usually relating to a lack of consent for processing), 
and have introduced new internal procedures for use of data 
for propaganda targeting purposes.
International agencies such as the EU, the Venice 
Commission, the Council of Europe and international election 
monitors also took actions to raise awareness. The European 
Union passed a communication on disinformation, and took 
actions to secure the EU elections, through encouraging best 
practice and self-regulation to deal with the matter, and provi-
ding a platform for information exchange. 
Parliaments and regulators worked to change the regu-
latory environment. Following significant interference in the 
French elections, the French Parliament passed a law on elec-
tion manipulation in December 2018 and the UK government 
published a proposal for legislation on online harms in April 
2019. As regards spending and data the legislative environme-
nt is as yet unchanged.
Did this combination of actions work? 
The EU elections offered an attractive opportunity to 
domestic and foreign actors that may wish to undermine 
democracy in the EU. Whilst the campaign itself was relati-
vely free of specific allegations (compared for example to the 
French elections of 2017), evidence on deliberate disinforma-
tion, spending and privacy breaches, and other social media 
related election manipulation is notoriously difficult to agree 
on and whilst many of the expert groups set up to monitor 
such nefarious practices reported low levels of manipulation 
the election saw allegations of all of these.
Junk News. According to the Oxford Computational 
Propaganda Unit, “Less than 4 per cent of sources circulating 
on Twitter during our data collection period were junk news 
or known Russian sources, with users sharing far more links 
to mainstream news outlets overall (34%), except in the Polish 
sphere, where junk news made up 21 per cent of traffic.” The-
re is a wide range of definitions and methods of measuring 
fake or junk news, and none are fool-proof, but it seems that 
the EU elections were not characterised by the high audiences 
for fake news as were the US elections of 2016 for example.
Platform Manipulation. There is some indication that 
platform attempts to deal with inauthentic accounts (fake 
profiles and bots) are bearing some fruit. Twitter claims to be 
challenging many more accounts at the point of registration, 
and Facebook moderators claim to actively remove accounts. 
However various researchers found an uptick in bot creation 
activity as the campaign developed, and there were indica-
tions that there was an attempt to use bots to boost hatred 
and extremist divisive content.
Data and Finance Breaches. It is too soon to reach a view 
on whether the campaign involved, as was found to be the 
case in 2016-17, significant breaches of campaign finance and 
data protection laws. Spending returns, possible complaints 
and legal challenges will come later. The potential for abuse is 
unchanged because the legislative framework is unchanged, 
but it is likely that regulatory findings and widespread public 
revulsion following data breaches by companies such as Cam-
bridge Analytica may be having a deterrent effect. Data driven 
campaigns are arguably easier to finance in illegal ways 
because spending over the limits and by foreign actors (both 
of which are illegal) are easier to do with complex campaigns 
that involve costly databases and lengthy campaigns.
In conclusion, the regulatory response to the hacking 
of democracy in Europe has been significant, but fragmen-
ted. Because legislation takes a long time to pass, with the 
exception of France, the EU elections have taken place in a 
legislative context that is unchanged in most EU countries. 
System vulnerabilities remain, and the lack of a scandal does 
not indicate that the system as a whole is now robust. The fo-
cus has been on promoting self-regulation and user awareness 
and this approach appears to be paying off. However, as Julian 
King, the EU commissioner for security remarked in a speech 
on ‘securing the EU elections’, such activities can never entire-
ly guarantee the security of any elections. It is the combina-
tion of citizen trust and vigilance with critical digital literacy 
that is the best inoculation against propaganda of any form.
Disinformation, data, manipulation  
and the European elections of 2019
Damian Tambini
Associate Professor






The protection of election campaign against all kinds of fake 
news was one of the main stakes of the EU vote for at least th-
ree reasons. First, with the poll being held across 28 countries, 
it was possible to disseminate false information in the dozens 
of languages used in these nations. This obviously implied 
more difficulties in the operations to secure a healthy social 
media debate. In addition, with about 400 million people 
eligible to vote, the European elections likely represented 
an attractive target for strategic disinformation efforts often 
associated with both radical right movements and Russia. 
The third reason was about the extent to which social media 
giants would step up their engagement in the fight against 
the harmful practice, after showing some signs of good will in 
recent polls such as the midterm in the US. 
          In order to prevent the disruptions of authoritative 
information flow throughout the election campaign, the EU 
set up a plan of action including East Stratcom, a task force in 
charge of monitoring the Russian media as well as detecting 
systematic or independently produced deceptions on social 
media. Furthermore, the social media giants took measures 
to combat the proliferation of fake news on their platforms. 
Facebook for instance created a ‘war room’ in Dublin, where 
about 40 people scrutinized online conversation to identify 
dubious stories or hate speech.  Also, Twitter and Google 
developed easier means to report people spreading disorien-
ting incongruities about how to vote, and made clear to users 
which content was political adverts. Moreover, several news 
media organized themselves in groups with the purpose of 
unmasking fake news and providing the public with authen-
tic facts. One of such was FactcheckEU, gathering 19 media 
from 13 European countries.   
        That notwithstanding, we might want to believe 
that the outcome of all this mobilization was rather modest. 
Though there was little evidence of large-scale strategic 
disinformation attempts, some non-negligible amount of 
falsehoods nevertheless polluted the public sphere. The misle-
ading narratives generally depicted Europe as collapsing, and 
the unreliable EU institutions trying to impose their views to 
the member states. For example, In Belgium it was propaga-
ted that MEPs are useless and bought by the lobbies, while In 
Italy the legacy media were portrayed as liars. In Lithuania, it 
was spread that Europe imposes same sex marriage, whereas 
in Poland, it was circulated that the EU wants to interfere 
in justice. In Austria, it was disseminated that NGOs make 
money from migrants, while in in Bulgaria, it was spread that 
the outer border of Europe is a colander.            
         Assuredly, the dissemination of fake news during the 
EU election campaign, despite the actions taken by various 
actors is a strong indication of how pernicious and complex 
the problem is. It suggests that it will take more than creating 
‘war rooms’ to significantly limit the circulation of fake 
news in times of election campaigns. Facebook CEO, Mark 
Zuckerberg stated recently that there was no magic formula 
to totally eradicate overnight the propagation of fake news on 
his platform. Howbeit, it appears that the social media giant 
is still refraining from taking important decisions, which will 
help substantially reduce the proliferation of disorienting 
absurdities. As a matter of fact, many weeks before the vote, 
the EU commission drew with very little success the attention 
of the social media giants on the necessity of additional tech-
nical improvements and the sharing of methodology and data 
sets for fake accounts. This, in order to enable independent 
experts, fact-checkers, and researchers to effectively assess 
their actions.  In the same vain, the EU commission wondered 
how Google claimed to be committed in fighting fake news 
while up till March 2019, it had not made the much-needed 
progress in defining issue-based advertising. Likewise, Twitter 
could not provide the commission with details on what has 
been done against spams, fake accounts, as well as measures 
to ameliorate the verification of ads placements. 
          That said, it is clear that the fight against fake news 
dissemination on social media and political websites in times 
of election campaigns has progressed during this now ended 
European union parliament election. The combination of 
efforts from decisive actors somehow limited the propagation 
of large-scale false information as it was the case with the 
Brexit vote and Trump’s campaign in 2016. However, there are 
still some noticeable resistances certainly favored by factors 
inherent to the characteristics of the social media. Noneth-
eless more gains in the combat against fake news is possible. 
But for that, the actors concerned must engage fully. For 
instance, it is imperative for the social media giants to step up 
their efforts by adopting a more transparent attitude that will 
enable researchers to independently assess the actions.  








The 2019 European Parliament (EP) Elections have shown 
that social media are an essential battleground for catching 
the hearts and souls of European voters. If compared to the 
2014 elections, the use of social media by EP political parties 
has intensified and modified, mostly because of technological 
developments and sophistications in data management, but 
also because of the increased outreach as result of the rapid 
increase of digitalization in Europe of the past few years. 
How did the main EP political parties use social media 
during these past elections? 
What kind of digital presence did they have and what is 
their strategic use of social media?
The majority of EP parties have a multi-channel social 
media strategy to reach different typologies of citizens. All EP 
parties have a social media presence in Facebook and Twitter, 
followed by YouTube, Instagram and Flicker. The EPP and 
ALDE are the only parties having a specific LinkedIn profile. 
Near to all parties show a certain level of integration of these 
platforms among each other and with the main party website. 
Basic party information is offered across social media, albeit 
information in the “about” page is not consistent across all 
platforms. 
A point to remark is the growing role of visual communi-
cation in political communication, as demonstrated by the 
specific choices for social media platforms.  Instagram, Flicker 
and YouTube, particularly focus on visual contents, pictu-
res, images and videos. These are very popular social media 
platforms among youngsters. Thus, the choice of adding these 
platforms to the mix of digital channels by many EP political 
parties represents an important step for increasing the reach-
out to youngsters during these past elections. 
Overall, there is a good mix of content-based and profile-ba-
sed social media platforms and a good mix of customized 
versus broadcasted media. Content-based social media are 
those platforms where the centre of interest is the content 
posted. Flicker, Instagram and YouTube are good examples of 
content-based social media. Content-based social media are 
particularly relevant to reach out to audiences that have a 
particular interest in a topic that go beyond own constituents 
and party members. Profile-based platforms, such as Facebook 
and Twitter, are those centred around individuals or political 
parties rather than the content per se. While Facebook mostly 
targets party supporters or members, Twitter allows the 
search by content, hence, technically could attract a large 
spectrum of audience interested in specific topics. 
Facebook and Twitter, which are the two social media used 
by all political parties, represent two different ways of com-
municating. Facebook can offer customized messages through 
opportunities to send private messages. Whereas Twitter 
is considered a broadcast platform, because the content is 
public and intended for a general public. Twitter is known 
to be highly relevant to pitch journalists and other relevant 
stakeholders. Facebook is a good example of a platform for 
online political-constituent relationship management in that 
it offers the party members, supporters and enthusiasts an 
online space to receive the most updated information from 
the party. This differentiation is clearly visible in the number 
of followers that each platform has (see table 2).
All parties receiving more followers in Facebook – most 
likely made of members, supporters and sympathisers –, than 
in Twitter.
Despite the great mix of social media platforms, the level 
Social media use by main EU political  
parties during EP elections 2019
Chiara Valentini
Professor of Corporate Communication
Jyväskylä University School  
of Business and Economics 
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Table 2. Main EP parties Facebook and Twitter reach-out and influence as for 04 June 2019*
*these numbers periodically change as users can unfollow/unlike a party’s social media page. 
Source: own elaboration
Facebook Twitter
Party # FB liking # FB followers  # TW following # TW followers
European people's party (EPP) 434,326 433,454 10,800 134,700
Socialists and Democrats in EP (S&D) 396,650 397,030 8,893 111,200
Alliance of liberals and democrats for Europe (ALDE) 206,578 205,773 14,200 80,000
European Green party (Green-EFA) 62,733 64,381 2,215 51,600
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR Group) 82,230 82,397 4,218 35,300
Party of European Left (GUE-NGL) 27,792 28,817 1,011 30,100
Europe of Freedom and Direct democracy (EFDD) 21,805 22,039 99 9,095
European democratic party (PDE/EDP) 22,624 22,711 1261 3,211
European Christian Political Movement 2,441 2,481 266 894
Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom 8,8547 9,553 278 3,348
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of reciprocity, measured on the ratio between followers/ 
following, has been limited for some of these parties. As table 
2 shows, the number of people who liked and are following 
these parties in Facebook varies significantly. Most of the  
parties, at the exclusion of EPP, PES and ALDE are much 
below hundred thousands. Facebook is rather a semi-private 
sphere of conversations for existing political parties’ own 
members and supporters than a place for open political 
discussions across ideologies. Yet, it attracted more followers 
than in Twitter. The number of followers in each party’s  
Twitter account is lower than those of Facebook. Further- 
more, the number of other users’ Twitter accounts that a 
party follows back tends to be substantially low compared to 
the number of followers that a party receives. In other words, 
parties do not seem to reciprocate the mutual interest that 
they receive by other Twitter users, which clearly shows some 
limits in term of how much debate and conversation occurred 
in these Twitter accounts. 
Overall, the usage of social media by EP political parties 
during the past elections shows an increased maturity in the 
strategic thinking, yet the communication approach during 
the elections was less dialogic than could have been. 
The media The media
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The protagonists of this European election campaign in Italy 
were the leaders of the main national parties. At the centre 
of the media scene were primarily the two main ministers 
currently in government: Matteo Salvini (League), the winner 
with 34.3 per cent, and Luigi Di Maio (Five Star Movement), 
clearly defeated with 17 per cent. The systematic opposition 
between the two has allowed them to compete for the role of 
first party in Italy by dominating the media coverage and im-
posing the government’s agenda among the main themes of 
the election campaign. The controversies of domestic politics, 
in fact, have attracted 41 per cent of the coverage in TV infor-
mation programmes and 54 per cent in TV news. The strategy 
of saturation of TV spaces is also that of the first ”telepopu-
list” leader Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia), who, playing the 
role of the ”old wise” Europeanist, has often been in difficulty 
with the ever faster times of the contemporary talk show and 
with the ever more aggressive styles of Italian politics. Giorgia 
Meloni was the unique face of Brothers of Italy, the sovereign 
right-wing party. To challenge Berlusconi in the same political 
space, Meloni diversified her proposal with arguments typical 
of the national identity-based right. Finally, Nicola Zingaretti, 
leader of the Democratic Party, chose a lesser personalised 
media exposure, with the aim of giving a more plural image 
of the party than that offered by his predecessor Matteo 
Renzi. 
The campaign was played out on three interconnected 
levels through the processes of hybridization of digital en-
vironments: the saturation of information and infotainment 
spaces on radio and TV; the rediscovery of the election rally 
as a key moment in the leader’s spectacular and performative 
aim to fuel and influence the media agenda; the intensive use 
of social networks as a hub for the leader’s self-promotion as a 
cognitive short cut to the political offer for voters; and finally 
as a device for the online and offline mobilization of the 
fanbase and supporters. The strategic centrality acquired by 
social networks, on the other hand, is demonstrated first of 
all by the investments in political ads on Facebook: during the 
last month of the campaign, Salvini spent 127,518 € on 56 ads, 
followed by the Democratic Party with 93,264 € on 197 ads. 
Confirming a weak campaign leadership, Zingaretti invested 
only 1,417 € on five ads. Berlusconi was third in the ranking 
with 64,018 € on 343 ads, followed by Five Star Movement 
with 48,293 € on 25 ads, Meloni with 35,624 € on 58 ads and 
Forza Italia with 30,517 € on 22 ads.
Salvini was the most active leader in the digital arena. His 
strategy was a hybrid strategy combining TV appearances 
with a packed programme of rallies, after which he gave 
himself to the public by allowing selfies with fans, who, in 
sharing them became influencers of his political message 
in individual communities. On social networks he had an 
unmatched fanbase in terms of size. On election day, he was 
followed on Facebook by 3,6 million people, while Di Maio 
– leader of a movement born from the web – reached 2,2 
million. Berlusconi and Meloni had over a million followers 
while the leader of the centre-left only reached 270,000. Sal-
vini was the only Italian leader to reach 1,5 million followers 
on Instagram – with Di Maio at 800,000. On Twitter Salvini 
reached 1 million, followed by Meloni with 800,000. The Lea-
gue leader showed the most effective performance in terms of 
engagement during the campaign on all platforms. Consider 
Facebook, which is the most popular, between April 15 and 
May 26, the activation of the fanbase produced a 40 per cent 
increase in engagement on the platform. Much less effective 
at mobilizing were Berlusconi (13 %), Meloni (5.8 %), Zingaretti 
(3.9 %) and Di Maio (1.3 %). A fundamental function to ”push” 
mobilization and activism is content management, i.e. the 
tactical use of messages and issues. Given the self-promotional 
nature of social networks, propaganda constituted the most 
consistent part of the flow, albeit to different extents: 56 per 
cent for Berlusconi and Salvini, 49 per cent for Di Maio, 44 
per cent for Zingaretti and 33 per cent for Meloni. The leaders 
also promoted their thematic priorities through Facebook: 
Di Maio, Zingaretti and Berlusconi focused their communica-
tion on national political life more than Salvini and Meloni, 
who prioritized issue ownership over security (10.5 and 8 % 
of posts) and immigration (8 %). Di Maio’s core themes were 
development and employment (18 %), to which Zingaretti also 
positioned himself as a challenger by placing himself as the 
second national party (18 %). Finally, Berlusconi focused on the 
themes of economy (9 %).
In conclusion, the leaders focused the campaign mainly on 
national issues. Europe was not very present in their commu-
nication on Facebook. Berlusconi was the most ”European”, 
including the subject of Europe at least once in 41.7 per cent 
of his posts. Meloni and Zingaretti showed a degree of Euro-
peanization of their message of 22 per cent, the former in a 
nationalist key, and therefore averse, the latter pro-European. 
Di Maio (7.4 %) and Salvini (4.9 %), respectively Minister of the 
Interior and of Economic Development, were the leaders who 
least emphasized the European question. This situation was 
reflected in their appearances on information talk shows, 
where – with the exception of Berlusconi (28 %) - they talked 
about Europe for less than 20 per cent of the time available. 
Despite the rhetoric widely spread by journalists and political 
actors on the importance of this election for the destiny of 
integration and European institutions, in Italy the real stakes 
were once again the weight of the parties in national politics.
Cristopher Cepernich





Communication strategies of political  
actors in the 2019 European elections in Italy
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Even if politicians sometimes meet voters eye to eye, they 
mostly use different kinds of indirect channels to communi-
cate with the electorate. News media are of course crucial for 
their campaigning, but channels controlled by journalists are 
not the only ways to reach voters. Election posters have been 
around for as long as there has been democracy, press ads 
has a long history and in many countries, television spots are 
crucial for campaigning. The contemporary internet-centered  
media environment gives politicians additional political com-
munication tools, such as websites and social media accounts.
Previous research has given us extensive knowledge on 
news media coverage of the European elections, but we have 
more limited understanding on how European politicians 
choose to campaign; using posters, ads and social media to 
convince their voters. This is why, we decided to create the 
European Election Monitoring Center (EEMC), an internatio-
nal research project led by  University of Roma Tre, funded by 
the European Parliament. The general aims of the EEMC, are: 
• to promote the diffusion of and knowledge about the  
 electoral debate in the European election campaign;
• to improve the transnational circulation of the electoral  
 materials produced in the different nations;
• to allow European citizens to access and compare the  
 different national European campaigns;
• to improve the study and knowledge of European  
 political communication, political cultures, and political 
 history.
To accomplish these goals we needed a large network of 
researchers. In the beginning of the year 2019, we had ac-
complished to find a network comprising of fifty university 
and research centers, with more than a hundred scholars 
and researchers. These scholars have collected and classified 
election posters, press and television ads and Facebook posts 
produced by approximately 300 political parties from all 28 
EU countries during the last 4 weeks of the 2019 campaign. 
We looked at verbal aspects of the campaign content, 
such as if the appeals had a national or European dimension, 
which policy issue the content focused on, if negativity and 
humor was used. Further, we also analyzed visual elements, 
such as facial expressions and dress code of the politicians 
and to what extent political symbols were visible. 
This dataset will give an opportunity to see whether there 
are differences in both campaign content and campaign style 
around Europe and between parties. More than 800 posters 
and almost 500 press ads and television spots of the 2019 elec-
tion campaign have been collected and analyzed. The inquiry 
of Facebook posts is even more extensive, where more than 
8000 different kind of posts has been categorized. 
So what have we found? At the general level, it would be 
better to talk about 28 different election campaigns than one 
European election campaign. Indeed, national factors such as 
different regulations and the persistence of various political 
cultures and traditions have a great influence on the forms 
and content of the European electoral campaign in the diffe-
rent nations. If we should say something about the content of 
the campaign, the tentative results of the collected material 
show that more than one-third do not focus on issues at all, 
but instead of different aspects of the campaign, such as calls 
to vote for a candidate/party or in social media promotion 
for up-coming campaign events. If we focus on how different 
issues have been promoted by the parties, one conclusion is 
that voters around Europe were exposed to quite different 
campaigns dependent on were they live. Europeans living 
in the western och northern parts of the EU saw a lot more 
appeals focusing on environmental issues.  Labor issues and 
to some extent, economy was more prevalent in southern and 
eastern EU. In line with what previous research has found the-
re seems to be no common European public sphere, instead 
can a number of different ones be detected.
Besides the manual coding, we also collected metrics from 
200 Facebook accounts of the political parties. A first glance 
at those results indicate vast differences in party performance 
on social media, where parties in southern Europe and especi-
ally Italy, had a much more intense campaign on social media 
compared to other parts of the EU. Another result is that 
anti-establishment parties all over Europe tend have more 
active Facebook accounts compared with more traditional 
parties.  
On the EEMC website (www.electionsmonitoringcenter.eu) 
one can find extensive interesting information about the 2019 
European election campaign. We have summarized some of 
the results in general reports, but there are also reports from 
the different EU countries. Apart from the analyzed data, one 
can watch more than 10000 documents, posters, spots, press 
ads and social media content, from campaigns all over Euro-
pe. During 2019 and further we will publish a lot more about 
how European politicians campaign for Europe.
Campaigning for Europe - posters, ads and  
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One distinct feature of the 2019 European Parliament 
elections were the campaigns of the pan-European lead 
candidates of several European party groups. These so-called 
“Spitzenkandidaten” were first introduced in the previous 
elections of 2014. Back then, it was hoped that – by personali-
zing the campaigns – European citizens would become more 
aware of the elections and ultimately more mobilized to take 
part in the polls. In 2014, there was no clear evidence that the 
Spitzenkandidaten indeed fulfilled this function. In fact, only 
few citizens could recognize any of the Spitzenkandidaten 
during the campaigns. Nonetheless, one of the past Spitzen-
kandidaten, namely Jean-Claude Juncker, was later nominated 
by the European Council and ultimately elected as Commissi-
on President by the Parliament. 
That is why the European Parliament urged European 
party groups to again nominate pan-European Spitzenkan-
didaten for the 2019 elections. This time, there were seven 
Spitzenkandidaten: the European People’s Party nominated 
the German Manfred Weber, the Social Democrats Dutchman 
Frans Timmermans, the Conservatives the Czech Jan Zahradil, 
and the Greens and the Left each chose a duo of a male and a 
female candidate. The Liberals put forward a team of candida-
tes, comprising among others Guy Verhofstadt from Belgium 
and Margrethe Vestager from Denmark. 
In order for European citizens to take note of the Spitzen-
kandidaten, there has to be sufficient media visibility. So, how 
visible were the candidates? Did the media pay more atten-
tion to them than in 2014? Seeing that the outcome of the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure was still unknown during the 
2014 election campaigns, but eventually led to the selection of 
Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President, journalists may 
have taken the procedure more seriously in 2019 and hence 
may have more frequently reported about the Spitzenkandi-
daten.  
Back in 2014, I conducted a content analysis of each two 
French, Dutch, German, Irish and Italian newspapers over a 
period of ten weeks prior to Election Day. I repeated this con-
tent analysis for the same newspapers and time-span for the 
2019 elections. On the whole, news coverage of the Spitzen-
kandidaten was not significantly more comprehensive in 2019 
compared to 2014. German newspapers paid most attention 
to all Spitzenkandidaten in 2019, followed by the Dutch press, 
which is not surprising because the candidates of the two big-
gest party groups are German and Dutch, respectively. French 
newspapers reported most extensively about the Spitzenkan-
didaten in 2014. This year however, they devoted significantly 
less attention to the Spitzenkandidaten than before. In 2014, 
the German Spitzenkandidat Martin Schulz (Social Democrats) 
received most attention in all newspapers under study, while 
in 2019, the German Manfred Weber was most reported only 
in Germany, Italy and France. Margrethe Vestager was the 
most visible candidate in the Irish press; Frans Timmermans 
unsurprisingly received most attention at home. In short, the 
visibility of the Spitzenkandidaten varied across country and 
there was no significant increase in attention paid to them by 
European newspapers between 2014 and 2019. 
Moreover, three pan-European television debates between 
the Spitzenkandidaten were held in both 2014 and 2019. Two 
of them were livestreamed on the internet; and only the 
debate organised by the European Broadcast Union (EBU) was 
also broadcasted via national television stations. According 
to the EBU, the 2019 debate was broadcasted live in 19 EU 
countries, but not in nine other EU countries (Austria, Hung-
ary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia). However, one problem with pan-European debates 
is language: often, candidate statements have to be translated 
by an interpreter which hinders the audience to get a vivid 
impression of the candidates. Likewise, candidates may come 
across differently – for example, as less confident or less elo-
quent – if they debate in a language that is not their mother 
tongue. Still, these debates provide an important forum for 
citizens to learn about different candidates and their positions 
– if not directly, then at least through further media coverage 
about these debates (provided the media report about them, 
of course). 
It is still too early to say whether the Spitzenkandidaten 
were able to mobilize European citizens this time round; we 
need to systematically analyse data for that. Indeed, turnout 
figures have gone up in many countries compared to the 
previous European elections. But there could be several rea-
sons for this which are not necessarily linked to the Spitzen-
kandidaten. Then again, provisional election results of the 
Dutch Labour party of Frans Timmermans and the Bavarian 
Christian Democrats, for which Manfred Weber was standing, 
indicate that both parties have gained more seats in the Euro-
pean Parliament compared to last time. Even if these outco-
mes could be attributed to the Spitzenkandidaten, this impact 
remains limited to the country or region in which they had 
actually been listed on the ballot. Moreover, national parties 
tend not to campaign extensively with candidates from other 
countries, for example, on election campaign posters. 
Overall, it is unlikely that the Spitzenkandidaten were the 
driving force behind voter turnout and votes for specific party 
groups across Europe. Given that media attention differed 
across country and there was not significantly more news 
coverage about the Spitzenkandidaten compared to 2014, it 
remains to be seen whether European citizens have actually 
become more aware of the candidates during the 2019 elec-
tion campaigns. 
The “Spitzenkandidaten” in the media:  
A comparative perspective
Katjana Gattermann







As the youngest EU member, Croatia elected members to the 
EU parliament for the first time when joining in 2013. Each 
following election saw a turnout increase by some 5 per cent, 
to reach 29.85 per cent in 2019. The last increase probably had 
more to do with the wish for political change at the natio-
nal level than with the success of the campaign to motivate 
voters to participate in the European election. “What cam-
paign?”, most analysts have asked. The overall experience of 
this European election in Croatia brought into stark relief the 
challenge of forging a public connection in a polarized party 
environment with cynical media and voters that top the list of 
news avoiders in Europe. 
Parties focused mostly on national issues, with very few 
exceptions, reaffirming this as a second order election. Only 
several well-established parties mentioned their European 
political family. Political parties and candidates (and the 
media, especially the PSB) missed this opportunity to discuss 
European topics and to inform Croatian citizens about the 
common conversations, concerns and policies developed in 
the European parliament, which will affect them as well. 
No central debates of national candidates were organized, 
only one ‘Spitzenkandidat’ debate was aired (by N1Televi-
sion Zagreb, a cable news channel). N1Television Zagreb had 
the most substantial and systematic daily coverage of the 
election, including expert analyses, candidate interviews, and 
several debates with two competing candidates. Public service 
broadcaster HRT aired free 30-minute slots for each list on its 
TV and radio channels, giving the candidates total editorial 
control – while viewership data was not published, we suspect 
they did not attract a lot of viewers/listeners. The media were 
largely cynical in their coverage of the election (as they are of 
politics and politicians in general outside of election times), 
framing the election as a competition for a well-paid cushy 
job. Political cleavages are reflected especially in the polarized 
on-line media environment. In spite of the fact that legacy 
and online media did cover the campaign, and ads were 
bought and aired on legacy and digital media, the voter in 
Croatia could not make a connection with European Union on 
the basis of how she was informed. 
On top of everything, 56 per cent of on-line news audi-
ences sometimes or often avoid the news, according to the 
Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019. We have shown in 
our earlier studies of audience news habits at the Centre for 
Media and Communication Research, that 41 per cent of the 
audience belongs to a class of traditional users who chiefly 
use legacy media. Croatian citizens include different combina-
tions of media sources and genres in their news repertoires, 
from traditional legacy to digital, local to international, hard 
news to infotainment. Classes of users are differentiated by a 
predominance of traditional or digital/platform based, by the 
versatility of their news diet, by the breadth of the choice, 
from settling for a small number of national media sources to 
those including also local and international news of different 
types. The class of news avoiders (26 per cent, the largest sing-
le group) has the least interest in news and the most limited 
time spent on news use, primarily watches television news 
and reads some newspapers but never goes online in search 
of news. Two of the repertoires completely exclude online 
media and social media as news sources. These citizens also 
have fewer economic and cultural resources, as well as lower 
political interest. 
Our study of media consumption and political participa-
tion, performed outside of election time, shows that media 
in Croatia do not mobilize traditional political participation 
like voting, but only on-line participation; some media use 
– like watching commercial television – is negatively related 
to political participation, confirming the media malaise 
hypothesis. A later study on the 2016 parliamentary election 
in Croatia showed a class of voters who predominantly rely 
on getting their news in interpersonal communication with 
family and friends, instead of the media. These voters parti-
cularly identify with the conservative “Fortress state” policy 
expectations including strengthening of the security of the 
state, protecting against the migrants and refuges, lustration 
of the members of the former communist regime. Whilst a 
significant portion of citizens do not rely primarily on the 
media for their political information, and with television still 
on the top of the media list as a news source, this electorate is 
not yet living in the fourth age of political communication.
The final allocation of the votes was somewhat of a surpri-
se, pointing perhaps to a spiral of silence effect playing out in 
the surveys and in the media coverage. In comparison to the 
outgoing EP, the Croatian election lost EPP one seat (HDZ 4 se-
ats), S&D gained one seat (SDP 3 seats, and will have another 
after Brexit), ALDE lost one seat (Amsterdamska coalition 
1 seat), and the Greens/EFA lost the one they had. The ECR 
group remains with one. Two lost progressive seats go to new 
anti-system populist & protest candidates/parties, who have 
not yet announced their affiliation with EU parliamentary po-
litical groups (Živi zid, and the citizen list of Mislav Kolakušić). 
Looking on the bright side, the populist and radical right-
wing parties did not gain significant support. Croatian voters 
re-elected, with preferential votes, four previous MP’s who did 
a god job. The election was won by center right and center 
left parties who have in the past 30 years taken turns to lead 
government coalitions, reaffirming the middle of the road 
character of the electorate. 
The challenge of building a public connection
Zrinjka Peruško






Three days before the EU election, an opinion poll showed 
that only 55 per cent of the Portuguese voters knew that they 
were addressed to elect members of the European Parliament 
and only 31 per cent were able to tell the name of any of the 
Portuguese MEP’s. This ignorance may help to explain why 
turnout scored as one of the lowest among the EU countries, 
31. 4 per cent compared with an average of 51 per cent in the 
whole of EU. The stronger mobilization of European voters 
didn’t happen in Portugal, where the turnout was roughly 
the same. Apparently, the need to fight the rise of nationalist 
and populist parties was not felt here, and the global results 
of the elections confirm this perspective. The five mainstream 
parties continue to dominate the political landscape and no 
far-right movement has been able to get a significant position 
(the two nationalist parties – one more traditional, another 
just launched – scored together less than 2 per cent of the 
votes). 
The electoral outcome confirms Portugal as an original 
case in Europe: the ruling party (PS - Socialist Party, from the 
social-democrat family) won the elections with 33.4  per cent 
of the votes, when it is common that European elections are 
used to ‘punish’ governments; a government positioned in 
the centre-left (with a parliamentary support from two left 
parties, the PCP - Communist Party and the BE - Left Block) 
continues to show fairly good results and the opposition 
(centre-right and right) had major losses in this election; the 
far-right was almost absent in terms of votes. In one point, 
however, the Portuguese political landscape came closer 
to other EU countries: the increasing importance of green 
parties. The most surprising result in this election in Portugal 
was the rise of the party PAN (“People, Animals, Nature”), 
which had already one seat in the national Parliament but 
now tripled its votes, reaching 5.1 per cent and winning, for 
the first time, a seat in the EP. There is an older Green Party 
in Portugal, but rather irrelevant, since it always lived under 
the influence of the Communist Party, with whom it has a 
permanent coalition. Now, PAN has filled the empty space of 
environmental concerns, such as climate change, sustaina-
ble development or respect towards animals, which opens 
up for good perspectives for its growth in the next national 
elections.
These elections are scheduled for October 6th, and their 
proximity strongly affected the way the electoral campaign 
for the EP was run by all parties. There was a lot of debate to 
find out who was more to blame for the clear devaluation of 
the European issues and the focus on domestic affairs instead: 
the ruling party?, the opposition?, the media? 
The fact is that the Prime Minister himself had a daily 
presence in his party’s campaign, although he was not a can-
didate; the idea of making this election a kind of “first round” 
of the national election in October was clearly assumed 
by the government, who used the hours of political me-
etings, debates and media coverage mostly to emphasize its 
economic and social achievements rather than to talk about 
Europe. The fact is also that the main opposition parties – the 
so-called Social-Democrat Party (PSD) and the Democratic and 
Social Centre (CDS), both belonging to the European family of 
the EPP (European People’s Party) – played this same music, 
focusing the domestic political topics and insisting that the 
European election should mean a no-confidence vote to the 
government. Given the final results it ended up well for the 
government and badly for the opposition.
Still, media coverage was also responsible for the absence 
of European issues during the campaign. In a first moment, 
legacy media (newspapers, radio and television stations) tried 
to bring those issues to public debate, explaining how impor-
tant the EU is, what the Portuguese MEP’s did there, how the 
EP should deal with the new challenges faced by Europe, etc. 
But, as soon as the electoral campaign officially started (two 
weeks before the election), all this gave place to the internal 
political fights. Since television still plays a very important 
role in the Portuguese media reach, all the parties prepared a 
daily event with some appeal, usually on the street and with 
a noisy group of fans around, in order to have their coverage 
by television channels, more interested in anecdotal images 
and soft fait-divers than in political debates. We could say 
politicians did it because of television pressure, but also that 
televisions did it because of politicians’ way of trying to be po-
pular, perhaps with guilt divided by both. One of the biggest 
concerns shared by all participants in the aftermath of the 
elections was precisely the need to re-think the way of doing 
(and covering) electoral campaigns in our modern societies, 
instead of repeating the same old recipes over and over again, 
with an increasingly disinterest by the voters – that is to say, 
the citizens.
Social media had an increasing presence in this landscape, 
and they were important especially for the small parties (a to-
tal of 17 parties applied for the election in Portugal, although 
only six – the five “mainstream parties” and the “green” PAN 
– elected MEP’s). Some of them referred to Facebook as “the 
weapon of the poor”, and their publicity was mostly made 
through the net. It should be noticed that the two parties 
with stronger growth –PAN tripled its votes, and BE doubled 
them – were also the most active in Facebook and Twitter. 
But legacy media, and television in particular, are still very 
important and tend to give much more attention to the bigger 
parties, mainly for market (audience) reasons. In this field, 
things are changing slowly. But they are moving…
Portugal: Politics as usual but with a green touch
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The election to the 14 Danish seats in the European Parli-
ament was held Sunday May 26 2019. Though the official 
campaign commenced May 4, the news media’s coverage 
started several months before. One reason was that a national 
election for the Danish Parliament was predicted for Spring 
2019 as well, potentially crowding the political communica-
tion agenda of both politicians and news media. 
Tuesday May 7, the Danish Prime Minister from the liberal 
party Venstre, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, announced that the na-
tional election would take place ten days after the European 
Parliament Election – Wednesday June 5, the date marking 
the 170th anniversary of the Danish Constitution. Political 
opponents, journalists and pundits had been speculating 
about this date for months with excitement and intensity, 
but also with concerns about the collision with the European 
Parliament Election. Many were worried that the national 
election would distract voter attention from the election 
to the European Parliament, especially among young, new 
voters. In 2014, 56 per cent of eligible Danes voted, and even 
fewer – 39 per cent – among the 19-21-year olds. 
The concern was also that the national election would 
distract the attention of the news media. Not only had both 
news media and the political establishment been in a state of 
permanent campaign for months due to the much-expected 
calling of the national election. European politics is also consi-
dered distant and complex to communicate, whereas national 
political matters fit the news logic better, as they appear 
closer and more relevant to the public. Additional challenges 
were that some candidates ran for both elections and that key 
topics overlapped, especially the overarching climate issue, 
potentially blurring the two campaigns, their candidates – 
and their media coverage. 
These worries were belied in several ways, however. 
Even though the national election did occupy the agenda 
of politicians, voters and journalists, this did not sidestep 
media coverage of and public debate about the European 
Parliament election. In fact, the media coverage was qui-
te extensive. The public service institutions, DR and TV 2, 
showed several documentaries about key European issues and 
live-broadcasted numerous debates with the parties’ main 
candidates. Many news media had themed websites about the 
European Parliament election and offered ‘candidate tests’ to 
help voters decide who to vote for. Some newspapers even 
repealed their paywall, either to all voters or to new voters, to 
provide access to quality information and professional journa-
lism about the elections to as many Danes as possible. 
Not surprisingly, the news media covered the election to 
the European Parliament as, first and foremost, a political issue 
of both international and national significance, focusing on, 
among other things, climate change, immigration, Brexit, na-
tionalism in Hungary, polarization in Italian politics, EP-party 
groups or coalitions, including the emerging alliance between 
the populist parties in the Parliament, the Danish candidates 
running for the election and the viewpoints on Europe of the 
two competing Danish Prime Minister candidates. 
Part of the framing of this coverage was proactive. Several 
newspapers, for example, gave voice to pundits, correspon-
dents, experts, politicians and business elites, encouraging 
the public to use their democratic right and duty to vote, 
also on election day May 26, under headlines such as “Your 
vote counts” (Børsen, May 26 2019), “The Candidates for the 
European Parliament are heroes. The salt of Democracy. This 
election’s anonymous men and women” (Politiken, May 26 
2019) and “The chairman, the ex-general secretary, the entre-
preneur and the expert: This is why you should vote today” 
(Berlingske, May 26 2019). 
The coverage and debates also addressed broader sociocul-
tural issues, such as European identity, cohesion, tolerance, 
polarization and fragmentation, e.g. in newspaper chronicles 
by European experts, lobbyists, EU-politicians and candidates 
running for the Parliament, or in themed series about ordi-
nary European citizens and their views upon the European 
situation. European issues were also present in the cultural 
columns. A main ‘cultural’ news story concerned the Minister 
for Culture, announcing her candidature for the European 
Parliament in Fall 2018. In the months prior to the election, 
the cultural coverage also included reviews and reportages 
about new literature or art exhibitions engaging with Europe-
an topics as well as interviews with experts, critical thinkers 
and intellectuals, commenting on sociocultural transforma-
tions in Europe. A third example was a series of articles about 
cultural policies in EU member states, such as Austria and 
Hungary, asking what happens to culture when right-wing na-
tionalist parties conquer the culture political agenda. In this 
way, broader sociocultural issues, linking to the European Par-
liament election, also became topics in cultural journalism.
From early May to early June 2019, both the European 
and national Parliament elections set the media agenda in 
Denmark, competing for the voters’ attention about European 
as well as national issues – sometimes overlapping, someti-
mes distinct. Broader cultural aspects of the European project 
also engaged the mediated public debates across traditional 
beat-distinctions such as politics, arts and culture. For now, 
we can only speculate about the role of this media coverage in 
terms of voter turnout and patterns. It is a fact, however, that 
more Danes than ever, 66 per cent, voted at the European 
Parliament election 2019 – despite of, or perhaps because of, 
this very crowded political communication agenda.
A crowded political communication agenda:  
The EP election in Danish news media
Nete Nørgaard Kristensen






The European Parliamentary elections held in the Nether-
lands resulted in an unexpected victory of the social-demo-
cratic party PvdA, who obtained six seats (out of 27), while 
both the socialist party SP and the anti-immigrant PVV ended 
up losing all their seats. Newcomer Forum voor Democratie 
obtained three seats, which was less than expected based on 
various polls days before the election. Turnout was considera-
bly higher than five years ago: 41.2 per cent compared to 37.3 
per cent in 2014.
Two Dutch candidates actually functioned as Spitzen-
kandidat for their European party groups. Bas Eickhout for 
the European Green Party and Frans Timmermans for the 
social-democratic PES. The latter is a well-known EU com-
missioner, with a long history in Dutch politics as well and 
received ample coverage in the weeks before the election. The 
success of the social democrats has been partly attributed to 
the ‘Timmermans-effect’.
The most remarkable event during the campaign was 
actually the debate between two national politicians that was 
organized the night before the elections took place and was 
broadcasted by the late-night talk show Pauw at the Dutch 
public television. Framed as the battle between the two 
‘largest’ parties, and seen as a battle between the voices of 
both the ‘pro-European’ and ‘anti-European’ parties, conserva-
tive-liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte (VVD) debated populist 
Thierry Baudet (Forum voor Democratie) on a wide variety of 
topics.
The timing of and excessive media attention for the debate 
received a lot of criticism. Foremost, for presenting the 
election as a two-man (or party) battle between two right-
wing parties. It fits a strong tradition in Dutch politics and 
journalism that tries to bring election campaigns back to the 
question which party will be the largest. Given the extreme 
level of fragmentation of the political landscape – in this case, 
the PvdA received most votes, but still only 18.9 per cent - this 
question is increasingly difficult to answer in advance, and 
has also become less relevant. In national elections, ending up 
the largest party might provide some advantages in coalition 
negotiations, but it does not guarantee a position in govern-
ment. The media logic, focusing on a single winner stemming 
from a fierce ‘battle’ between two opponents is (increasingly) 
at odds with the fundamentals of the Dutch political-institu-
tional setting and electoral landscape. Especially when it co-
mes to public media, this is an issue of serious concern. When 
a key task is to inform a general audience about politics and 
current events, reducing the multi-faceted European election 
campaign to a battle between two right-wing politicians, is 
questionable. The additional wide media attention this debate 
received, mainly in the final week of the campaign, detrac-
ted even further from the issues at stake at the European 
elections.
A second voiced point of criticism was about the fact that 
both participants in this debate did not stand for election the 
next day: it was the Prime Minister debating a Member of 
Parliament. In that sense, the Dutch public broadcaster contri-
buted to the second-orderness of the EP elections. European 
issues did receive attention and a few less prominent debates 
between EP candidates were aired on national television. 
Too often, however, the European Union was presented as 
something one can be ‘in favour’ or ‘against’ – devoting a lot 
of attention to a potential ‘Nexit’, which is favoured by only a 
small minority of the Dutch electorate.
Despite the simplified, domestic focus of the election 
campaign, turnout was higher than before, and voters did 
ultimately not follow the two-party media logic and especi-
ally the election results for Eurosceptic parties were not as 
anticipated. Furthermore, results deviated substantially from 
those of the provincial elections that were held a few months 
earlier – suggesting that voters are able to see the EP elections 
as being inherently different from other elections. This provi-
des some additional legitimization to the elected EP members, 
and to European Union as a whole.
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